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Editors’ Introduction
This issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention, titled “Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention:
Theory, Practice, and the State of the Field,” presents a critical overview of the current state of
Atrocity Prevention around the world. The issue was conceived of in mid-2016 by Douglas IrvinErickson and James P. Finkel, with the hope of responding to two immediate needs in scholarship
and practice. First, we felt, scholars can always benefit from the perspectives of practitioners,
officials, and others with experience working in various bureaucracies—while practitioners and
policy makers could benefit from scholarship that helps them critically reflect on their work.
Secondly, very little research was being conducted on the sudden outburst of energy around the
world (over the past five years) to create national-level government, governmental, and civil-society
institutions (with clear institutional connections to governments) dedicated to the prevention of
genocide and mass atrocities.
Why there has been such little scholarship on these national mechanisms is a matter of
speculation. Perhaps the horrors of mass atrocities and genocide in Syria, South Sudan, Iraq,
Myanmar, and many other places, cast a shadow over these bright spots? Whatever the reason,
the editorial board of GSP felt it was important to try and cast a spotlight on some of the positive
developments around the world in the area of atrocity prevention. Even when the authors in this
special issue feel that the institutions and “mechanisms” they are writing about might be failing to
meet their goals or fulfill their mandates, there is nevertheless a collective sense that hundreds of
millions of people around the world have a stake in the success of these efforts.
How far has the field of genocide and atrocity prevention come in the last decade? Readers
are encouraged to peruse back issues of GSP to get a sense for just how much the state of the field
has evolved—looking especially to the first issue of the journal dedicated exclusively to atrocity
prevention, issue 2.1 published in 2007.1 Now, there are national level mechanisms for atrocity
prevention (or other national-level officially established bodies that include representatives from
different areas of government relevant to the prevention of atrocity crimes) in Argentina, Burundi,
Canada, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Germany, Kenya, Mexico,
Paraguay, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United States, Uganda, and many others. Most of these
national-level mechanism, such as the Ugandan National Committee for Genocide and Atrocity
Prevention, are focused primarily on the prevention of mass atrocities domestically in their own
national communities. Others, like the United States’ Atrocity Prevention Board, are exclusively
concerned with the prevention of mass atrocities outside of the country. Others still, such as the
Swiss national body, integrate both foreign and domestic prevention efforts into their mandate.
There are also many international and regional mechanisms for atrocity prevention, working
in various capacities (and in various directions), including the United Nation’s Office on the
Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, the International Conference on the
Great Lakes Region, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and so forth. Of course,
these institutions and organizations have their own agendas, and are certainly not working
synchronously. In some instances, they even seem to be contradicting each other. Yet, in one way
or another, genocide and atrocity prevention is now part of their mandates.
The authors who responded to our call for papers issued in 2016 represent some of the leading
international scholars in the field. The editors were pleased to see many of the above-mentioned
cases covered in the submissions, and we hope this issue will inspire GSP’s readers to submit
research on those efforts left out of this issue. What makes this issue especially valuable is the profile
of the contributors. Some of the authors consider themselves atrocity prevention practitioners, and
many have years of experience working in government or international organizations.

1

Herb Hirsch, “Editor’s Introduction,” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2, no. 1 (2007), 1-6.

Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Christian Gudehus, Susan Braden, Joann DiGeorgio-Lutz, Lior Zylberman, and Brian Kritz. “Editors’
Introduction” Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 3 (2018): 1-2. ©2018 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1590
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Finally, we would like to thank the guest editor James P. Finkel for working tirelessly with the
authors to produce this issue. We also extend a special thanks to our anonymous peer reviewers
for their considerable efforts.
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Christian Gudehus
Susan Braden
Joann DiGeorgio-Lutz
Lior Zylberman
Brian Kritz
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Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: Introduction to the Special Issue
Most observers who follow US human rights policy and atrocity prevention issues and recall the
fate of Washington’s first effort to systematically foresee and prevent atrocities—the second Clinton
Administration’s Interagency Atrocity Prevention Group led by former Ambassador-at-Large For
War Crimes David Scheffer—probably expected the incoming Trump Administration to quickly
dismantle the Obama era Atrocity Prevention Board and its subordinate units and procedures.
Instead, despite the tumult of the Trump Administration’s first year in office, an Atrocity Prevention
Board has been reconstituted under the auspices of the National Security Council’s International
Organizations and Alliances directorate. The working level Sub-APB has continued to meet,
staffed by a remarkable cadre of civil servants who are determined to ensure that the hard-learned
lessons about what works are not lost, and who are also willing to reconsider approaches that
have proved less promising or simply haven’t worked. To their credit, they seem to be giving
considerable thought to seeking ways to bridge the traditional “regional-functional” divide that
has frequently weakened Washington’s efforts on these questions.1 They also appear to be making
a conscious effort to deepen the dialogue on atrocity prevention with key like-minded states and
international organizations while simultaneously robustly engaging civil society. None of this is a
one-time effort. It requires constant attention, and maintaining momentum is challenging due to
frequent turnover of key staff, resource issues, and sudden shifts of policy decided at much higher
levels of authority.
Meanwhile, as the essays that follow illustrate, atrocity prevention continues to attract attention
from a diverse range of scholars and practitioners, both in the United States and abroad. Samantha
Capicotto and Rob Scharf’s article,“National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes,”
underscores the broad range of approaches to atrocity prevention currently being explored by
different states, particularly in the global south, and the important role that local civil society
is playing. It is hard to read their essay and avoid concluding that, while the mechanisms they
discuss all have their individual challenges, the National Mechanisms are generating some of the
most creative thinking about atrocity prevention that can be found anywhere.
Two of the issue’s articles explore the structures and evolution of atrocity prevention policy
in key like-minded countries, Switzerland and Germany. Giulia Persoz in her “Neutrality: A Tool
or a Limit for Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes and Genocide? The Case of Switzerland” traces the
development of Switzerland’s approach and Bern’s efforts to be pro-active, while simultaneously
continuing to pursue its traditional neutrality. Persoz underscores Swiss creativity and its support
for various regional atrocity prevention forums, which in 2013 gave rise to a new international
network, the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes, or GAAMAC. Persoz describes
GAAMAC as a “platform to exchange best practices” and for helping build state capacities to
develop and implement national preventive strategies. Switzerland chairs the network’s Steering
Committee.
Sarah Brockmeier and Philipp Rotman in “Germany’s Politics and Bureaucracy for Preventing
Atrocities” set out to introduce us to “the political context and recent history of Germany’s
institutional setup for atrocity prevention.” They recount the implications of Germany’s lack of
a strong NGO community focused on atrocity prevention and note that “most of the prominent
or semi-prominent politicians who do support a stronger German leadership role on atrocity
prevention prefer to do so quietly, rather than championing the issue in public and risking to
alienate voters.” Individual studies of various countries’ approaches to atrocity prevention have
been few and far between. Hopefully, journal readers will take up the challenge in the months
ahead to undertake similar research on other key countries including the UK, France, the Nordics,
etc.
1

See James P. Finkel, Atrocity Prevention At The Crossroads: Assessing The President’s Atrocity Prevention Board After Two
Years (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Center for the Prevention of Genocide, 2014);
James P. Finkel, “Moving Beyond The Crossroads: Strengthening the Atrocity Prevention Board,” Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal, 9, no. 2 (2015), 138-147.

James P. Finkel, “Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: Introduction to the Special Issue” Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 3
(2018): 3-5. ©2018 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1589
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Persoz’s and Brockmeier and Rotman’s articles both touch on resources and coordination
as key challenges. Ed Luck, in his “Why the United Nations Underperforms at Preventing Mass
Atrocities” and Ekkehard Strauss in “The UN Secretary General’s Human Rights Up Front
Initiative and the Prevention of Genocide: Impact, Potential, Limitations” highlight those issues as
well. Luck insists that many of the UN’s shortcomings arise from conceptual misunderstandings
and institutional dysfunction along with capacity deficits. He also notes that the UN’s emphasis
on “maintaining impartiality and presence, humanitarian space and access may (sometimes)
entail prioritizing the cultivation of good relations with the very regimes that may be committing
or planning to commit… atrocities against their populations.” He concludes with an important
reminder that we are still very early in the process of learning how to curb atrocities.
In one of the most far-reaching looks at the UN’s Human Rights Up Front Initiative to date,
Strauss traces the evolution of UN thinking about various failures to deal effectively with atrocities,
touching on Bosnia and Rwanda and more recently the Sri Lanka Panel’s report on UN missteps.
He characterizes the Human Rights Up Front Initiative as an internal UN action plan aimed at
introducing “a cultural change within the UN, an operational change to bring the three pillars
of the UN Charter (i.e. development, peace, and security, human rights) closer together, and a
change to UN engagement with its member states.” Strauss stresses that the Initiative is primarily
a prevention tool that “aims to strengthen the link between early-warning and early-action.” It
is based on “a general recognition that human rights violations” can be “an early indicator of a
deteriorating situation and that field presences can observe changing events and discuss them with
their counterparts on the ground.” To my knowledge, human rights has not heretofore figured
prominently in most of the mainstream quantitative modeling efforts that aim to rank countries in
terms of atrocity risk. Intuitively, this has never made sense to me. Regardless of whether the issue
has been a data problem or a modeling issue, I suspect Strauss would agree that finding better
ways to systematically and more dynamically integrate human rights information into our efforts
at early warning of mass atrocities should yield important returns.
David Frank in his “The Reduction of Mass Atrocity Crimes in East Asia: The Evolving
Norms of ASEAN’s Prevention Mechanisms” and Matthew Levinger in “Forging Consensus For
Atrocity Prevention, Assessing the Record of the OSCE” shed renewed light on the value and
importance of norms at a time when so many of what have long been considered established rules
of international relations are being cast in doubt. While highlighting Myanmar’s treatment of its
Rohingya population as a bright red exception, Frank notes the dramatic reduction in the incidence
of mass atrocity crimes in East Asia over the past forty years. He argues that some of the change
can be attributed to such “structural developments” as a decrease in the use of mass atrocities as
a tool of war, rising incomes, and the spread of democracy, but his main focus is on the impact of
the global community’s development of new norms like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and
their surprisingly rapid adoption by ASEAN and its member states. Matthew Levinger’s essay on
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides something of a more
cautionary tale in comparison to Frank’s ASEAN piece. Levinger traces the evolution of the CSCE to
what is now the OSCE along with its rules and institutions. He rightly lauds the accomplishments
attributable to the generally quiet efforts of parts of the organization like the office of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), but notes the impact that the evolution of NATO
and the EU, and most importantly the strained relations between Russia and the US, have had on
the OSCE’s ability to play the type of role that originally was envisaged. He concludes that for
OSCE to get back on track and “play a more robust role in enhancing human security in Eurasia,”
the organization will need to find a way to begin “rebuilding the normative consensus between its
Eastern and Western participating states.”
Finally, in their essay entitled “Improving Intervention Decisions To Prevent Genocide: Less
Muddle, More Structure,” decision scientists Robin Gregory, Michael Harstone, and Paul Slovic
draw on multi-disciplinary research in decision analysis and psychology to offer “a general
approach to assessing genocide prevention decisions” that they believe could provide decision
makers with insight into how to construct more defensible intervention policies, linking proposed
actions to national values in a manner that is both consistent and efficient. The authors readily
concede that no decision-aiding framework can or should “make” the tough choices required of
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the US (or any other) government with respect to interventions intended to reduce the risk of
genocide or other mass atrocities. But they argue (and persuasively, in my view) that adoption of a
clear decision-aiding framework can improve the quality and extent of those deliberations. Surely,
with so many lives potentially at risk, more systematic and thoughtful deliberations are called for.
My thanks to the articles’ authors and the Journal’s editorial board for making this special
issue possible.
James P. Finkel
Bibliography
Finkel, James P. Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing the President’s Atrocity Prevention
Board After Two Years. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Center
for the Prevention of Genocide, 2014.
----------. “Moving Beyond the Crossroads: Strengthening the Atrocity Prevention Board.” Genocide
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National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes
Samantha Capicotto

The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
New York, NY, USA

Rob Scharf

The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
New York, NY, USA

What is a National Mechanism?
National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other Atrocity Crimes are officially
established bodies that include representatives from multiple areas of government relevant to
the prevention of atrocity crimes.1 ” Atrocity crimes” refers to three legally defined crimes under
international law: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.2 National Mechanisms have
been established to lead the development of a coordinated national strategy for the prevention of
such crimes on behalf of their government.
The inclusion of representatives from all relevant areas of the state enables National Mechanisms
to carry out an initial system-wide assessment of strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of
atrocity prevention. Following this assessment, the National Mechanism supports the development
and implementation of the necessary preventive policies to bolster the state’s resilience to atrocity
crimes. National Mechanisms are not intended to be the sole body of government tasked with
thinking about prevention. Instead, they are meant to be the primary body responsible for ensuring
that the entirety of the state is thinking about, and working towards, prevention.
National Mechanisms are vehicles through which states are able to exercise their responsibility
to prevent genocide under their obligations as parties to the United Nations Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as their responsibilities to prevent
atrocity crimes as parties to other relevant international treaties, regional protocols, and as a
product of their own national legislation. There is no single prescribed method for establishing
a National Mechanism. However, a growing number of governments have looked to pre-existing
institutions to incorporate this agenda, while others have chosen to establish new structures with
the sole mandate of atrocity crimes prevention.
With regard to the structure of these bodies, ministries of foreign affairs, justice, defense —
and where they exist, national human rights institutions—are regularly represented. Additionally,
in some countries, ministries of education and national security forces are represented. In Latin
America, national and international civil society organizations often play an advisory and support
role through the provision of technical assistance, capacity building, and output monitoring.
In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, by contrast, a heightened level of civil society engagement
with National Mechanisms has been observed. In this region, representatives of civil society have
membership in the Mechanisms alongside their government colleagues. National Mechanisms
differ from state to state, but four major themes emerge in their mandates and activities:
1.

Risk assessment and early warning, including data gathering and analysis using an
atrocity prevention lens, in order to detect patterns of group vulnerability and to alert
the appropriate authorities so that they are able to take the recommended course of early
action;

1

The information presented in this article is drawn primarily from an annual publication produced by the Auschwitz
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), an international non-governmental organization that works with states
to prevent genocide and other atrocity crimes. Specifics relating to the parameters and activities of the National
Mechanisms are reported by the members of the bodies themselves and aggregated by AIPR to provide a practical
resource for use by practitioners in the field.

2

David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 1, no. 3 (2006).
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2.
3.
4.

7

Development of training programs for civil servants and other relevant actors in society,
which offer preventive approaches and practical tools that are able to be employed at the
local and national levels;
Recommendation and elaboration of policies geared towards the protection of vulnerable
populations from risks of genocide and other atrocity crimes; and
Communication and partnership building with regional and international organizations
on issues related to the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes.3

Across the globe, the majority of active National Mechanisms are at an early stage of development,
capacity building, and work plan implementation. However, each year the Mechanisms engage
more profoundly in targeted preventive programming and policy development, resulting in
the whole-of-government approach to atrocity crimes prevention gaining both momentum and
legitimacy. The following sections detail the work of specific National Mechanisms in the Great
Lakes Region of Africa and Latin America on atrocity crimes prevention.
The Kenyan National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination
History
On March 22, 2012, Kenya’s Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thuita
Mwangi, officially launched the Kenyan National Committee (KNC). The Committee was established
and complies with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Protocol for
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All
Forms of Discrimination, which all founding ICGLR Member States ratified on November 29, 2006.
This Protocol reaffirms the responsibility of Member States to domesticate and operationalize their
duties under international law to combat atrocity crimes. One of the measures under the document
calls for the establishment of a Regional Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination. The
ICGLR Regional Committee subsequently required all ICGLR Member States to establish their
own National Committees to operationalize these duties under both the regional Protocol and
international law.
The launch of the Kenyan National Committee was followed by two days of training on Early
Warning Systems (EWS), facilitated by the UN Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of
Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect (UN OSAPG).
Mandate
The Committee has a mandate to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

3

Regularly review situations at both the national and county levels for the purpose of
preventing genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and all forms of discrimination;
Collect and analyze information related to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and discrimination;
Alert both national and county governments in a timely manner to take urgent measures
to prevent potential atrocity crimes;
Suggest specific measures to effectively fight impunity for these crimes;
Contribute to raising awareness and education on peace and reconciliation through
national and county-level programs;
Recommend policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of the crimes of
genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity to truth, justice and compensation,
as well as their rehabilitation, while taking into account gender-specific issues and
ensuring that gender-sensitive measures are implemented; and

The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other
Atrocity Crimes: Effective and Sustainable Prevention Begins at Home (New York: 2015), 3, accessed December 28, 2017,
http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/AIPR_National_Mech_Booklet_2015.pdf.
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•

Monitor the National Program on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation,
Repatriation and Reinstallation (DDRRR) for former child soldiers, ex-combatants and
combatants.

Structure
The National Committee operates under the guidance of a National Chairperson, who works
in consultation with the Regional Committee, the National Coordinator of the Great Lakes
Region, and other arms of the Kenyan government. The membership of the National Committee
is drawn from governmental departments and non-governmental/civil society organizations.
The Committee’s membership is currently comprised of representatives from: the Ministry of
Provincial Administration and Internal Security, the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and
Constitutional Affairs, the State Law Office, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Kenya Police,
the Office of National Cohesion and Integration Commission, the Kenya National Commission
on Human Rights, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, the Law Society of Kenya, the International
Commission of Jurists, FIDA Kenya, Peace Net Kenya, the Kenya Red Cross, and the National
Coordinator of the Great Lakes Region (the Committee’s coordinator).4
Outputs
Currently, the Committee is moving toward formalization within the Kenyan government and
has drawn up a draft national legal notice seeking to formally institutionalize its mandate within
the state. Although still in an interim period of consolidation, the Committee is already active, in
carrying out its stated mandate under the auspices of the ICGLR. To strengthen the effectiveness of
its operations, the KNC has established subcommittees on: the construction of a National Memorial
for Post-Election Violence, Early Warning, Rules, Resource Mobilization, a national Genocide
Prevention Bill and Policy, as well as the use of punishment as a preventive mechanism. The KNC
has also undertaken training and capacity building initiatives for its members aimed at enhancing
their knowledge and skills surrounding the prevention of atrocity crimes.
Ahead of the general elections held on March 4, 2013, the KNC held a Peace Forum in the
Coast region for County Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners, and community leaders.
Using this precedent, the Committee has held peace fora in hotspots for potential violence around
the country. The KNC also carried out an initiative of public messaging, distributing pamphlets
with peace messaging in Nairobi and other at-risk regions.5 In order to respond to the atrocity
crime risk factors presented by the outbreak of violence following the now-annulled August 2017
election, Committee members are working in the field to mediate disputes and diffuse tensions at
the local level among other preventive efforts.
Previously, the KNC co-organized a capacity building seminar in July of 2015 with AIPR that
focused on the memorialization of violence related to the 2007-2008 electoral process. The seminar
hosted participants from several Kenyan government bodies for training, with the objective of
examining the state of prevention in Kenya and the surrounding region, as well as developing
capacity to plan and implement prevention projects at national and grassroots levels. Additionally,
the KNC participated in the Sixth Regional Committee Meeting and Training of the Regional and
National Committee Members on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War
Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination in the Great Lakes, held in
January of 2015 in Kampala, Uganda. The activity provided ICGLR and state representatives
with a space to share best practices and learn about the latest trends in prevention. The KNC also
participated in an ICGLR Regional Committee Meeting in Congo (Brazzaville) in December of
2015, which focused on the situation in Burundi.
Finally, in February of 2016, the Committee attended a meeting organized by AIPR in
Kampala, Uganda, and also contributed to the GAAMAC II meeting held in Manila, Philippines.
4

AIPR, Effective and Sustainable Prevention, 5.

5

The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other
Atrocity Crimes: Pursuing Institutionalization of the Prevention Agenda (New York: 2017), 6-7, accessed December 28, 2017,
http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-National-Mechanisms-Booklet.pdf.
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In March of 2016, the Committee participated in a workshop held by the Budapest Centre for the
International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, as well as a training seminar conducted
by the Tanzanian National Committee in collaboration with AIPR in Dar es Salaam. Additional
training programs for committee members took place in December of 2016, February and August
of 2017 in collaboration with AIPR. These programs focused on early warning and risk assessment
frameworks and brought in partners from the region including the East African Community to
develop and expand upon current models in place for the period leading up to the general elections
in August 2017.
The Committee also has a number of planned activities, including:
•

•
•

Establishing a memorial, or memorials, such as peace parks in the capital city of Nairobi
and other strategic locations to commemorate past atrocities and promote prevention.
The KNC is collaborating with the government of Argentina on this project, as Argentina
has vast experience in establishing public memorials to commemorate atrocity crimes
committed on their soil.
Spearheading the formulation of genocide prevention policy and legislation.
Further considering ways in which punishment can be used as a mechanism to prevent
future atrocities in collaboration with the Kenyan Judiciary.6

The Tanzania National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination
History
The Tanzanian National Committee (TNC) was established under the auspices of the ICGLR
Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity
and All Forms of Discrimination. Tanzania established their National Committee in February of
2012, making it the first ICGLR Member State to do so.
The government prioritized its establishment of the Committee given the country’s history of
religious tensions and internal land disputes — both recognized as potential flashpoints for future
violence. Another potential spark for conflict stems from the presence, within Tanzanian borders,
of refugees and groups of foreign citizens who oppose foreign governments. For decades, Tanzania
has received refugees from neighboring countries such as Rwanda and has recently mediated peace
talks in Burundi and Rwanda. Moreover, the country has hosted foreign opposition groups from
many countries in southern Africa. According to the Chair of the National Committee, Felistas
Mushi, these risk factors are a by-product of Tanzania’s inclusive culture. As explained by Ms.
Mushi, Tanzanians strive to help fellow citizens and their neighbors build peaceful and tolerant
societies. The requirements maintained by the Protocol, she said, are therefore complementary to
Tanzania’s inherent commitments in this regard.7
Mandate
Tanzania’s National Committee seeks to prevent the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and all forms of discrimination through:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Regularly monitoring situations and processes that could lead to these crimes;
Collecting and analyzing relevant information;
Alerting the government and proper authorities in a timely fashion to undertake
immediate measures to prevent the commission of these types of crimes;
Recommending measures to effectively prevent them;
Fighting impunity for the crimes listed above;

6

The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other
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•
•
•
•

Raising awareness on the processes that enable these crimes and educating others about
prevention to promote the implementation of peace and reconciliation programs;
Recommending policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of these crimes to
truth, justice, compensation, and rehabilitation; and
Carrying out any further tasks the Minister of Justice may entrust to the Committee under
its mandate.

Structure
The Tanzanian Committee is comprised of members of the government, human rights institutions,
civil society, religious institutions, and academia. Government officials from the following
institutions are represented: the Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, which holds the Chair,
the President’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense and National Service, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the
Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, the Attorney General’s Chambers, the
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions,
the State Police Force, the Ministry of Information, Youth, Culture and Sports, the Ministry of
East African Cooperation, and the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance. From
civil society, there is representation from the Centre for Foreign Relations, the Mwalimu Nyerere
Foundation, and the Legal and Human Rights Center. Both Catholic and Muslim communities
have representation on the Committee through the Inter-Religious Council. Finally, the University
of Dar es Salaam and the Legal Aid Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam School of Law
are also members.
The process of selecting members was based on the model provided in the ICGLR’s Rules
of Procedure of the Regional Committee and was also localized according to the Tanzanian
administrative system. The main goal was to draw membership from all key ministries and sectors
dealing with peace and security, either directly or indirectly. Throughout its work, the Committee
invites a broad spectrum of institutions to assist in implementing its operational strategy. For
example, capacity building seminars for members have been conducted in collaboration with
AIPR and other international organizations. The Committee’s operational strategy includes the
development of partnerships and management capacity to enable further cooperative work.
The Committee believes that broad participation and inclusiveness of Tanzania’s citizenry in the
formulation and implementation of preventive policy ensures operational effectiveness.8
Outputs
The Committee has conducted interfaith peace forums and programs involving both civil society
and political leaders, and has developed tailored training and technical assistance programs to
increase capacity in order to carry out its mandate. These training programs have been supported
by international civil society organizations, as well as the UN OSAPG. The first of these trainings
took place in March and October of 2014 and covered such topics as electoral violence, land conflict,
inter-religious tensions, and natural resource-based conflict. More recently, in March of 2016, the
TNC and AIPR co-organized an additional training to:
•
•
•

8

Familiarize participants with the concept of genocide and other atrocity crimes, the
relationship between them, and the processes by which they occur;
Empower participants with the practical competencies (knowledge and skills) necessary
to be able to identify, deter, and limit the impact of genocide and other atrocity crimes; and
Strengthen the capacity of leaders, as shapers of political will, to become agents of atrocity
crime prevention with a heightened degree of sensitivity and awareness to the role of
governmental and non-governmental actors in zones of conflict.

Ibid., 8.
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The main topics discussed during this training were the prevention and management of electoral
violence, early warning and response tools for atrocity crimes prevention, and the construction
of institutional synergies between regional and national mechanisms for prevention. This event
served as the third in a series of capacity building training seminars and has been followed by
additional programming already taking place in 2017.
The success of interfaith peace forums towards building peace and social cohesion in Tanzania
is noteworthy. These forums have covered concrete strategies and opportunities to prevent
genocide in Tanzania as well as the role of religious leaders in peacebuilding. More specifically,
genocide prevention strategies most relevant to the Tanzanian context were identified as:
•
•
•
•

Fostering peaceful cooperation, interactions, and coexistence between different religious
faiths in peacetime;
Encouraging the media to adhere to established professional ethics and act as positive
forces relative to building national unity, social cohesion, and sustainable development;
Building political and governance systems on the principles of transparency, accountability,
and the timely administration of justice; and
Eliminating nepotism, discrimination, and injustice in national institutions.

Finally, the TNC is currently in the process of establishing a National Centre for Conflict Early
Warning and Early Response. The objective of the Centre will be to build an efficient framework for
information sharing and communication, utilizing available technologies among governmental and
nongovernmental actors. The resulting network will include local and national-level representatives
and function with the goal of providing timely advice and policy recommendations for burgeoning
conflicts and threats to peace and security in Tanzania.9
The Uganda National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination
History
Like the Tanzanian and Kenyan National Committees, the Ugandan National Committee (UNC)
was established under, and in compliance with, the ICGLR Protocol for the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination.
The Ugandan National Committee was officially launched on October 15, 2012, in Entebbe, Uganda,
with support from the UN OSAPG. A preliminary one-day training was held for members of the
Committee to coincide with the launch, at which time a six-month work plan was developed. The
plan addressed the unique challenges facing Uganda — a country where the process of genocide
has unfolded in the past and where the risk of atrocity crimes remains.
Mandate
Uganda’s National Committee seeks to prevent the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and all forms of discrimination by:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

9

Regularly monitoring situations and processes that could lead to these crimes;
Collecting and analyzing relevant information;
Alerting the government and proper authorities in a timely fashion to undertake immediate
measures to prevent the commission of the above crimes;
Recommending measures to effectively prevent these types of crimes;
Fighting against impunity for the above crimes;
Raising awareness and providing education on the processes that enable these crimes to
promote the implementation of peace and reconciliation programs;
Recommending policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of these crimes to
truth, justice, compensation, and rehabilitation; and

AIPR, Pursuing Institutionalization, 8.
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•

Carrying out any further tasks the Minister of Justice may entrust to the Committee under
its mandate.

Structure
Unlike others in the region, the Ugandan National Committee features a member of civil society
as its chairperson. While all national committees in the Great Lakes Region include a significant
number of non-governmental experts and practitioners, this structure is unique to Uganda.
The UNC is comprised of the Chair and Secretary, a Treasurer, who represents academia and
the legal community, and a representative from the Human Rights Commission of Uganda as
the Communications Director. Additional members include representatives from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Gender, the
Uganda People’s Defense Force, and other civil society organizations.10
Outputs
In August 2014, the UNC engaged in community-level consultative and mediation meetings
to address tensions in Western Uganda. This led to the diffusion of violent escalations and has
served as a model for further peace talks and mediation techniques undertaken by the Committee.
In 2015, the Committee completed an initial assessment of national strengths and weaknesses
from the perspective of atrocity prevention. The main policy gap that was discovered concerned
domestic legislation for atrocity crimes. The Committee subsequently forged a partnership with a
group of parliamentarians to draft a bill defining punishment for the crime of genocide as well as
institutionalizing the UNC within the state apparatus. The “Genocide Bill”, as it is most commonly
called, was introduced on the floor of parliament and was referred to a select committee. The UNC
is working to support the passage of the bill into law over the coming parliamentary sessions,
which will give Uganda a domestic legal framework for the National Committee and its mandate.
Later, in December of 2015, the Committee led a training session, held in collaboration with
AIPR, for various members of the National Committees in the ICGLR region. The primary objectives
of the seminar were to provide background information on past experiences and to address new
challenges and lessons learned on thematic issues involving the work of National Committees in
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. It also worked to provide state leaders and National Mechanisms
with policy and programmatic recommendations towards further institutionalization and increased
sustainability of efforts for the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes. Members of the
Ugandan Committee also participated in the March 2016 training in Tanzania, described in the
previous section. During the workshop, Ugandan representatives proposed initiatives for the
translation of existing human rights documents and legislation into local languages as well as
classroom and extracurricular programs for youth on the prevention of paramilitary mobilization.
Paramilitary mobilization remains an ongoing problem and one to which the Committee has
devoted much of its work. Unfortunately, the successful and complete implementation of these
programs is still pending the availability of resources.11
The Commission for International Humanitarian Law of Costa Rica (La Comisión
Costarricense de Derecho Internacional Humanitario - CCDIH)
History
The Costa Rican government has looked to the existing body of the CCDIH to manage the state’s
agenda of atrocity crimes prevention. The Commission was created by an Executive Order in 2004
as an inter-ministerial/inter-departmental body with an advisory role to the Executive branch of the
government. The CCDIH is also mandated to implement International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
and propagate its dissemination. The Commission is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Culture, and is the only inter-ministerial mechanism in Costa Rica with a mandate and competency
in issue areas pertaining to atrocity crimes prevention.

10
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Mandate
The mandate of the CCDIH concerning IHL is drawn from Costa Rica’s commitments in this area,
as party to various international treaties, regional agreements, and national regulatory legislation.
As the CCDIH performs an advisory role on matters of compliance with relevant legal obligations
and assists in the implementation and dissemination of regulations, it is, therefore, well suited to
operationalize the agenda of atrocity crimes prevention, considering that the field of IHL holds
many tools for prevention. Specifically, the CCDIH has a mandate to carry out the following
functions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Make recommendations to the Executive on measures to be taken towards the
implementation of international legal provisions in force relevant to International
Humanitarian Law;
Advise the Executive in the drafting of bills and regulations to ensure Costa Rica meets its
international obligations in the field of International Humanitarian Law;
Promote, encourage and support the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law in
the institutions of the state and society in general, as well as taking appropriate action to
this end;
Attend meetings, seminars, and conferences related to International Humanitarian Law,
with the nomination of the Executive;
Promote and collaborate with the academic authorities of the country for the incorporation
of International Humanitarian Law in educational curricula; and
Suggest actions to contribute to the implementation and enforcement of international
humanitarian law.

Structure
The Commission consists of three subcommittees, which manage various aspects of the body’s
work. They are a) Rules/Standards, b) Outreach and Education, and c) Protection of Cultural
Property. The Commission includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education,
the Ministry of Justice and Peace, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of the Presidency,
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Culture and Youth, the Attorney General’s Office, the
Judiciary, the Legislature, the Office of the Ombudsman, the University of Costa Rica, the National
University, the National Council of Rectors, the Costa Rica Red Cross, and the Bar Association
of Costa Rica. Thus, the CCDIH’s membership exemplifies a whole of government approach
in addition to including membership from other sectors, such as academia and civil society,
which are extremely important to the development and implementation of effective preventive
policy within the country. Furthermore, the efforts of Costa Rica in this area demonstrate that a
government does not need to establish a new body to act as a National Mechanism, but instead can
pursue this agenda through an existing mechanism that includes the necessary characteristics and
competencies.
Outputs
The CCDIH has produced a number of outputs that contribute to the prevention of atrocity crimes
in Costa Rica. Firstly, under the impetus of the Subcommittee on Rules and Standards, the Costa
Rican Legislature has begun the process of incorporating protections for individuals and property
under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) into the National Penal Code. Specifically, the
drafted bill pertains to “Offenses Against Human Rights” and “Crimes Against Persons or Property
Protected by International Humanitarian Law.” The bill is awaiting discussion and debate during
an upcoming plenary session of the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly.
Additionally, the Commission is currently working to address the status of the implementation
of current international law into the National Penal Code as it pertains to the prevention of
genocide. At this time, the crime of genocide is stipulated in Article 375 of the National Penal
Code, however, according to the Commission, the stated law fails to fully meet the current
international standards on atrocity crimes, particularly with regards to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, of which Costa Rica is a signatory. Therefore, the Commission is
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recommending that Article 375 be amended to include specific and systematic acts of torture
and forced disappearance, whether committed within the context of an armed conflict or outside
of one.
Regarding its mandate to disseminate IHL, there are a number of activities the Commission
has highlighted within the framework of its tenth anniversary, specifically pertaining to its work
with state institutions and civil society. The CCDIH has been involved in the development of
training programs for various actors from these sectors, including those from state security forces
and legislative bodies. Additionally, the CCDIH organized a series of workshops to prepare for the
XXXII International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which was held from December
8-10, 2015 in Geneva, Switzerland. The first workshop, held on March 4, 2015, consisted of an
introduction to IHL at the headquarters of the Bar Association of Costa Rica, with participation
from civil society and legal professionals. Drawing on its mandate for collaboration with academic
authorities, the CCDIH has recently established partnerships with the National University of Costa
Rica and its Faculty of Law, which led to the initiation of a series of activities with the Commission,
beginning in 2017.
Beyond these outputs, the Commission has been very active in communicating with the
general public on issues concerning IHL and, by extension, the prevention of atrocity crimes. It has
participated in various radio programs, such as Radio Universidad de Costa Rica, to speak about
these topics and their importance in the lives of civilians. The CCDIH also sponsored the Race of
the Red Cross in Costa Rica, which welcomed the participation of over 3,000 runners and carried
messages related to IHL and the prevention of atrocity crimes.
The CCDIH also played an important role in the organization of the 2014 Global Action
Against Mass Atrocity Crimes meeting held in San Jose. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed
the program, in coordination with the governments of Denmark, Argentina, Switzerland and
Tanzania. The event looked to bring together representatives from government and civil society
around the world who serve as focal points for atrocity crimes prevention.
Finally, members of the CCDIH have participated in multiple training seminars held by AIPR
in conjunction with Costa Rica’s membership –through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs– in the Latin
American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. As a result, these participants are
now able to organize training modules on topics related to genocide prevention for the members
of the CCDIH. The last session, which took place on August 5, 2016, was called “Social Identity
and the Creation of ‘the Other’” (Identidad Social y la Creación del Otro), and was inspired by
AIPR’s curriculum for the Latin American edition of the Raphael Lemkin Seminar for Genocide
Prevention.12
Other Emerging Mechanisms
Argentina
The government of Argentina is currently in the process of developing its National Mechanism for
the Prevention of Genocide. The motivation for the creation of this inter-ministerial Mechanism
comes from its national human rights policy, which has been in development since 2003. The
establishment of a National Mechanism is complementary to a number of existing initiatives on
fundamental human rights related to memory, truth, and justice that were launched in light of the
country’s civil-military dictatorship of 1976-1983.
In this sense, the National Mechanism is an essential institutional tool in the pursuit of higher
levels of effectiveness in the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities and is consistent with
Argentina’s active membership in the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity
Prevention. The impetus for establishing a National Mechanism is also derived from Argentina’s
responsibility as a party to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. In this context, the Mechanism will serve as a tool for the domestication and
operationalization of international law. Official authorization of the Mechanism will be provided
through a Presidential Decree, which, as of the date of publication, is awaiting signature by the
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President.
The Argentinian National Mechanism has been designed as an inter-ministerial body with
a well-defined framework for governmental and non-governmental actors playing a joint role in
matters related to the prevention of atrocity crimes. In accordance with the Presidential Decree, the
responsibilities of the Mechanism will include:
•

•

•

Risk detection and early warning, including the development of procedures for the
circulation and exchange of information within the government and to interested external
parties, including civil society organizations and academic institutions, on various cases
and situations posing a possible risk of atrocity. This also provides for the development of
a standardized evaluation process for the data gathered.
Systemic prevention and awareness, including the implementation of seminars and
trainings on topics related to human rights, international humanitarian law, transitional
justice, and other related topics under the prevention umbrella. This also provides for
the implementation of standardized training curricula on anti-discrimination and atrocity
prevention for public academic institutions, as well as institutions training civil servants.
Lastly, it entails the development of an evaluation process for content in the media and
mass communications.
Collaboration and information exchange, including the establishment of procedural
mechanisms for data processing and communications with the United Nations, as well
as regional organizations, such as the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass
Atrocity Prevention.

The agencies that will participate in the National Mechanism and form its Coordinating Committee
are the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Worship, Justice and Human Rights, Education,
Public Communications, and Institutional Reform and Democracy Building, as well as the
Director of the Ministerial Cabinet, and the National Institute for the Prevention of Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Racism. The Mechanism will also include a Committee for Genocide Prevention,
which serves as a space for exchange with civil society organizations that are accredited by the
Committee. Additionally, a Federal Network for Genocide Prevention will be established under
the auspices of the National Mechanism, and will assist in developing the capacity of the Federal
Government to coordinate prevention policy with provincial authorities.
As of the date of this publication, the nascent National Mechanism has only had preparatory
meetings. However, the development of internal procedures is currently underway. The next step
in the process will be the coordination of a National Action Plan for genocide prevention, which will
be approved and put into place once the Presidential Decree has been signed and an assessment of
the strengths and weaknesses of the current prevention policy framework has been conducted.13
Paraguay
The Truth, Justice and Reparation Directorate General of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay — both Focal Points of the Latin American Network for
Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention — have developed a bill to create a National Commission
on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. The National Commission will facilitate
interagency coordination among the various state agencies that have authority with respect to
the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities. The establishment of the Commission is
supported by Paraguay’s responsibilities derived from international law under the framework
of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
To this end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the focal point for the domestication of the
Convention.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Directorate for Truth, Justice and Reparations
within the Office of the Ombudsman will chair the National Commission. The Commission shall
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consist of a primary and alternate representative from the following institutions: the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice,
the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of National Defense, the Judiciary, the Public
Prosecutor, the Departments of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, Congress, and the
State Police. The Commission reserves the right to call upon other institutions to join, should their
membership become necessary.
The Congressional approval process for the bill creating the National Mechanism is currently
underway, having been submitted for official consideration by six Senators. The prospective
Commission is engaging with AIPR to develop capacity building programs, which will provide
training to the body’s members in order to assist in effectively carrying out its mandate.14
Common Challenges and Innovative Solutions
A number of the National Mechanisms featured in this article have existed in various forms for
several years, and so it is appropriate to discuss some of the challenges that they are facing in
effectively carrying out their mandates and highlight some of the innovative solutions they have
developed to meet these obstacles head-on. Despite the varying geographical landscapes and
even more diverse political and social narratives, a number of the challenges faced by National
Mechanisms exhibit common themes.
States establishing new bodies often face difficulties in formally integrating the nascent
Mechanism into the national government, such that it becomes an official body with resources
allocated towards its mandate. This has been the experience of the Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian
National Committees, as well as the emerging Mechanisms in both Argentina and Paraguay. Each
of these bodies is still waiting for proper legal integration through the necessary bureaucratic
processes of their legislatures. Without this formalization, it remains very difficult for members to
receive official leave from their primary professional duties to carry out programming and activities
convened by the Mechanisms. Additionally, without proper funding allocated by their respective
national legislature, the Mechanisms are obliged to seek resources from outside organizations in
order to carry out their activities, which is not a sustainable practice.
While this lack of resources has continually proven to be among the most challenging obstacles
to overcome, the Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Kenyan National Committees have been successful
in employing outside funding to carry out a diverse array of programming. This includes the
successful execution of a variety of training seminars, memorialization projects, and early warning
activities, all while concurrently working towards formal institutionalization. As Felistas Mushi,
Chairwoman of the Tanzanian National Committee, explains:
Our biggest strength as a Committee is our individual and collective commitment to
prevention work. Despite all the challenges, the Committee has been able to accomplish what
we have thus far because of this commitment, which has given us a great deal of credibility.15

Conclusions and Lessons Learned
In reviewing the outputs and activities of existing National Mechanisms for the Prevention of
Genocide and other Atrocity Crimes, a small collection of lessons learned should be highlighted.
Perhaps the most important of these lessons is that a National Mechanism does not necessarily need
to be formally integrated into the central government to begin carrying out its stated mandate. We
have seen this in the experiences of the Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian National Committees,
as well as the nascent National Mechanisms in Argentina and Paraguay. In the same vein, a
Mechanism also does not necessarily require its own resources to hold effective programming such
as trainings, peace forums, and other meetings at the outset. Collaboration with outside partners,
whether through regional bodies or international civil society organizations, foundations, or
donor governments, has proven to be an effective method for gathering the requisite resources and
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expertise to hold programming under their stated mandates in the initial stages of their work plan.
Additionally, the role that National Mechanisms play in the gathering and assessment of
information has not been significantly constrained by a lack of formal institutionalization. As long
as the members representing the various apparatuses of the national government and other sectors
of society are present and committed to the mandate, in many cases information has continued
to flow. This information has been utilized to issue formal policy recommendations to the proper
authorities, often providing crucial early warning for potential crises.
That being said, it is also clear from discussions held between AIPR and members of the National
Mechanisms that the long-term sustainability of these bodies, as well as their general effectiveness
over the coming years through administration changes and shifting political contexts, depends
heavily on their formal institutionalization into governmental structures and the allocation of
budgetary resources that follows. Therefore, its long-term importance cannot be understated. This
is why each of the Mechanisms has prioritized the active pursuit of institutionalization alongside
their ongoing activities.
Based on the collective experiences of existing bodies, the following considerations are
important in the establishment of new National Mechanisms:
Mandate: The establishment of a National Mechanism often requires that a national
government take a strong policy position on atrocity prevention as a national priority.
This will not only aid in the inception of a new Mechanism, but also allow for the future
actions of the body to be framed as part of this national-level policy. In the case of
the African Great Lakes Region, the 2006 Protocol that mandated the establishment of
a regional committee and individual national committees continues to constitute the
main point of departure.
Membership: What areas of government should be represented, and why?
Comprehensive membership confers many benefits and extends beyond government.
Civil society organizations are also seen to be key partners in an effective prevention
agenda, occupying both formal advisory roles and participating directly alongside
governmental members of a National Mechanism.
Structure: It is important include both horizontal and a vertical considerations.
Horizontally, all relevant departments must be included. Vertically, Mechanisms can
often produce policies that would require implementation by agents within the nationallevel administration, as well as those from regional and local power structures. While
this may be clearer in federated states, it is not exclusive to them.
Goal: It is important to emphasize that the objective of these mechanisms is the design
of unified national policies for the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes.
Inherent in this is an emphasis on “upstream” prevention, meaning that National
Mechanisms aim to address the steps leading up to violence, taking measures to halt
these processes before we see any resulting casualties.
Function: National Mechanisms are established to carry out two main functions. The
first of which is to carry out a system-wide assessment of strengths and weaknesses
from the perspective of atrocity prevention. Ideally, the results of the assessment
should lead the discussion on further functions of the mechanism. Secondly, they are
established to support the design, implementation, and coordination of national policies
for prevention.
Outputs: In order to maintain institutional momentum and demonstrate efficacy, there
is a need to realize concrete achievements. These most often include trainings, published
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national strategies, inter-ministerial forums, and a variety of other programs or policy
recommendations. The National Mechanism needs to display value added to ensure its
sustainability.
Impact: Ideally, the process of establishment should build in a system of impact
evaluation. The National Mechanism should also be flexible in amending its work plan
in order to take the results of any evaluation into account.
Budget: National Mechanisms can rely on international assistance in the short term,
but they must quickly become self-sustaining, which requires inclusion in the national
budget. This step constitutes a true indication of the priority that a national government
gives to the establishment of a National Mechanism.16
These lessons are important to note for countries working to establish their own National Mechanisms
within the particular context of their governmental structure and the societal conditions concerning
atrocity crimes prevention. Genocide and other atrocity crimes are complex social problems that
must be addressed effectively by the societal collective as a whole. Thus, it follows that the state
must employ a whole of government approach to the prevention of such crimes, bringing in those
representatives who have responsibilities concerning prevention to the planning table, as well as
non-state actors who play a key role in prevention policy implementation.
In Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide, James Waller notes the
importance of National Mechanisms in the upstream prevention of atrocity crimes. To mitigate risk
factors for atrocity associated with governance, conflict history, economic conditions, and social
cohesion, he finds that “initiatives that are highly responsive to the unique internal dynamics of
the society are crucial in building a state’s resilience, reducing its susceptibility to genocide and,
ultimately, reinforcing a state’s sovereignty.”17 He follows this by citing the work of a number
of National Mechanisms featured in this article as examples of effective frameworks for civilian
protection. Bridget Moix has asserted that:
…Turning genocide prevention inside-out to focus first on supporting and strengthening
local capacities for peace within a society, linking them more effectively with regional and
global backup response systems, would not only save lives, it would also be significantly less
expensive and less damaging, and holds greater promise for finally closing the prevention
gap so often debated.18

The work of National Mechanisms represents a more community-based or localized approach to
atrocity prevention, inclusive of both state and non-state actors within society. Moix points to various
examples of what she calls “local peace agency,”19which provides important opportunities to the
field of genocide prevention, challenging the dominant assumptions about external interventions.
She goes on to explain that such localized approaches my help “re-orient our theory and practice
in ways that can help [us] move upstream to earlier prevention, break repeating cycles of violence,
and ensure more sustainable recovery and reconciliation processes over the long-term.”20
This growing understanding within the field, one that supports local solutions to local problems
and involves both state and non-state stakeholders in the development of prevention strategies, is
reflected in the emergence of National Mechanisms and has manifested in their programming and
16
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activities. The proliferation of these bodies in states around the world lends itself to the notion
that National Mechanisms represent an inclusive approach to atrocity prevention that has had a
positive impact on our field and will continue to do so.
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Germany has accepted the unique responsibility arising from its history. The avoidance of
war and violence in international relations, the prevention of genocide and severe violations
of human rights, and the defence of endangered minorities and the victims of oppression
and persecution are integral to Germany’s reason of state.1

As of June 2017, this is official German government policy, adopted by the federal cabinet as the
highest executive organ in its “Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building
Peace.” Compared to earlier policy documents, the ambition is expressed more strongly than
ever: raison d’état, or reason of state, is vernacular usually reserved for Germany’s unwavering
commitment to the survival of the state of Israel.
The statement quoted above must be seen in the context of Germany’s broader coming of age in
matters of international leadership. It does not describe the emphasis on preventing genocide and
mass atrocities in current policy. Interpreting this aspiration and its prospects for shaping future
policy requires substantial background on the past and present of Germany’s political debates
and bureaucratic infrastructure on crisis prevention, atrocity prevention, and responsibility to
protect.
This paper consists of two main sections. The first introduces the political context and recent
history of Germany’s institutional setup for atrocity prevention. The second describes this setup
and explains its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the key challenges to be addressed in order to
live up to the aspiration of making more effective contributions to the prevention of genocide and
other atrocities. We conclude with an outlook on Germany’s contributions to atrocity prevention
in the next few years.
Context: Debates on Prevention and Intervention in Germany
Atrocity prevention as a distinct category in German political debates is fairly new and still rarely
used. Over the past 15 years, the issues that were discussed in the US as atrocity prevention were
linked either to the responsibility to protect (R2P) or to conflict prevention, which is referred to as
“crisis prevention” in the German debate.2 Part of the reason for this is evident in the language.
There is no consistent, agreed-upon phrase for “mass atrocities” in German. However, the two
debates about R2P and conflict prevention have been almost completely disconnected from one
another: the R2P debate is tainted by its association with military intervention, while the conflict
prevention debate is shaped by an emphasis on long-term, structural peacebuilding with civilian
means. Accordingly, atrocity prevention is almost never treated as a category in itself, and there is
little awareness of the differences between conflict and atrocity prevention.3
“Never Again What?” Contradicting Historical Lessons at the Center of the Prevention Debate
Key to comprehending German views on all three categories – R2P, conflict prevention and atrocity
prevention – is understanding the societal and historical debates in Germany on these topics. This
1
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is linked to Germany’s own history and the Holocaust, but also the history of the peace movement
and its role in shaping the internationalist left. The distinct meaning and use of the pivotal term
“never again” in Germany illustrates a key difference to the United States.
In the US, genocide prevention advocates, Holocaust survivors, and high-ranking politicians
regularly draw comparisons between the Holocaust and mass atrocities in Rwanda, Srebrenica,
Darfur or Syria.4 Historical responsibility, in that interpretation, includes not only remembering
the past but also fighting mass atrocities today.
In Germany, the phrase “never again” is used in two ways. First, to refer to “never again war,”
the conclusion drawn from the responsibility for two World Wars that expresses the core of the
pacifist streak in mainstream German society. Second, where “never again” is used in reference
to the Holocaust (“never again Auschwitz”), it is usually interpreted as a responsibility to prevent
right-wing ideology, racism, and fascism in Germany. When, in 1999, then-foreign minister
Joschka Fischer used “never again Auschwitz” to mobilize support for the military intervention
in Kosovo, he was heavily criticized for abusing the phrase and diminishing the singularity of
the Holocaust. Since then, politicians hardly ever make such connections. In the German peace
movement, including significant parts of the foreign policy community from the left of the political
spectrum, the Kosovo intervention is still hugely controversial.
In 2001, the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty that developed
the idea of a responsibility to protect actually had a prominent German member. Klaus Naumann
had recently retired as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and previously served as the
Inspector-General, effectively the Chief of Staff, of the German Bundeswehr. Known as a passionate
advocate for muscular intervention in the Balkans, Naumann was put in charge of the chapter
on military options by the Commission. The German government, however, did everything to
ignore that Naumann existed: the defense department refused to meet or even reply to his requests
for guidance, and the Foreign Office directed him to junior officials who received his occasional
reports about the proceedings but refused to provide him with any insight into the considerations
of the government on the matter.5
It took a whole decade, as well as a controversial German vote in the UN Security Council,
to bring the R2P debate home. Beginning in 2005, when the UN General Assembly endorsed a
version of R2P, German policymakers treated the concept as a legal norm in the making that
required German support at the level of the European Union and the United Nations, mostly
in the sense of including the words “responsibility to protect” in statements and resolutions.6
In 2011, Germany’s controversial abstention on a resolution authorizing an intervention in
Libya triggered the first genuinely public debate on R2P in Germany.7 Mainstream newspapers
published editorials on R2P’s origin and purpose, and parties in the Bundestag voiced their support
for R2P in party motions. In this context, German policymakers began to see R2P as not only
international law in the making, but also a moral principle and a practical commitment that needs
operationalization.
The dominant links to Kosovo and Libya, however, exemplify the bias in the public perception
of atrocity prevention in Germany. To this day, every debate about preventing or stopping atrocities
gets short-circuited into a debate about military intervention. Whatever the political decision,
whether Germany refuses to employ military force, as in Libya, or whether it breaks a longstanding
taboo and delivers military assistance, as in Iraq in 2014, as soon as the military question is settled,
the debate ends. How best to use and equip German armed forces for such interventions, or which
other diplomatic, economic, or judicial tools the German government has at its disposal, is hardly
ever subject to public or even expert discussion.

4

See, for example, Elie Wiesel, “Genocide Prevention Initiative Launch” (speech, Washington, DC, April 23, 2012), United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xTGJxYp76w.

5

Interviews with former German policymakers, Berlin, Summer 2013.

6

Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz, and Julian Junk, “Emerging Norm and Rhetorical Tool: Europe and a Responsibility to
Protect,” Conflict, Security and Development 14, no. 4 (2014), 448-449.

7

Sarah Brockmeier, “Germany and the Intervention in Libya,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 6 (2013), 63-90.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

22

Brockmeier & Rotmann

Little Civil Society and Political Pressure
The open public dispute over Germany’s lessons from history may also partly explain why
the German public and civil society advocacy are relatively listless and lackluster on atrocity
prevention. Whereas US reforms on atrocity prevention have been significantly driven by civil
society mobilization, there is no comparable NGO infrastructure devoted to the issue in Germany.
Most internationalist civil society organizations, including religious and human rights groups,
build on an anti-imperialist, often pacifist tradition of opposing American interventions during
the Cold War and beyond. They advocate for human rights and peace in general, but hardly any of
them work on atrocity prevention specifically. Instead of embracing R2P as an advocacy tool, most
of them see the principle primarily as a back-door attempt to legitimize military adventures. There
are very few exceptions: Genocide Alert, Crisis Action, Human Rights Watch Germany, and the
Society for Threatened Peoples are the main groups.8 In contrast to the US, Germany does not have
large-scale advocacy campaigns pressuring the government to take action on particular country
cases or to improve its atrocity prevention tools.
All of this makes atrocity prevention an unattractive and even difficult issue for political
leaders to support. Most of the prominent or semi-prominent politicians who do support a stronger
German leadership role on atrocity prevention prefer to do so quietly, rather than championing the
issue in public and risking to alienate voters.
In the European Union as a whole, dynamics are similar. Although a large number of groups are
committed to peace and human rights, the topic of atrocity prevention does not play a substantial
role in major human rights organizations.9 There are also fewer political entrepreneurs, such as
Samantha Power, who alternate between civil society and bureaucracy. Compared to the United
States, political elites and the bureaucracy in both Germany and the European Union are less open
to exchange with academia and civil society in general.
These differences between the United States and the European Union are exemplified by a
comparison between the results of the U.S. Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) and the fate
of the attempted European replica, the Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities.10 The EU
Task Force, in 2012, provided a thorough assessment of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses on mass
atrocity prevention and provided a list of recommendations to European institutions on how to
improve the institutional set-up of the EU (some of which we repeat below). Yet while many of the
GPTF’s recommendations were taken up by the Obama administration, the EU Task Force’s report
seems to have largely been forgotten shortly after its presentation in early 2013. The key difference
between the EU and the US version of the reports was not the quality of their content, but the
political clout of their drafters. The most important feature of the Genocide Prevention Task Force
was its composition, a veritable who’s who of credible foreign and security policy experts, chaired
by Madeline Albright and William Cohen. This was vital to its acceptance as an objective among
Washington’s political elite. The European equivalent, initiated by a Hungarian NGO, failed to
receive such high-level political backing for its work—a reflection of the differing conditions for
promoting mass atrocity prevention between the US and the European Union.
Recent Growth in Responsibility
Despite the shortcomings in the political and societal context for atrocity prevention debates
in Germany and the EU, Berlin’s role in the world and willingness to take on responsibility has
been growing. This has important side effects for atrocity prevention, as we will show in the next
section.
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For a long time, Germans have seen events in distant war zones as something that does
not concern them. This has been changing. The 2015 refugee crisis confronted many previously
unconcerned Germans with the reality of wars and atrocities in far-away places. Chancellor Angela
Merkel summarized this tendency in an unusually candid fashion in the fall of 2015: “In many
regions war and terror prevail. States disintegrate. For many years we have read about this. We
have heard about it. We have seen it on TV. But we had not yet sufficiently understood that what
happens in Aleppo and Mosul can affect Essen or Stuttgart. We have to face that now.”11
German support of the negotiations with Iran, Berlin’s central role in addressing the crisis in
Ukraine, its decision to arm the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against IS as well as its support of
the anti-IS coalition with up to 1200 German troops are all signs that Germany is taking increasing
responsibility. Polls show unprecedented backing for this approach. In annual polling about public
attitudes toward security issues, record numbers of Germans reported that they now support an
active role in addressing the problems, crises and conflicts of the world. After 2000, support for this
question usually lingered between the mid-40s and mid-50s; in many years, there was essentially
a tie between supporters and opponents of an active role. In 2014, the picture changed. Suddenly,
there were clear majorities in favor: support jumped to 59%, then 66% (2015) and then 63% (2016),
with fewer than 35% opposed each year.12
In this context of growing international ambitions, based on a foundation of growing public
support, the last administration issued two new foundational documents about Germany’s
international posture. In the summer of 2016, a new defense white paper was issued, while a year
later, in the summer of 2017, guidelines on “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace”
followed. Both documents broke new ground in placing Germany’s responsibility for international
peace and security in the context of its historical past. In so doing, the government has begun to
turn a powerful argument that had previously been used mostly to support restraint and passivity
into a justification, even a requirement, for the country to play a more active role.
Both documents are formally of equal status, adopted by the entire cabinet as the highest
organ of the executive, and both are meant to express a cross-party consensus that should hold for
the next five to ten years, regardless of changes in government. At the same time, German security
policy continues to be lopsidedly biased toward territorial and alliance defense, and the defense
white paper—which does not go into any kind of detail on atrocity prevention—is thus seen as
significantly more important than the guidelines. The effective political weight of the guidelines
remains to be seen in the coming years.
Germany’s Institutional Setup for Atrocity Prevention
Who Owns Atrocity Prevention? Inter-agency Coordination
The administration of Germany’s international relations is based primarily on the country’s
parliamentary system of government and an electoral system that usually leads to coalition
governments. Germany’s Basic Law firmly enshrines the “Ressortprinzip” (usually translated as
“departmental principle”) that grants a high degree of autonomy and responsibility to individual
ministries. Compared to many other Western democracies, these legal foundations and the decades
of political custom built on them have produced an unusually weak role for the Chancellery
in any but the top-tier foreign policy issues of the day. The day-to-day policymaking process
is supposed to be coordinated by the Foreign Office but on any overlapping policy issues, its
leadership role is often challenged by either the Defense or the Development Ministry. In contrast
to almost any other country in the world, the latter is a separate ministry, independent from the
Foreign Office.
These general observations have a number of implications for atrocity prevention. First,
Germany’s Federal Security Council is largely defunct as a policy-making forum on international
11
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security; its main role is to take decisions about arms exports. On conflict prevention and
peacebuilding, the existing working level coordination group has done little more than facilitate
information exchange between various ministries. There is no other cabinet-level forum to
coordinate international security or prevention issues, not even a single deputies-level forum
with this kind of broad mandate. After years of constant squabbling, the cabinet decided in June
2017 to pilot a “coordination group for crisis prevention, stabilization and peacebuilding” among
directors-general (roughly equivalent to undersecretaries in the U.S. administration). Its future
under the new administration depends on the arrangements and decisions to be taken by the next
government.
Second, given these structural challenges, there is little inter-agency strategy development on
conflict prevention and stabilization in general, let alone atrocity prevention. In addition, so far,
German political leaders across all ministries lack an overview of the tools available for atrocity
prevention. What is still missing is an inter-agency review that could provide an overview of
existing instruments and capabilities and that not only refers to the tools of the Foreign Office
and the Ministry of Defense, but also include the contributions by the Development Ministry,
intelligence services, as well as the Ministries of Justice, Finance and the Interior.
Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and R2P in the Foreign Office
If there is no structure akin to the Atrocities Prevention Board coordinating inter-agency
prevention initiatives, is there at least an individual in any of the ministries responsible for such
coordination? In the fall of 2012, the German foreign office named the deputy director of its UN
division the R2P focal point. However, successive focal points have mostly viewed themselves as
the German representative at international focal point meetings organized by the Global Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect. None of the German focal points of the past five years considered
themselves responsible for looking inward and examining how the German government could
improve its coordination and improve its tools for atrocity prevention.13
The relative neglect of R2P stands in stark contrast to the huge build-up of resources for “crisis
prevention, stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian aid,” which is the name of an entirely
new directorate-general created in 2014. As of 2017, it has more than 100 staff and an annual budget
of more than 2 billion euro, the largest part of which is being spent on humanitarian aid. After
the most recent reshuffling in the summer of 2017, there is now a division for “strategic foresight,
early warning, scenario planning, R2P and civilian experts” as part of the new directorate-general.
It supports the R2P focal point and seeks to keep track of atrocity risks as part of its broader early
warning and early action efforts (see below).
The Foreign Office has long funded projects for what is known as civilian crisis prevention
– usually without a link to an explicit conflict analysis or strategy process, but rather based on
suggestions or requests from embassies or implementers (mostly NGOs) submitting proposals.
In the fall of 2012, along with designating a formal R2P focal point, it began designating already
existing crisis prevention projects as R2P projects to be able to respond to international or civil
society questions about its operational footprint. Of course, the distinction between crisis, conflict,
and atrocity prevention is usually more relevant at the analytical stage (to avoid missing certain
risks) than at the level of programming.
An even larger proportion of the increased spending—hundreds of millions of euros per year
in recent years—goes into civilian stabilization projects. Again, there is no formal distinction made
between funding for atrocity prevention or R2P. Many of these projects seek to re-establish basic
public services along with the social fabric of communities after civil war, displacement, and/
or atrocities. Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, among others, are priority countries. In recent years,
some of this support went to supporting communities outside government or extremist control in
Syria. Some projects promote inter-ethnic reconciliation or similar efforts that might be considered
contributions to atrocity prevention in particular, while others follow merely broadly similar goals.
However, despite significant conceptual investments into the improvement of programming for
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crisis prevention and stabilization at large, the role of atrocity prevention or R2P in decisions about
priority countries or program design remains unaddressed.
Early Warning
A prerequisite for prevention is the ability of government bureaucracies to develop appropriate
strategic policy options at an early stage and in every new phase of escalation. In most cases, however,
violence escalates while the pressure to act only mounts as a response to media attention, at which
point it is too late for most forms of prevention. As in other countries, German decision-makers
are then too often confronted with the choice between either authorizing a military intervention—
with all the associated political and practical risks of such an intervention, which translate
into significant obstacles for such a decision—or just standing by while the slaughter unfolds.
For this reason, it is critically important to create political instruments that provide a wider
range of policy options at all stages of violent escalation14 and increase the government’s capacity
to detect crises early. Related to the lack of coordination structures in the German administration,
there are several individual early warning tools by different ministries, but no opportunities to
analyze their results together and adjust the German government’s strategy and programing
accordingly.
While the foreign ministry draws on its embassies, there is little incentive for individual
ambassadors to raise the alarm bells. Diplomats themselves are overextended, since embassies in
at-risk countries are often too small and their freedom of movement is restricted. In some cases,
embassies have been closed precisely at a time at which particularly close monitoring of the situation
would have been decisive. There is no training for the diplomatic corps or embassy personnel on R2P
or the risk factors in atrocity prevention (let alone for intelligence agents or development workers).
Aid workers regularly complain about the lack of reporting from the government on violence and
conflict risks, while government representatives prohibit them from publicizing their own earlywarning analyses. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development commissions annual
country assessments by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, which classifies the 90
countries that the ministry works in into three categories: low risk of conflict, increased risk of
conflict, acute risk of conflict. This traffic light-style system is supposed to guide country desk
officers in longer-term programming decisions and is shared with the Foreign Office, but there is
no systematic, unified approach by the whole government to assessing the results of the different
early warning instruments and devising a response.
The situational awareness provided by the intelligence services with regard to atrocities is even
more deficient, largely because threats to Germany dominate the mission of the Federal Intelligence
Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND).15 Meanwhile, German military advisors serving in fragile
countries are not even required to report on conflict or atrocity risks. Some of them consider any
kind of critical reporting on local partners, even within their confidential internal channels, as
damaging to their trust-building mission.
Mediation Capacities and Sanctions
The new government guidelines on crisis prevention and peacebuilding identify German support
to mediation initiatives as a priority and commit the government to strengthening its own capacities
as well as those of international institutions. The government also promises to appoint more highranking special envoys for specific crises. Germany might also be able to increase its support to
mediation capacities on a European level; in many cases, the EU as a whole can be better placed to
mediate than individual member states. In recent years, the Mediation Support Team within the
European External Action Service (EEAS) has provided technical support to mediation processes
in Mali, Myanmar, Lebanon, South Sudan, CAR, and Ukraine.16
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Similarly, the guidelines promise to strengthen targeted sanctions and sanctions regimes—
something that the German government would do through the European Union as well. The threat
or imposition of targeted sanctions such as visa and travel bans, or the freezing of assets against
individual perpetrators, is one tool at the disposal of the international community to deter atrocities.
In comparison to the United States, the EU’s capacity to impose and monitor targeted sanctions
remains very weak. While more than 180 people are dedicated to designing and implementing
sanctions at the US Treasury, some US policymakers complain that they face just a handful of
people at the EEAS to deal with the measures.17 Here the EU could learn from the US experience, as
well as review its own lessons from previous sanctions regimes.18 Strengthening the EU’s capacity
to design and impose sanctions will also allow it to engage more with the United States on the
legal questions concerning listings of individuals. The required legal changes include improving
the legal framework for sanctioning individuals so that well-founded travel and financial sanctions
will be more difficult for perpetrators to challenge in the European Court for Human Rights.
Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation
In the context of Germany’s system of strong ministerial autonomy, the fact that R2P belongs,
so to speak, to the Foreign Office has long been a convenient excuse for other ministries to avoid
participating in any possibly controversial discussion on their potential contributions to atrocity
prevention. This is regardless of the fact that several other ministries have been responsible for
important contributions to atrocity prevention themselves. While atrocity prevention or R2P are
thus not formally recognized as relevant issues by the German development apparatus, there is a
longstanding commitment (with its associated institutional backbone) to contributing to conflict
prevention, security, and peacebuilding in development cooperation. The Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development has a policy division for “peace & security and disaster risk
reduction,” and the implementing agencies have their own departments on peace and conflict
reduction.
Around two-thirds of the partner countries of German development cooperation are fragile or
in conflict. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and its main implementing
agencies, the KfW banking group and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ),
claim to implement conflict-sensitive development programming and to follow a do-no-harm
approach. Their analytical foundation for doing so is the country-specific traffic light assessment
mentioned above as well as an internal GIZ classification of countries at risk of conflict. Both
lists are updated once a year. If a given country is marked yellow or red in the annual analysis,
the corresponding programs need to conduct a so-called peace and conflict assessment. This
assessment (in theory) includes an analysis of the main conflict drivers and key actors, identifies
development needs related to the risk factors, outlines options for contributions to peacebuilding
that the suggested project could deliver, describes external risks, and suggests ways to monitor the
implementation of such projects.19 In this context, there should be trainings for all employees in risk
management and conflict sensitivity in crises countries.
In reality, the degree of conflict sensitivity for any given program depends very much on the
country context and its staff. In some cases, conflict sensitivity has been exclusively understood
as reputational risk management for GIZ or its implementing partners, not as minimizing the risk
that a given project escalates a conflict. In some countries – in particular those that receive a high
level of political attention in Berlin – time and pressure to spend money is so high, that there is no
time for proper analysis, trainings, or check-ins for and with implementing partners.20
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Support to International Criminal Justice Mechanisms
An area in which the German administration has made promising progress in 2017 is international
criminal justice – again without labeling it atrocity prevention or as relevant to R2P, as was the
case with development cooperation. Until recently, the baseline for German or EU contributions to
the national or international criminal prosecution of atrocity perpetrators was low.21 The German
Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt) has a “Central Unit for the Fight against War Crimes
and further Offences pursuant to the Code of Crimes against International Law,” which cooperates
with the war crimes units of international police services in the EU Genocide Network, with the
International Criminal Court, as well as with Europol and Interpol. The level of staffing remains
low, and witness protection as well as stakeholder involvement require improvement.22
The influx of almost a million refugees from Syria and the introduction of universal jurisdiction
in German law has led to significant developments. First, the Federal Prosecutor is investigating
cases in which suspected Syrian war criminals are now on German soil. As of late 2017, German
authorities have conducted 27 investigations against individuals for war crimes committed in Syria
or Iraq, as well as two wide-ranging investigations about Syrian war crimes (so-called structural
investigations without targeting a particular accused individual). Four of the individual cases have
been brought to trial on charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in addition to 45 cases
based on terrorism charges.23
Second, it seems that the German Federal Prosecutor is willing to, for the first time, apply the
principle of universal jurisdiction and prosecute high-ranking members of the Assad regime for
war crimes or crimes against humanity. The so-called principle of opportunity has so far given
German prosecutors an out from prosecuting war criminals worldwide (something that would
theoretically be possible within German law). The principle stipulates that if perpetrators are not
in Germany, do not have German citizenship, and the prosecution has little chances for success,
the Office of the Federal Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) can decide against taking up such as case.
On Syria, however, the fact that thousands of potential victims and witnesses now live in Germany
and that there is more available evidence gathered on the crimes of Syrian regime members,
has significantly increased the chances of success. In mid-2017, the Federal Prosecutor General
(Generalbundesanwalt) seemed willing to bring a case against key members of the Assad regime
to trial (in absentia) in Germany. In the fall of 2017, the Federal Prosecutor was handed the socalled “Ceasar” files, which had been smuggled out of Syria years earlier and document systematic
torture in Syrian prisons with photographic evidence. The German Federal Prosecutor is the first
judicial authority worldwide that could use evidence to issue international arrest warrants against
key members of the Assad regime.
Military Contributions
Despite a growing readiness to deploy German troops, military interventions remain controversial
and their mixed results have only reinforced a tendency to be skeptical about the utility of military
force to achieve political objectives among the German strategic community. Accordingly, for the
Ministry of Defense, atrocity prevention is a difficult issue in several ways. Despite 82% support
in polls for using the military to “prevent acts of genocide”24 and the fact that the public had little
21

Despite the massacre in Andijan/Uzbekistan (2005) and the EU sanctions, the German armed forces continued
its military training program; the erstwhile Uzbek Interior Minister, Sakir Almatow, the person with primarily
responsible for “Andijan,” traveled to Germany in November 2005 on “humanitarian grounds” and received
treatment in a private clinic in Hannover. On criminal law actions against war criminals in Germany: Dominic
Johnson, Simone Schlindwein, and Bianca Schmolze, Tatort Kongo – Prozess in Deutschland. Die Verbrechen der
ruandischen Miliz FDLR und der Versuch einer juristischen Aufarbeitung (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016).
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Wolfgang Kaleck, “Keine Straflosigkeit bei Kriegsverbrechen – Völkerstrafprozesse in Deutschland voranbringen,“
Anhörung im Ausschuss für Recht und Verbraucherschutz des Deutschen Bundestages (statement, Berlin, April 25,
2016), European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.bundestag.
de/blob/419958/16a05fb20339cecc383b10dba5835b10/ecchr-data.pdf.
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Human Rights Watch, “These Are the Crimes We Are Fleeing” Justice For Syria In Swedish and German Courts, October 2017,
accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ijsyria1017_web.pdf.
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objection to arming and training the Kurdish Peshmerga since 2014, the measure is still considered
unpopular. Preventing or stopping atrocities is also widely seen as irresponsible overreach among
the military itself and the strategic community, partly due to a lack of expeditionary capabilities
and partly because of a lack of familiarity with specific operational and tactical scenarios such as
those developed in the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) project in the US or similar
work in Norway.25 As a result, neither the Defense Ministry as an institution nor any incumbent
ministers have anything to gain politically by actively looking for expeditionary adventures.
The most likely scenario for a German military contribution to preventing atrocities in the
coming years is through its growing participation in UN peace operations. Since 2015, up to
600 soldiers have been serving with the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. This tripled German
participation in peacekeeping, which had thus far been limited to contributions to the UN Interim
Force in Lebanon and to a few soldiers each in South Sudan, Darfur, and Liberia, among other
places. At the same time, the German government presents its participation in Mali not as a
contribution to strengthening the UN peacekeeping system and the protection of civilians, but as
a contribution to the fight against terrorism. Similarly, the government contributed to the anti-IS
coalition as a response to French demands.
It is still likely that German contributions to peacekeeping will further increase in the next four
years, and since most peacekeeping operations are mandated to protect civilians, it would be high
time for the German military to familiarize itself with the practical challenges of this particular
mission. So far, there is no doctrine on operational or tactical protection of civilians (POC) in the
Bundeswehr that goes beyond the basics of international humanitarian law.
The other military pillar that Germany is likely to expand in the coming years is military
assistance. A new €100m train and equip program, created in 2016, partly aims to build the
capacity of reliable military contributors to UN, African Union (AU), and other peace operations,
particularly in Africa and the Middle East. This program is set to expand along with a similar police
training component and an older, slightly smaller non-lethal equipment and advisory program.
As the specific projects under these programs move from their historical focus on logistics and
medical support toward frontline capabilities, a focus on operational and tactical protection of
civilians and broader atrocity prevention scenarios such as safe zones will become increasingly
relevant as well.26
Engaging Emerging Powers and Rebuilding Effective International Order
Since the global political fallout over NATO’s abuse of the UN Security Council resolution for
military intervention in Libya 2011,27 leading powers have been unable to find common ground
to discharge their duties in safeguarding international peace and security. The most glaring
example has been the war in Syria. Most major supporters of atrocity prevention turned their
attention away from the multilateral promotion of atrocity prevention toward internal, operational
instruments they were able to improve regardless of the multilateral environment. At the same
time, atrocities take place in a permissive political climate. In an increasingly contested world
order, technical instruments such as prevention, stabilization and development projects through
Politikforschung zur Sicht der Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik [Get in or Keep out? Results of a representative survey by
TNS Infratest Policy Research about the View of Germans on Foreign Policy], October 2014, accessed February 20,
2018, http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/fileadmin/user_upload/allgemein/Koerber-Stiftung_Umfrage_
Aussenpolitik_Broschuere.pdf.
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Stephen F. Burgess, “Comments on the Mass Atrocity Prevention Response Operations (MARO) Handbook,”
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 6, no. 1 (2011), 66-69, accessed December 31, 2017, http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol6/iss1/9; Stian Kjeksrud, Alexander W. Beadle, and Petter H.F. Lindqvist, “Protecting
Civilians from Violence: A Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations,” (Oslo: FFI and
NODEFIC, 2016), accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.ffi.no/no/Publikasjoner/Documents/Protecting-Civiliansfrom-Violence.pdf.
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One of the authors developed more detailed recommendations along these lines in Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and
Philipp Rotmann’s contribution to the Peace Report 2017. Heinemann-Grüder and Rotmann, Practical Implementation of
Prevention.
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Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of
Protection,” Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016), 113-133.
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criminal prosecutions, sanctions, mediation, or military force alone will not stop atrocities. In many
cases, Syria or Burundi being just two of the most obvious current examples, preventing atrocities
remains foremost a problem of international political order.28
For the UN Security Council to overcome its paralysis on atrocity prevention, the Council
needs to address the danger of mandate abuse. Germany, which is seeking another two-year nonpermanent seat for 2019 and 2020, could play a pivotal role in building bridges, having abstained
from the ill-fated mandate for the military intervention in Libya together with the later critics
Brazil, India, Russia and China. Germany could use the Brazilian proposal for “Responsibility
while Protecting” (RwP) as a starting point in such an endeavor. Brazil proposed the idea in late
2011, frustrated with how the Libya intervention had turned into regime change with no checks by
the UN Security Council. At the time, the initiative fell flat,29 but the substantive proposals continue
to be worth another serious look.
RwP focused on two areas that are of continued interest to Germany: the criteria for the use of
force to protect civilians, and the creation of accountability mechanisms for the use of force. Given
the controversies surrounding Resolution 1973, it is unlikely that the Security Council will ever
again pass a resolution to protect civilians with all necessary means without also installing checks
or regulations that give the council more control over an intervention.30
Conclusion
Slowly, Germany is making progress on atrocity prevention, but the issue is far from playing a
key role in Berlin. As our review of Germany’s bureaucratic structures on atrocity prevention has
shown, German contributions to atrocity prevention—whether diplomatic, financial, conceptual or
military—will not fill the gap created by the US retreat in this area any time soon. This is equally
the case for other countries in the European Union and the EU as a whole. Much of the recent
progress, both on the operational and on the doctrinal levels, is the result of nimble bureaucratic
entrepreneurship rather than popular political mobilization or effective lobbying by civil society.
Civil servants, as the name implies, are servants of state and society. More domestic political and
civil society leadership will be required to realize Germany’s stated commitments to preventing
genocide and mass atrocities.
Note
This article draws on previous publications by the authors, including Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit
Kurtz, and Philipp Rotmann, “Schutz und Verantwortung: Über die US-Außenpolitik zur
Verhinderung von Gräueltaten” Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung & Global Public Policy Institute,
2013; Tessa Alleblas, et al, “In the Shadow of Syria. Assessing the Obama Administration’s Efforts
on Mass Atrocity Prevention,” Policy Brief (Hague Institute for Global Justice and Global Public
Policy Institute, April 2017); Sarah Brockmeier, Julian Junk, and Gerrit Kurtz, “Emerging Norm
and Rhetorical Tool: Europe and a Responsibility to Protect,” Conflict, Security & Development 14,
no. 4 (2014), 429-460; Sarah Brockmeier, “The Future of Germany’s support to the Responsibility to
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Introduction
If the United Nations always succeeded or never succeeded in preventing atrocity crimes, then
there would be no point in trying to improve its performance. Instead, its track record has been
remarkably uneven. Its quiet successes at preventing mass violence have been more than matched
by horrific and well-publicized failures to prevent (or protect).1 Though it is impossible to measure
prevention with any degree of certainty, it appears that the world body has, on occasion, made a
positive difference.2 So, it has potential. But, in too many situations, that potential has not been
realized. This essay asks why the UN’s preventive efforts have been so inconsistent and how some
of the shortcomings in its performance might be remedied.
At the outset, this paper makes three assumptions. One, over the years, the United Nations has
been no worse at preventing mass atrocities than have been regional and sub-regional organizations,
governments, and/or civil society. Two, when prevention has worked, it has generally been because
there has been productive collaboration among actors of these various types and levels, so credit
or blame should be shared. Three, nevertheless, mediocrity on any actor’s part is not an acceptable
standard when it comes to an issue of public policy with such existential implications for human
life.
This essay argues further 1) that the United Nations has a unique combination of assets that
could be put to much better use in this area, 2) that shortcomings in its performance arise as much
from conceptual misunderstandings and institutional dysfunction as from capacity deficits, 3)
that these shortcomings have negative implications for whether and how effectively other critical
actors respond to the atrocity prevention challenge, and 4) that steps could be taken to improve the
situation significantly without a huge infusion of scarce resources. These points are addressed in
the following four sections on potential, shortcomings, implications, and remedies, respectively.
Potential
International efforts to prevent mass atrocity crimes require four core elements: legitimacy,
authority, capacity, and strategy. Legitimacy is the ability to generate and sustain political support
on the local, national, and regional, as well as international, levels for the preventive measures being
undertaken or contemplated and for the purposes being served. Authority, which may buttress
legitimacy, derives from those legal instruments and institutional decision-making processes that
confirm that those preventive actions are appropriate to the circumstances and proportional to the
purposes being pursued. Capacity refers to having and/or mobilizing and being able to employ the
requisite physical, material, financial, and human resources to carry out the preventive measures
fully and effectively. Strategy relates to the ability to assess and frame the unfolding situation
1

For the purposes of this paper, mass atrocity crimes are considered to be those identified under United Nations, General
Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), paragraph 138,
its discussion of the Responsibility to Protect, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity. The terms atrocity and mass atrocity are used inter-changeably in this paper.

2

In his 2015 and 2016 reports on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted
that preventive efforts by the United Nations and its partners had helped to prevent mass atrocity crimes and/
or their escalation in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Timor-Leste. United Nations, Report of the
Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, July 13, 2015 (UN Doc.
A/69/981-S/2015/500), para. 8; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next
Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, July 22, 2016 (UN Doc. A/70/999-S/2016/620), paras. 33 and 55. Twelve chapters
of the 2016 Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect are devoted to situations in which mass atrocity crimes
occurred or were prevented. See Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 693-910. Also see Naomi Kikoler, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the
Responsibility to Protect in Practice,” in The Responsibility to Protect: Overcoming the Challenge of Atrocity Prevention, eds.
Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 304-323.

Edward C. Luck, “Why the United Nations Underperforms at Preventing Mass Atrocities” Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 3
(2018): 32-47. ©2018 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1505

Why the United Nations Underperforms at Preventing Mass Atrocities

33

and the players involved both in a timely manner and from an atrocity prevention perspective,
to develop an effective plan for response to developments on the ground, to build a sustainable
coalition of actors on all levels willing to pursue the same objectives in a mutually reinforcing
manner, and to reassess and adjust the strategy as needed in the face of unexpected developments.
Ultimately, prevention is not completed until steps are taken to discourage a reoccurrence of such
threats of mass atrocities.
Legitimacy should be one of the United Nations’ prime attributes. The 193-member General
Assembly, the world’s only virtually universal political body, has endorsed both the Genocide
Convention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Though its decisions--other than on internal
matters—are not legally binding, the Assembly has, from its earliest days been the world’s prime
incubator of global norms and standards. Since 2009, the Assembly’s annual informal interactive
dialogues on R2P have shown broad and persistent support from the Member States for the
preventive dimensions of R2P, even as some delegations continue to express reservations about
possible coercive measures under the third pillar of the Secretary-General’s implementation
strategy (as crafted by this author).3 Successive Secretaries-General have produced a series of
well-received reports on conflict prevention, something which António Guterres has pledged to
make the centerpiece of his tenure.4 In many cases, moreover, the United Nations is more likely to
be perceived as a disinterested actor than would neighbors or more distant but powerful states.
Perceptions of impartiality should bolster claims to legitimacy. Multilateral measures are generally
assumed to be more legitimate than unilateral ones, as long as the measures undertaken by the UN
(or a regional body) are not perceived as being manipulated by a few powerful Member States to
further narrow national interests.
Authority should be another advantage for the world body. Its Charter gives the United
Nations ample legal authority for initiating preventive efforts and for building global-regional
partnerships to do so, as well as historically unprecedented authority for undertaking multilateral
enforcement action. Prevention is the first purpose mentioned in the Charter and Chapter VI lays
out a wide range of non-coercive tools for preventing and resolving conflict. Chapter VIII defines
the modalities for collaboration with regional arrangements in these pursuits, while Chapter VII
outlines the Security Council’s unsurpassed and historically unique enforcement powers.
Though enforcement is often thought of solely in terms of coercive military action, there are
a wide range of sanctions—relating to diplomatic, political, financial, and economic measures, as
well as restrictions on military assistance and arms transfers—that could be employed with greatest
effect early in a crisis for preventive and/or deterrent purposes, whether targeted on individual,
group, or national actors. Multilateral sanctions tend to be much more persuasive than unilateral
ones, so getting Security Council authorization can be an essential step. In the context of atrocity
prevention, it should be recalled that the Council’s enforcement powers override the constraints on
intervening in essentially domestic matters noted in Article 2 (7). Though the Charter is silent on
genocide and mass atrocities, it is replete with multiple references to promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that regard, the Security Council has the
authority to make referrals to the Intrnational Criminal Court (ICC), a non-UN body, concerning
the alleged commission of atrocity crimes. In a number of situations, UN representatives have
reminded local and national actors of this possibility.

3

In 2009, the General Assembly held both a short informal interactive dialogue and then a formal debate on the Secretary
General’s report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, of 12 January 2009, which laid out his three-pillar strategy.
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, January 12, 2009 (UN Doc.
A/63/677). This author was the architect of the strategy and the principal drafter of that report and all other statements
and reports by the Secretary-General on R2P from 2007 to mid-2012. Each year since 2009, the Secretary-General
has produced a report on different aspects of R2P to be addressed at informal interactive dialogues of the General
Assembly. The reports and summaries of the dialogues can be found on the web sites of the Global Centre on the
Responsibility to Protect and of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.

4

The first major report, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was United Nations, Report by the Secretary-General, Prevention
of Armed Conflict, June 7, 2001 (UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574). More recently, see António Guterres,“SecretaryGeneral-Designate Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office” (speech, New York, December 12,
2016) United Nations.
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It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations’ claims to legitimacy and authority are
not matched by a reliable capacity to carry out its decisions and to forward its values. There is
much to this observation. However, this is more a commentary on its capacity for response than
for prevention, given that a coercive response under Chapter VII requires the mobilization of the
economic and/or military capacities of the Member States, as well as authorization by the Security
Council. The organization’s capacities for preventive action under Chapter VI and Article 99 (see
below)—even if only undertaken by the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, or other parts of the
UN system—do not necessarily depend on explicit action by the Member States. These preventive
capacities are quite varied and broad, if not deep or robust.
In terms of structural or upstream prevention, the UN system has a presence, whether for
sustainable development, humanitarian, human rights, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and/or
conflict resolution purposes, in most of the countries of potential concern. In terms of operational
or more immediate preventive measures, when endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, the
gathered heads of State and government agreed to support the United Nations “in establishing
an early warning capacity” and to assist States “under stress before crises and conflicts break
out.”5 Though the Summit authorized the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
limited to post-conflict scenarios, it should be recalled that the initial proposal for the Commission,
introduced by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
in late 2004, envisioned it having an R2P-like preventive function as well. The first core function
for the Commission, according to the High-level Panel, should be “to identify countries which are
under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse” and “to organize, in partnership with the
national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further.”6
The substantive parallels to the R2P language on assisting states under stress are striking. Yet the
fact that the preventive dimension of the PBC was not retained in the Summit articulation of the
purposes of the PBC is suggestive of the political hurdles that have to be overcome in some cases
of structural and operational prevention, as well as in crafting effective responses to unfolding
atrocities.
In terms of operational prevention, under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General “may
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.”7 Since 2009, this clause has increasingly been
interpreted as including the potential commission of mass atrocity crimes, whether in statements
to the Council by the Secretary-General, his Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, or the
High Commissioner for Human Rights.8 The bully pulpit that the Secretary-General and his small
army of SRSGs (Special Advisers, Special Representatives, and Envoys) share can be critical to
getting preventive messages to would-be perpetrators, bystanders, vulnerable populations, media,
civil society leaders, governments, and regional arrangements. These messages have often been
about discouraging the incitement of atrocity crimes, something which all of the world leaders
agreed at the 2005 World Summit to prevent (paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document). In this
author’s experience, pushing back against indications of incitement has proven to be one of the
most flexible and timely tools in the prevention toolkit.
5

United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138 and 139, respectively.

6

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004 (United Nations Department of Public Information), 83, para. 264.

7

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 (United Nations),
article 99.

8
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practice. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South
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Strategy, perhaps more than the other core dimensions, is an area under construction. Though
the General Assembly approved the Genocide Convention almost seventy years ago, the first
UN plan to prevent genocide was not articulated until 2004 to mark the tenth anniversary of
the Rwandan genocide (discussed more fully below).9 Since 2009, the Joint Office on Genocide
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect has developed an all-encompassing Framework for
Analysis for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes and the Secretary-General’s annual reports on
different aspects of R2P have placed a heavy emphasis on prevention. Though the UN was late to
framing concepts and strategies for preventing atrocity crimes, so too were governments, regional
organizations, and academia. In the 1990s, however, the UN was at the forefront of the articulation
of concerns about human security and human protection that continue to provide an intellectual
and political context for atrocity prevention.10 This intellectual heritage suggests that the world
body is in a position to develop a broader and more multilateral framework for preventing and
responding to mass atrocity crimes beyond the narrower perspectives of some governments, much
as it did in the case of counter-terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.
Shortcomings
It would be tempting, but overly sweeping and simplistic, to assert that the primary reason for
the UN’s underperformance in atrocity prevention has been because of the narrow domestic and
geopolitical agendas of powerful Member States. This may be the case in places, such as Syria,
Sudan, or Yemen, where the geopolitical stakes are perceived to be high and the UN’s entreaties
have fallen on deaf ears. The UN’s preventive efforts may well have had more success in low
profile cases on the whole than in high profile ones in which there have been more actors of
significance. Yet the UN has done relatively well in some places, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kenya,
where the stakes were high geopolitically and relatively poorly in others, such as Sri Lanka and
Central African Republic, where the international stakes were modest.
It may well be that the 193 Member States are simultaneously the greatest strength and
the greatest weakness of the United Nations. Either way, forging their collaboration on matters
of common concern was a founding purpose of the organization. So it is not enough for the
Secretariat—or for capitals or civil society-- just to lament the differences among key Member
States and declare some situations to be too politically sensitive to handle, especially when there
appears to be an imminent threat of mass atrocity crimes. The inter-governmental bodies provide
the mandates that the Secretariat has an obligation to implement, but the latter cannot be passive
bystanders to the political process. Their responsibilities are not limited to narrow interpretations
of the specific mandates they are assigned by the inter-governmental bodies.
UN officials are obligated both to act to further the principles and purposes of the Charter
and, as noted above, to inform the Security Council of possible threats to international peace
and security under Article 99 of the Charter. The latter entails taking proactive steps to gather
and assess the information needed to provide the Council and other relevant organs with
the Secretariat’s informed and considered judgements about situations of concern. As the
2000 Brahimi peacekeeping report famously commented, in the context of mass atrocity
prevention, the Secretariat has an obligation to tell the Security Council what it needs to hear, not
what it wants to hear.11 Too often, the Secretariat engages in pre-emptive self-censorship, trimming
their analytical sails before even testing the direction and velocity of the political winds. (There
have also been occasions, of course, when the Secretariat has exaggerated risks and potential
casualties.)
9

The reasons for this delay are discussed in Edward C. Luck, “Roots of Ambivalence: The United Nations, Genocide, and
Mass Atrocity Prevention,” in Policies and Practices for Preventing Atrocities, eds. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff
(London: Routledge, forthcoming).
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by humanitarian assistance, internal displacement, children and armed conflict, sexual and gender-based violence,
women, peace, and security, and civilian protection in peacekeeping contexts. See Chapter One of Alex J. Bellamy and
Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice (Cambridge, UK: Polity Books, forthcoming).
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The long tradition of blaming the Member States for every UN failing has done little to enhance
understanding of how to improve the organization’s performance, especially in areas, such as
atrocity prevention, in which the Secretariat could, and often does, play a major operational role.
The Security Council’s growing willingness to hear from the Secretariat—and, in informal settings,
from civil society—about potential atrocity crimes has been an important step forward, but much
more could be done in the future to make this a more regular feature of Secretariat-Member State
collaboration.12 Little attention, for instance, has been given to the roles the General Assembly, the
Peacebuilding Commission, and the Human Rights Council could play in forwarding the atrocity
prevention agenda.
Though the Assembly, under Article 12 (1) of the Charter, may not make recommendations
on matters being addressed by the Council, it may discuss or investigate any matter. It has, for
instance, passed several pointed resolutions on Syria, reflecting broad frustration among the
Member States about the blockages within the Council on the situation.13 Under the Uniting for
Peace formula, the Assembly has a long history of authorizing peace operations under Chapter
VI of the Charter.14 Though such operations would not have an enforcement mandate, they might
play a useful function as preventive deployments in places where there are real possibilities of
instability and atrocity crimes. Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the Assembly has the equivalent
of Article 99 authority for referring threats to the Council. As noted earlier, the Assembly has been
the locus for efforts to refine R2P and to build broader Member State support for it. But it has
also been the forum for frustrating attempts to gain the human and financial resources needed to
mount a proper and sustainable effort to prevent atrocity crimes. For instance, a small minority in
the Assembly’s Fifth Committee has been able—or allowed—to repeatedly block the provision of
even very modest capacities to implement R2P, despite its endorsement at the highest levels at the
2005 World Summit.
As noted above, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was originally conceived as an intergovernmental body that could deal with countries either sliding into or emerging from conflict. It
was established as a subsidiary advisory body both of the General Assembly and of the Security
Council.15 Though its pre-conflict function was dropped, it could still have a preventive role in
helping societies that had suffered sectarian violence from repeating the cycle. This could be a
significant preventive measure, as it has long been said that the best predictor of genocide is past
genocide. In its country-specific configuration, the PBC could potentially help draw economic
and political resources to situations of atrocity concern that have not received much international
attention. In practice, however, there has been relatively little overlap between the countries on
which the PBC has focused and those of highest priority from an atrocity prevention viewpoint.
As a 2015 review of the PBC underscored, for a variety of political and institutional reasons, it has
not been able to realize its potential for strategic leadership or for bridging the gaps between the
Security Council and the General Assembly.16
The Geneva-based Human Rights Council came rather late to the R2P debate for both political
and geographical reasons. However, the Council’s Commissions of Inquiry on the Democratic
12
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University Press, forthcoming).
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16
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People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and on Syria have both been outspoken about the growing
evidence of mass atrocity crimes, and the former invoked R2P and called on the international
community to address the dire human protection situation in the DPRK more vigorously.17 In late
2016, the Russian Federation failed to be elected by the General Assembly to membership in the
Human Rights Council, purportedly because of widespread concerns about the commission of
atrocity crimes in Syria.18 From the passage by the General Assembly of the Genocide Convention
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a day apart in 1948, these two agendas have
followed parallel, not convergent, paths.19 Mutual respect and common purpose have been
combined with a sense of ambiguity and even ambivalence about the relationship between atrocity
crimes and human rights.20 In terms of implementation, the relatively large Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and its much smaller cousin addressing genocide
prevention and R2P in New York have tended to have distinct perspectives on reporting and
institutional matters, even as they generally have viewed specific situations from similar but not
congruent perspectives.21 It was this author’s experience that the human rights conditions in a
country were not always indicative of its proclivity to mass violence. Some chronic human rights
violators were relatively stable, while some societies that were not among the worst violators, such
as Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, nevertheless witnessed sudden violence and atrocity crimes.
The pursuit of human rights is not the only seemingly natural partner for atrocity prevention
in which the relationship has had dysfunctional elements. In the case of humanitarian affairs, the
differences have run deeper, based on divergent conceptual and political assumptions that are
not easily reconciled. R2P, in particular, has not been embraced by many in the humanitarian
community because of its inclusion of the use of coercive military force as a response option
in extreme situations. As Hugo Slim has put it, the concerns of humanitarian actors about the
third pillar of the Secretary-General’s R2P implementation strategy “focus on four issues: the
politicization of civilian protection; raised expectations that tend to freeze conflicts and postpone
peace-making; the likely failure of force and the widening of conflict; and the contamination of
humanitarian agencies by association.”22
From an atrocity prevention or R2P perspective, the emphasis in humanitarian principles on
maintaining impartiality and preserving humanitarian space and access may entail prioritizing the
cultivation of good relations with the very regimes that may be committing or planning to commit
mass atrocities against their populations. These differences came to a head in the shaping of the
UN Secretariat’s response—the Security Council largely stayed on the sidelines--to the mounting
violence targeted at civilians in the concluding phases of the civil war in Sri Lanka in late 2008-early
2009. It was decided at the upper reaches of the Secretariat that the situation should be framed as a
humanitarian emergency, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put in charge. R2P and genocide prevention perspectives were
17
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Republic of Korea, February 7, 2014 (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63) and Detailed Findings (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1).

18

It is highly unusual for one of the five permanent members of the Security Council to lose such a vote. Julian Borger,
“Russia Denied Membership of UN Human Rights Council,” The Guardian, 28 October 2016.

19

It took several decades for human rights to gain a solid foothold in the UN Secretariat, and the first UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights was not appointed until 1993, 45 years after the Universal Declaration. Genocide
prevention took even longer, not gaining any presence in the Secretariat until 2004, as discussed below.

20

For largely historical reasons, the ten human rights treaty bodies addressed by the Human Rights Council do not
include the Genocide Convention. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Status of the Human Rights Treaty
Body System, July 18, 2016 (UN Doc. A/71/118), 2, para. 1. For the negotiating history of the Genocide Convention and
the singular role of Raphael Lemkin, see James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging the Responsibility to Prevent Genocide
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 15-23 and Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of
Genocide (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 51-60. For a discussion of the reluctance of the UN founders to embrace
genocide or atrocity prevention, see Luck, Roots of Ambivalence.

21

The appointment in 2010 of an Assistant Secretary-General to head the High Commissioner’s office in New York has
enhanced the opportunities for collaboration.

22

Hugo Slim, “Saving Individuals from the Scourge of War: Complementarity and Tension between R2P and
Humanitarian Action,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 555.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

38

Luck

not welcome in the deliberations, reports of mounting human rights violations were dismissed,
and the UN’s voice was muted as the war crimes unfolded.23
The internal review of the organization’s failures in the Sri Lankan crisis was candid about its
shortcomings and pointed to a number of areas needing improvement. The primary institutional
response was the enunciation of the Rights Up Front Action Plan by Secretary-General Ban in
September 2013.24 The Plan had many positive elements, including the development of more
coherent and streamlined means of collecting and integrating information on serious human
rights violations into crisis response planning at UN headquarters. From an atrocity prevention
perspective, however, the results have been more mixed. The differences in perspective between
the humanitarian and atrocity prevention views of the crisis in Sri Lanka were finessed rather than
confronted.
As Andrew Gilmour, at the time a key official in the Office of the Secretary-General and now
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights in New York, put it: “those involved in formulating
the initiative avoided getting into what was seen as an unproductive debate on the distinction
between the ‘protection of civilians’ and the ‘protection of human rights,’ as Rights up Front is
committed to both.”25 He goes on to note the common emphasis in Rights Up Front and R2P on
prevention and to underscore the concerns of some Member States with the possibility of using force
under an R2P banner.26 Though the use of force was never a desirable or feasible alternative in Sri
Lanka, the 1999 reports on the UN’s failures to act in a timely and decisive manner in the Rwandan
genocide and the massacre at Srebrenica highlighted the consequences of the UN’s reluctance to
take decisive military action when atrocity crimes were unfolding and it was a feasible option.27
The Rights Up Front initiative had significant implications, as well, for decision-making in
the upper echelons of the Secretariat. A Senior Action Group (SAG) was established, chaired by
the Deputy Secretary-General, to review a range of ongoing crises and to insure that human rights
perspectives were taken into account. Though probably a net positive for atrocity prevention,
SAG added little in those cases in which violence was not necessarily preceded by an escalation
of human rights abuses. It also helped to ease the demise of the Policy Committee, a high-level
group that had been chaired by the Secretary-General and that permitted more opportunities
for his Special Advisers to present the case for addressing particular situations from an atrocity
prevention perspective. This author’s experience suggests that there are risks in imposing any
barriers to the direct access of those mandated to prevent atrocity crimes to the Secretary-General
or in creating distance between the Secretary-General and his/her personal responsibility for acting
to try to prevent such crimes.28 That, after all, should have been one of the primary lessons from
Sri Lanka.
23
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Another potential asset—the presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground—has proven to be
a mixed blessing. The record has been inconsistent. In Rwanda, Srebrenica, Sierra Leone, Darfur,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), mass atrocities occurred despite the presence
of UN forces. A moral hazard can be created when the promise of protection is not matched by
commensurate action by those institutions and countries with the capacity to offer protection, as
with the Security Council’s declaration of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.29 Yet in Mozambique,
Cambodia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali, the blue helmets
helped to prevent mass atrocities or their reoccurrence. In Kenya (twice), Kyrgyzstan, and Guinea
(Conakry), preventive efforts prevailed without an international force on the ground. In South
Sudan, peacekeepers have provided shelter for hundreds of thousands of civilians even as mass
atrocities escalated elsewhere.
Given this mottled history, it is not surprising that the United Nations has developed distinct,
if related, doctrines for the protection of civilians (POC) in a peacekeeping context and for mass
atrocity prevention and R2P.30 Those in charge of peacekeeping at the UN have tended to be quite
cautious about R2P for both political and conceptual reasons and about adding atrocity prevention
tasks to already ambitious mandates for over-stretched peacekeeping operations.31 The United
Nations, at this point, does not have a well-developed doctrine for the use of force, with or without
consent, for the explicit purpose of protecting civilians from atrocities or of deterring such crimes.32
It has relatively few cases from which to draw lessons and these scattered experiences have been
quite disparate. As Paul Williams puts it, “while it is understandable that the main practitioners of
POC (UN peacekeepers and the Secretariat) would like this agenda to remain as uncontroversial as
possible, pretending that these mandates can ignore the four R2P crimes or that they do not arise
from a similar sentiment as R2P-inspired military intervention is not helpful. Avoidance is not the
solution.”33
This conceptual muddle has not been simplified or clarified by the growing recognition that
non-state armed groups are—and have long been—among the more virulent perpetrators of atrocity
crimes. In 2008, when this author was Special Adviser, he introduced armed groups, including
those practicing terrorism, into the UN’s R2P lexicon, which previously had focused entirely on
governments as the sole perpetrators.34 Now, however, there is a real danger that concerns about
preventing mass atrocity crimes could be distorted or overwhelmed by the much larger narrative
and more widely embraced policy agenda on counter-terrorism. It is not entirely reassuring, in that
regard, that the first time that a Security Council meeting directly addressed R2P was in a counterterrorism context or that the Secretary-General’s 2015 report on conflict prevention included a
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section on “Violent Extremism and Atrocity Crimes.”35
The mother of all muddles, however, has been the UN’s conflation of conflict prevention
and atrocity prevention.36 When Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the world body’s first
post and action plan to prevent genocide in 2004, to mark the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide, he apparently had no inter-governmental mandate to do so. Instead, he cited a Security
Council resolution on conflict prevention, which responded to his report on conflict prevention.
Neither document addressed the matter of atrocity or genocide prevention, despite the two mea
culpa reports in 1999 on the organization’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica.37 For the UN, the
temptation to make atrocity prevention a subset of conflict prevention and resolution can be
overwhelming. The Charter has countless references to preventing and resolving conflicts and,
as noted above, not one to genocide or mass atrocities. The UN—both its Secretariat and its intergovernmental organs—is highly sophisticated and experienced in the former and little more than
a novice in the latter. As they say, when your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
This would apply as much in the UN context to peaceful settlement as it does to the use of force in
the US government.
Though it is undoubtedly true that more atrocities occur within armed conflicts than outside of
them, experience has shown that horrific atrocities have occurred in a number of situations without
armed conflict. During the period when the author was Special Adviser, these cases included,
among others, Kenya (twice), Guinea (Conakry), and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the early stages of the
violence in Libya and Syria. The etiology of mass atrocity crimes may sometimes include armed
conflict, but that explains neither why atrocity crimes do not occur in all armed conflicts nor why
they often take place in other circumstances. Prevention, therefore, demands a broader yet more
dedicated understanding of the origins, course, termination, and possible reoccurrence of atrocity
crimes. The very process of conflict resolution may tempt one or more parties to resort to the
commission of atrocities to undermine the potential peace settlement, as may have been the case in
both Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Conflating conflict prevention and atrocity prevention presents challenges for practice as well
as for understanding and doctrine. For those engaged in mediation, keeping doors to the parties
open will generally be perceived as more important than relaying uncomfortable messages about
possible atrocity crimes. It was this author’s experience that warnings from UN headquarters to
parties in a conflict about behavior that was troubling from an atrocity prevention perspective
were sometimes seen by SRSGs in the field and officials of the Department of Political Affairs in
New York as too pointed or untimely. Governments are never eager to be told that their supporters
or armed forces are committing atrocities, especially when they are facing armed opposition and
their grip on power is threatened.
Sometimes quiet diplomacy, especially by the Secretary-General and/or senior regional
figures, can make a difference in preventing atrocities, especially when the regime is divided or
not fully committed to a genocidal project and the message is given relatively early. As noted
above, the advent of the ICC has added a critical talking point about the decline of impunity
and possible personal consequences for leaders in such situations, but that message tends to fall
on deaf ears when the targeted leadership already sees the struggle in existential terms, has the
backing of a permanent member of the Security Council, or the atrocities are being committed
by extremist armed groups. From a conflict resolution perspective, however, the invocation of
35
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possible post-conflict ICC referrals may be regarded as a deterrent to a peaceful settlement that
could leave leaders vulnerable to prosecution. In sum, when conflict prevention and atrocity
prevention narratives converge, they can be mutually reinforcing, but often quite the opposite has
been the case.
Implications
As the foregoing discussion underscores, the fact that the United Nations is pursuing so many
related agendas simultaneously presents both opportunities and challenges for atrocity prevention
efforts. There is no shortage of symbiotic possibilities, both in the field and at headquarters. But
it is difficult to pursue so many policy streams at the same time and in the same place, as policy
coherence tends to be far more difficult to achieve than surface-level coordination. Early warning,
in this author’s experience, is much less of a problem than assessment and framing. Policy makers
with different responsibilities are likely to read the same information flows in distinct ways. What
are the frameworks and patterns within which policy makers understand, sort, and prioritize
the information before them? Why was Rwanda framed chiefly as a matter of implementing the
Arusha accords rather than of preventing a massive genocide? Why was it believed that Serbian
forces would not test the Security Council’s will to enforce the safe areas it had established? Why
was Sri Lanka regarded as a primarily humanitarian matter? And why were the early responses
to the growing violence in Syria couched as a question of regime change rather than as a question
of changing regime behavior and addressing the longer-term risks of mass atrocities, including
against the ruling largely Alawite minority? Can atrocity prevention perspectives, given their
chronically weak institutional positions, even get a voice at the key decision-making tables?
In this regard, the question of mainstreaming R2P and genocide prevention concerns presents
risks as well as opportunities. In his final report on R2P, Secretary-General Ban was anything but
ambivalent. The United Nations,” he asserted, “must redouble its own efforts to mainstream the
responsibility to protect. Faced with mounting challenges on multiple fronts, business as usual
will not be sufficient.”38 The common theme from the multiple reviews of related UN work in
2015-2016, he underscored, was prevention. Fair enough, but the price of gaining the benefits of
wider institutional visibility and greater conceptual coherence cannot be that atrocity prevention
becomes just part of the bureaucratic checklist of other, more robust, institutional mandates. In the
process of mainstreaming, it is essential that the singular perspective of atrocity prevention not be
lost. The goal must not be the typical bureaucratic blending of messages—for which the UN is well
known--but to maintain a distinctive and sometimes obnoxious voice for the prevention of mass
atrocities. It has been—and will continue to be—hard to have it both ways.
Finding a distinct voice can be particularly difficult at the stage of structural prevention,
when states under stress are not yet at a crisis point. As this author commented in 2001, in the
context of conflict prevention, structural prevention strategies can confront a “dilemma of
comprehensiveness” in which so many factors are perceived as potentially relevant that there is no
basis for coherent priority setting or policy making.39 If everything is critical, then nothing is. More
recently, the UN’s joint office on genocide prevention and R2P developed a Framework of Analysis
for Atrocity Crimes that is being employed with increasing frequency around the UN system.40 As
a checklist, it has some merit. But, with 14 risk factors and 143 indicators, the Framework does not
provide a clear basis for determining the relative weight of the various factors and indicators. Most
importantly, it lacks a dynamic dimension and a sense of which of these elements matter the most
in which situations. For those decision makers charged with making quick and critical decisions
in situations of acute concern, an over-reliance on such generic lists or templates could lead to the
overlooking of those characteristics that make each situation unique.
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For these reasons, it is understandable that policy makers tend to put a premium on operational
over structural prevention. Early engagement with societies under stress can be helpful for
developing familiarity with the local dynamics and for gaining a modicum of mutual trust. Being
engaged, however, is not the same thing as making a difference when push comes to shove. Mass
atrocities are not spontaneous events. They require some degree of planning and mobilization,
flowing from a series of destructive choices over time. The United Nations, regional arrangements,
neighbors, influential governments, and civil society need to recognize opportunities to interrupt
and disrupt such a chain of decisions and actions before they become irreversible. Some regimes
and armed groups, of course, are determined to take such a course and cannot be dissuaded.
Others, however, are reachable and perhaps persuadable through some combination of reason,
carrots, and credible sticks. Local partners can be invaluable, particularly from civil society, media,
clergy, the private sector, and parliaments. Where no such partners can be engaged because of
the authoritarian or totalitarian nature of the political and security systems, as in Syria or the
DPRK, respectively, then external actors have much less to work with and less chance of making
a difference.
In all of this, getting the framing right is essential. That is why this author based the SecretaryGeneral’s R2P implementation strategy on the premise of “early and flexible response tailored to
the specific needs of each situation.”41 That is also why efforts to smooth out R2P’s rough edges
so that it can blend better with other UN mandates pose the risk of missing the most valuable
and distinctive elements of atrocity prevention work. This was not meant to be a comfortable,
inoffensive quest. Crafting the most productive conceptual and working relationships between
atrocity prevention and its conflict prevention, peacekeeping, human rights, and humanitarian
cousins may take some time. As even Goldilocks discovered, it takes patience to find the right fit.
But the effort is worth it.
How these conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional matters are resolved will matter far beyond
the confines of the world body. As discussed earlier, the UN’s unmatched political legitimacy and
legal authority mean that what it does and does not do, where it does or does not speak out, matter
much more than its deficits in material capacities would suggest. It is not a marginal player when it
comes to atrocity prevention, in operational as well as normative terms, because of its catalytic role
in encouraging regional and sub-regional bodies, governments, and civil society to step up when
atrocities are threatened and societies are under stress. Each time the UN fails to utilize its voice or
to try to make a difference, it feeds cynicism about the prospects for preventing mass atrocities and
makes such crimes appear to be normal, if not acceptable. The world body, in that regard, has an
enduring obligation to keep hope alive.
When costs and risks are high, the UN may have trouble rousing others to action, especially
when its own Security Council is divided. But it has a responsibility to try to make a difference.
Time has shown that the absence of its voice can be deafening when it decides to look the other
way, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. Each of its absences from the struggle for prevention,
just as its operational shortcomings, tends to undermine both its moral authority/legitimacy and
the strength of the norms, purposes, and principles for which it stands. In atrocity prevention,
people and governments expect the UN to demonstrate moral and political leadership. And they
notice when it fails to do so.
Remedies
Any honest enumeration of lessons learned about how to do atrocity prevention better is bound to
be both short and speculative. The base of experience is recent and scattered. Trying to prevent mass
atrocities is a recent endeavor, whether by governments, international institutions, or civil society.
The United Nations did not even begin to articulate a strategy—and that just to prevent genocide—
until 2004. Not surprisingly, the learning curve has proven to be quite steep. No one who has tried
to curb atrocities could ever claim it to be an easy or assured task. We are still learning how to do it.
It is essential to retain a profound sense of modesty about what has been accomplished and about
41
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what future prospects look like. Vulnerable populations should not expect the United Nations to
be anything close to a miracle worker, as it has at best proven to be a sometimes partner and/or
catalyst to prevention and, less often, to protection.
R2P, in this author’s view, offered two essential elements, both of which remain works in
progress. One was to underscore that the prevention of atrocity crimes imposes both individual
and collective responsibilities. Neither side of this equation will get far without the other. Notions
of collective responsibility bring collective action problems. As the UN illustrates all too well, in
this and most other areas, collective undertakings offer myriad opportunities for passing the buck.
Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, there is reason to believe that the unique political legitimacy
and legal authority offered by the United Nations and other inter-governmental bodies outweigh
the collective action dilemmas that multilateral approaches to problem-solving entail. Only
occasionally do other, more unilateral, avenues offer feasible and sustainable alternatives. The
collective action dilemmas associated with genocide prevention and R2P at the world body led this
author to emphasize the need for a parallel assumption of an individual responsibility to protect.42
As discussed above, the Secretariat can, and often has, acted without specific mandates from the
Security Council or other inter-governmental organs. Obviously, the best chance of making a
difference is when both individual and collective responsibilities are triggered at the UN and it has
willing partners at the regional, national, and local levels.
The second essential element offered by R2P was the possibility of drawing much broader
public, political, and media interest to prevention and protection issues. The fact that the assembled
heads of state and government at the 2005 World Summit endorsed R2P at a time when they could
not agree on many other matters was, in and of itself, quite remarkable. The Secretary-General’s
2009 implementation report generated the longest debate on any question in the General Assembly
that year, and there have been reports and Assembly debates (informal interactive dialogues) every
year since. The Security Council has referred to R2P in 62 resolutions as of June 2017, with the
frequency actually accelerating since the controversies over the use of force in Libya in 2011.43 The
academic and policy literature on R2P seems endless.
Much of the commentary has, naturally, been critical, but the essential point is that the advent
of R2P has undoubtedly spurred far more attention and analysis to the question of how to prevent
atrocity crimes and protect populations than had been achieved over the more than a half century
between the agreement on the Genocide Convention in 1948 and the ICISS report introducing
R2P in 2001. Whether that momentum is sustainable, however, remains an open question. The
progress with parliamentarians has been decidedly uneven and sporadic, and the discouraging
developments in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan appear to have had a dampening effect. As of
spring 2017, 59 governments had appointed R2P focal points, but there is little uniformity in their
backgrounds or assignments.44 It may be that too much of the action has been at the UN in New
York and too little in national capitals.
Atrocity prevention and R2P continue to be much more political than technical or institutional
challenges, though progress on the latter could affect political calculations about what is possible
and what the associated costs and risks of engagement are likely to be. Among the steps that could
be helpful at this point would be:
•
•
•

Assigning a higher priority to identifying, discouraging, and disrupting incitement.
Developing global, regional, and national doctrine and capacities for preventive
deployments of peacekeepers and monitors in countries under stress, such as was done in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Burundi.
Revisiting the initial conception of the PBC as an inter-governmental body concerned with
situations under stress and sliding towards conflict and possible atrocities as well as those
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•
•

•

emerging from conflict.
Reviving the convening function given to the Special Advisers for Genocide Prevention
and for R2P in the Secretary-General’s 2010 report on early warning and assessment.45
Initiating joint UN/African Union and UN/European Union assessments of lessons learned
from past efforts to prevent mass atrocities and of ways to enhance their collaboration
in operational prevention efforts in the future, including responding to incitement and
undertaking preventive deployments individually or jointly.
Preparing a report by Secretary-General Guterres on how atrocity prevention fits
thematically, operationally, and institutionally into his announced intention to prioritize
prevention strategies in the work of the United Nations.

None of these or similar steps could make much difference, however, without a more far-reaching
reassessment of the UN’s institutional culture when it comes to preventing atrocities and protecting
populations. Despite three wrenching mea culpa reports on Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Sri Lanka,
there remains a deep-seated resistance in the Secretariat and among the Member States to absorbing
the hard lessons of those fundamental failures. There have been two entrenched assumptions: one,
that the UN’s natural and proper stance towards parties should be one of impartiality and two, that
the use of force should always be a last resort. Neither assumption, in this author’s view, conforms
with the provisions or spirit of the Charter. Each has its place, but should not be applied uniformly,
especially when the risk of mass atrocities appears high and imminent.
The 2015 report of the Secretary-General on conflict prevention properly heralds the value
of impartiality for providing “access to a diverse number of stakeholders with whom we can
build trust and engage.”46 But it goes too far in asserting that the UN’s unique role stems from
“impartiality and the legitimacy derived from the principles of the Charter.”47 In fact, the Charter
never uses the term “impartiality” or anything similar, as this is an attribute for conflict resolution,
not a founding principle of the organization. There are times when the UN should be impartial
and others when it needs to take sides. To avoid the League of Nations’ debilitating shortage
of will and capacity, the founders of the UN did their best to prepare it to organize resistance
to aggression. In his report on The Fall of Srebrenica, Secretary-General Annan criticized the “the
general tendency to assume that the parties were equally responsible for the transgressions that
occurred,” which led to negotiations with those planning and executing atrocities that “amounted
to appeasement.”48 He faulted the “institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted
with attempted genocide.”49 And he concluded that “the men who have been charged with this
crime against humanity reminded the world and, in particular, the United Nations, that evil exists
in the world. They taught us also that the United Nations global commitment to ending conflict
does not preclude moral judgements, but makes them necessary.”50
The founders would also be surprised to learn that it has become customary at the UN to
assert that the use of force should always be a last resort. That is far from what they had in mind
in crafting the Charter. In preparing the Secretary-General’s 2009 strategy for implementing R2P,
this author used the phrase “measure of last resort” instead. This was meant to convey the notion
that force was not a preferred tool, given its costs, risks, and consequences, but that it should not be
relegated to consideration as a final, desperate, alternative when all else has failed. The stance of
some Member States and members of the Secretariat that force should be regarded as a last resort
in a sequential or chronological manner runs counter to the goal of protecting populations and
to Secretary-General Ban’s early and flexible response strategy. Regarding the latter, SecretaryGeneral Annan’s report took his predecessor to task for speaking “against a ‘culture of death’”
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and for “arguing that peace should be pursued only through non-military methods.”51 He
acknowledged that “errors of judgement were made—errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality
and non-violence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.”52 And he pointed to “the pervasive
ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace.”53
More than two decades after these horrific failures to protect, the debate over R2P illustrates
how deeply these inhibitions continue to affect the effort to articulate and implement an effective
UN strategy for curbing mass atrocities. For instance, Brazil’s ‘responsibility while protecting’
(RWP) proposal, whatever its other merits, would have imposed both a sequenced approach
to R2P implementation and a series of standards for Security Council authorization for the use
of force in stopping atrocities that do not exist for the Council’s employment of force for other
purposes.54 That approach certainly would not have been among the lessons drawn from Rwanda
and Srebrenica.
Given these multiple obstacles, some imposed and others self-generated, it is striking that the
United Nations has had any success at all in helping to prevent mass atrocities. It has undoubtedly
underperformed, but its assets, particularly in terms of legitimacy and authority, are both real and
sustainable. There are unrealized capacities on the Secretariat side and the Member States could do
much more if they had greater confidence that their investments in the world body would pay off
and if they generally placed a higher priority on preventing atrocities and protecting populations. If
there is good news about unrealized potential, it is that there are substantial opportunities waiting
to be pursued. At every level—individual, local, national, regional, and global—curbing atrocities
is a relatively new enterprise that could take decades to nurture and develop. Possible synergies
abound. It is time to stop pointing fingers, to start taking responsibility, and to get to work on
building the kind of partnerships that could make a real difference over time.
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Introduction1
In September 2013, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon adopted the Human Rights Up Front (HRUF)
initiative and communicated his decision in a letter to staff in November. He recommitted, on behalf
of the UN senior leadership and all staff, to uphold the responsibilities the Charter assigned them
whenever there is a threat of serious and large-scale violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law.2 His successor, Secretary-General Antonio Gutierrez, appears determined to
continue the initiative, with regard to the explicit reference in his vision statement3 and congratulating
his predecessor in general terms on HRUF in his remarks on taking the oath of office.4
Given the confidentiality that surrounds the initiative arising from fear of adverse Member
States’ reaction, it remains difficult to identify all of its elements and assess its current status of
implementation. However, based on publicly available UN documents, recent academic writing5
and public statements by UN officials, it is possible to attempt a preliminary evaluation of the
impact of the HRUF initiative and its potential contribution to the prevention of genocide and
other mass atrocity crimes.6
Context
Past UN Action in Situations of Mass Atrocities
According to Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson (DSG), the HRUF initiative is closely related
to the recommendations, which derived from past reports reviewing UN action in situations of
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, particularly the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.7
Secretary-General Ban made an explicit reference to the initiative in his remarks at the occasion of
the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Kigali in 2014. Thus, as a starting point for evaluating the
possible impact of the HRUF initiative on the prevention of and response to, mass atrocity crimes,
the main findings and recommendations of relevant reports will be reviewed.
1
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Secretary-General Annan established the Rwanda Commission of Inquiry in March 1999 and
he presented its report to the Security Council in December of that year.8 The Commission found
that the failure of the United Nations to prevent and, subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda
was a failure of the UN system as a whole. The Commission sought to contribute to preventing
similar tragedies in the future. The overriding failure the Commission established was a lack of
both resources and will to take on the commitment necessary to stop or prevent the genocide. The
sequence of events the Commission established in the interaction between the Secretariat, the
Security Council and a peacekeeping operation on the ground has been similar in other emergency
situations. The Commission looked at the actions of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR) rather than any other UN actor present in Rwanda. The Commission found, in
particular, inadequate peacekeeping resources and logistics, a lack of analytical capacity, a failure
to protect political leaders and civilians and a flawed information flow as the main reasons for the
UN’s “collective failure.”
Secretary-General Annan also submitted a report on the fall of Srebrenica in 1999, pursuant to
General Assembly resolution 53/35.9 That report aimed at drawing lessons for the Secretariat and
Member States from the UN’s response to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, particularly its
safe-area policy. While the report also reviewed humanitarian activities, it concentrated mainly on
the functioning of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the role of the Security
Council. Similar to the Rwanda report, it noted the UN’s difficulty securing sufficient numbers of
troops to protect the safe areas and the peacekeeping operation’s inadequate capacity, especially
the reluctance of Member States to use air power to support the operation. It also deplored the
lack of exchange of intelligence information with Member States, which was needed to arrive at a
shared analysis of the situation.
The Kosovo Commission of Inquiry was an independent initiative led by Göran Person,
then Prime Minister of Sweden. Its members were appointed in their personal capacity. The final
report was handed over to Secretary-General Annan for further consideration.10 The Commission
recommended closing the gap between legality and legitimacy and, with a view to the NATO
intervention, called for a principled framework to guide future interventions. The Commission
also recommended an increase in peacekeeping capacities to protect civilians on the ground. The
Commission’s analysis went beyond the limited scope of the Rwanda Commission to include the
role of humanitarian workers, NGOs and the media. In this regard the Commission noted a lack
of coordination of mainly donor driven humanitarian action, institutional rivalries within the UN
and a lack of sufficient high-level UN staff to address the diplomatic challenges. The media were
not supporting the humanitarian interests, but reported on the details of violence. The Commission
did not look at the role of other UN actors on the ground, such as development agencies.
In order to respond more systematically and coherently to the recommendations regarding
peacekeeping operations, the UN Secretariat initiated several broad reviews of UN doctrine and
the functioning of its missions.
In May 2000, Secretary-General Annan appointed a Panel to undertake a thorough review of the
UN peace and security activities, and to present specific, concrete and practical recommendations.
The Panel presented its report to the Security Council in November of that year.11 The report argued
that the UN’s impartiality was based on the Charter, which includes a number of values and historic
experience. Equal treatment of all parties irrespective of their roles as perpetrators or victims had
damaged the UN’s credibility in the past. The report concluded that, following the experience in
Rwanda and Srebrenica, UN troops and police who witness violence against civilians should be
presumed to be authorized to stop it within their means, in support of basic UN principles. Any
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UN peace operation must be able to pose a credible deterrent to potential spoilers and UN military
units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components, and the mission’s
mandate. The report found that in most situations of large-scale violence, the Secretariat was likely
to face the challenge of persuading Member States and the international community to step up
their efforts. In this regard, pessimism about the lack of political will and strongly held perceptions
about the interests of Security Council members were prevalent within the Secretariat and often
lead to hesitation and self-censorship. The report recommended the creation of an Information
and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to facilitate closer cooperation among the key departments and a
more strategic UN approach to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.
Secretary-General Ban appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
in October 2014 to review the current state of UN peace operations. In its report, the Panel
recommended shifting the UN’s focus and, giving primacy to politics, tailoring all missions to
context, stronger partnerships with regional organizations, a stronger focus on enabling field
missions, and a renewed resolve to serve and protect the people.12
The Impact of the Review of UN Action at the End of the Conflict in Sri Lanka
The HRUF initiative explicitly encompasses a series of steps foreseen by the 2012 Review Panel
report on United Nations action in Sri Lanka13 to ensure that the lessons of that experience are fully
learned and acted upon.
The Secretary-General’s internal review panel on Sri Lanka was created in 2010 following the
recommendation of the Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka the previous year, which had suggested that
the UN review its own action during the end phase of the conflict between the government and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The internal review panel was requested to look in
particular into implementation of the UN’s humanitarian and protection mandates and to make
recommendations to strengthen UN country teams (UNCTs) and the UN as a whole to respond to
‘escalated conflict’. The UN had been present in Sri Lanka throughout the conflict, which began in
the 1970s, and worked on the basis of a joint United Nations Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF) and a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and within established coordination
and reporting structures with headquarters in a non-mission setting.
The Panel reviewed rather comprehensively the history of the Secretariat’s internal decision
making history, between agencies at headquarters and in the field, and the discussions within
various governmental bodies such as the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and the
General Assembly. Rather than analyzing the role of Member States, the Panel made an important
contribution by identifying lacunae in the joint analysis and planning capacities at UN headquarters
and in the field during crisis, the lack of a common sense of purpose between the different
agencies, funds, and entities serving under the same UN flag, and the lack of an UNDAF analysis
of government related root causes for conflict and crisis mainly due to institutional competition
and narrow approaches to mandate implementation.
The recommendations built explicitly on the Rwanda report and, not surprisingly, stressed
the importance of its findings for non-mission settings. However, the report was the first review
of UN action in a non-mission context during a situation of unfolding mass atrocity crimes. The
vast majority of UN presences are organized in a similar operational setting and, thus, the main
responsibility for the internal organization of their cooperation rests with the UNCT rather than
Member States.14  
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Following the report of the panel, the Secretary-General tasked the UN system to develop an
action plan to ensure that the necessary lessons were drawn and that the UN was better positioned
to deal with protection challenges during conflict. The HRUF policy is the direct result of these
efforts.
The Human Rights Up Front Initiative
Objectives
The HRUF initiative is essentially an internal UN Action Plan, based on the findings of the Sri
Lanka report and building on recommendations emanating from previous reports on UN action in
situations of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that amount
to mass atrocity crimes. The objectives of the initiative are to introduce a cultural change within
the UN, an operational change to bring the three pillars of the UN Charter, i.e. development, peace
and security, and human rights closer together, and a change to UN engagement with Member
States.15 These objectives are sought to be reached by undertaking a list of activities outlined in the
Action Plan.
HRUF is primarily a prevention tool and aims at strengthening the link between early-warning
and early-action. It includes procedures to more systematically review the unique information and
analysis available from UN field presences, covering almost every country in the world. It is based
on a general recognition that human rights violations are early indicators of a deteriorating situation
and that field presences can observe changing events and discuss them with their counterparts on
the ground. The initiative includes mechanisms for responding to crisis, but seeks to avoid the
creation of new heavy structures and to remain cost neutral, in an attempt to remain below the
level requiring Member States’ budget approval.16
Different from past initiatives, HRUF seeks to ensure that the UN leverages the full breadth
of its existing development, peace and security, and human rights mandates to protect people at
risk, based on a collective and individual recommitment of its staff to their responsibilities under
the Charter. The individual responsibility of staff members is put into the wider dictum that there
can not be peace without development, no development without peace, and there can be neither
without human rights.17
Implementation
With a view to the limited implementation rate of recommendations contained in past panel
reports, the most senior UN officials, namely Secretary-General Ban and the DSG, promoted and
supported implementation of the initiative through heavy personal engagement.
As can be gathered from the documents available,18 implementation measures of the HRUF
initiative since March 2014 has been considerable and has included measures to clarify the UN
vision and responsibility for preventing and responding to serious violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law, UN engagement with Member States, UN action at country
level, and UN headquarters coordination, in an effort to anchor HRUF permanently in the UN.
Secretary-General Ban shared the renewed commitment to the peoples and purposes of the
UN with Member States on different occasions. In December 2013, the DSG delivered remarks at
a briefing of the General Assembly on HRUF19 and sought the views of Member States in Geneva
15
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in July 2014. The DSG updated Member States on the progress that had been made in his remarks
during a panel discussion in commemoration of Human Rights Day 2015.20 In January 2016, he held
an interactive dialogue with the General Assembly on HRUF.21 For the purposes of that briefing,
the Secretary-General previously had summarized his interaction with Member States on HRUF in
a letter to the President of the General Assembly.22
The DSG’s letter to Special Representatives and Envoys23 and the joint letter with the chair of the
United Nations Development Group24 (UNDG)25 reflected the endorsement of the commitment by
the different UN entities, defined their respective roles and responsibilities, and encouraged them
to discuss the Action Plan with their senior staff. Resident Coordinators (RCs) were encouraged to
undertake discussions with their country teams and share their suggestions. The joint letter with
the chair of UNDG was also an attempt to reach out directly to local heads of agencies, funds and
programmes, which are only under a limited supervision by the Secretary-General.
The commitment was also embedded in human resources management processes through
including effective advocacy of human rights and other UN values, standards, principles and
activities in the RC job description.26 Reportedly, 13,000 staff from across various UN entities
attended a newly developed mandatory online training on human rights responsibilities.27 Senior
UN staff is held accountable for fulfilling their responsibilities regarding the prevention of and
response to, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law through a
revised performance appraisal system for UNCTs and RCs, which includes an annual evaluation
with more systematic participation of the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights
(OHCHR) and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) with regard to the evaluation of the
human rights and political aspects of the revised RC job description.
The Secretariat engaged pro-actively with Member States in the Security Council on situations
of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Council’s Informal
Expert Group on Protection of Civilians continued to meet regularly and was briefed on key
protection concerns in country-specific situations, actions taken to address these concerns and
suggestions for possible language to be incorporated in Security Council resolutions. Since the
adoption of the HRUF initiative, the expert group has convened several times regarding the
situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Mali, and Somalia.28 The DPA used a new informal meeting format, the
“DPA briefing”, which has been considered by some a successor to the “horizon scanning” started
in 2010.29 The use of the agenda items “any other business” has increased since the adoption of
20
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the HRUF initiative and was used, inter alia, to discuss specific incidents in CAR, Guinea-Bissau,
Libya, Mali, Burundi, Syria and Yemen.30
At the country level, the UNDG issued interim UNDAF guidance which aims at reflecting
better human rights concerns in Common Country Assessments (CCA) and UNDAF processes,
including the implementation of development and humanitarian activities.31 The UNDG Human
Rights Working Group acts as the lead mechanism through which the UNDG can effectively
deliver on the responsibilities and demands made on the UN development system by the HRUF
initiative.32 So far, interdisciplinary light teams, mainly comprised of OHCHR, DPA and the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), were deployed to Lesotho, Burkina Faso and Nigeria
in order to support UNCTs with conflict prevention and human rights capacity in critical moments
of prevention.33
Some basic procedures and mechanisms were established for better coordination of earlywarning and early action at UN headquarters. In order to better organize its early warning
and crisis management system, the HRUF initiative looks to develop strategies for different
countries through a Regional Quarterly Review (RQR). The RQR is a mechanism through which
representatives of UN system regional divisions at headquarters scan all countries in their respective
region every three months for early warning signs (developmental, political, humanitarian, or
explicitly human rights) and then discuss in more detail those situations that are “evolving” and
can presage the risk of serious violations and crisis. Where there is a UN country presence, the
senior UN official is consulted by the RQR co-chairs (DPA and Regional UNDG) on the situation.
In case of a heightened risk of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law, the senior UN representative on the ground or headquarters can call for the establishment
of an Inter-Agency Task Force (ITF), which will serve as the principal coordination platform
at headquarters.
A Senior Action Group (SAG), which can be convened by the DSG, may provide guidance
from executive heads of departments and agencies in situations of a high risk of or ongoing, serious
violations.
Reportedly, the response mechanism was activated in 2014 in response to developments in
CAR and South Sudan. Early support from headquarters allowed the United Nations Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) to continue its “open gate” policy, which succeeded in directly protecting
75,000 people in December 2013.34
Perceptions by UN Staff
The DSG reported on the enthusiastic reception of the HRUF initiative by staff. At the same time,
it can be perceived that staff at the country level and within small UNCTs may be less enthousiatic
regarding their capacity to implement the initiative and may hope that business as usual will
return, given the UN’s past track-record of change following similar initiatives. This likelihood has
increased for guidance material being available only in English; staff members in Arabic, French
securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/horizon-scanning-briefings.php.
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and Spanish speaking countries may not be able to study the related material themselves and will
have to rely on summaries and oral presentations
Heads of agencies at the country level are often unclear about the authority of the SecretaryGeneral versus their Executive Directors and may wait for more detailed instructions coming from
their own headquarters. As past experience has shown, there is a general concern over the negative
impact on their cooperation with their host governments if they started referring to human rights
considerations. Moreover, they often lack the capacity to undertake this analysis. It may be difficult
for development and humanitarian agencies to see a benefit for the implementation of their
country programmes from the present guidance material on HRUF. Many UNCTs, including those
involved in a RQR, may not feel sufficiently included in the discussions in New York.
In addition, the perception of HRUF suffers from its unclear relationship with the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P). While there is a clear parallel between the initiative and pillar 2 and the former
could, in fact, contribute to the implementation of the latter, the policy does not clarify this
relationship leaving it open to speculation in a difficult political environment for both policies.
Evaluation of the HRUF Initiative Regarding the Prevention of and Response to Mass Atrocity
Crimes
General Observations
The HRUF initiative is an ambitious policy regarding the prevention of and response to, serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, which has already accomplished
more than similar initiatives in the past. The Action Plan provides all of the elements of a
comprehensive strategy for implementing R2P as it has been discussed since 2005, in particular
clear leadership by the Secretary-General based on the Charter, a recommitment to the principles
and purposes of the Charter in order to close the commitment gap, and steps to counter the
resource gap tailored to align existing processes and structures with the overarching purpose of
preventing people from mass atrocity crimes starting with those structures and processes under the
authority of the Secretary-General.35 The “open gate” policy applied by UNMISS in South Sudan is
an impressive example of the possibilities for the UN to physically protect people from violence.36
Notwithstanding these first successful steps taken under the HRUF, it should be asked whether
factors, which inhibited the implementation of past recommendations, have been adequately
addressed under HRUF. In addition, the situation in Sri Lanka was characterized by a high level of
public attention to the situation, but Member States in the Security Council, the General Assembly
and the Human Rights Council, nevertheless, were not able to agree on joint action. The prevailing
deadlock led to increased self-censoring within the Secretariat and the UNCT as staff attempted
to avoid contributing to the deadlock, while upholding their ability to deliver humanitarian relief.
HRUF needs to be sufficiently specific regarding guidance and requires strong leadership from the
Secretary-General when confronting this type of scenario.
It should be noted that the documents and statements related to HRUF lack reference to the
legal responsibilities of Member States regarding violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law. Human rights accountability will need to be established more concretely in each
country situation, taking into consideration the recommendations and findings of UN human rights
mechanisms regarding the respective country and the general observations on the interpretation
of particular rights and corresponding obligations in order to make the implementation appear
impartial and non-politicized. Article VIII of the Genocide Convention37 could be used as an
encompassing framework for the initiative, if the relationship between HRUF and R2P was clarified.

35

E.g. Ekkehard Strauss, The Emperor’s New Clothes? The United Nations and the Implementation Of The Responsibility To
Protect (Berlin: Nomos, 2009), 122-137.

36

For more details e.g. UN News Centre, “UN Action Saved Thousands in South Sudan: Peacekeeping Chief,” April
2, 2014, accessed December 31, 2017, https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/un-action-saved-thousands-in-south-sudanpeacekeeping-chief.

37

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)).

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

UN Secretary-General’s Human Rights Up Front Initiative

55

The Relationship Between HRUF and R2P
While in practice there is an overlap between the situations considered under the R2P and the
HRUF, the relationship between “serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law” and
mass atrocity crimes remains unclear. In addition, the whole history of HRUF, which is built upon
past reports of UN shortcomings, points towards a close relationship. Secretary-General Ban has
referred to “atrocities and egregious crimes” in his presentations to Member States, which came
very close to R2P language. This wording was later replaced for the more general and legalistic
expressions of “serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law”. It will be
important to link “serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law” to mass atrocity
crimes through a more concrete description of the scenarios the UN has committed to prevent or
halt and link their different elements to HRUF and R2P.38 In general, R2P could provide arguments
and approaches in cases, where early-warning indicators point towards mass atrocity crimes. In
addition, the application of R2P to the respective country situation could clarify responsibilities
for taking action agreed in the ITF or SAG. Depending on the risk-level determined and the risks
identified, action may be required by political bodies, UN entities - including the Special Adviser
on the Prevention of Genocide - or remain at the country level, according to available genocide
prevention methodology.
At the same time, HRUF could weaken the application of the R2P by the UN. While in the past
the Secretary-General used the latter to call on Member States to provide the mandate and resources
for the UN to intervene in situations of evolving mass atrocity crimes, HRUF offers a possibility to
carve out space for UN entities sheltered from the political bodies. Given the considerable political
investment of the Secretary-General in situations like Syria or Yemen and the negative impact on
the authority of the UN of Member States not following his call, HRUF could lead the SecretaryGeneral in future situations to concentrate on internal coordination rather than pleading to nonreceptive Member States to uphold their R2P obligations.
The Institutional Commitment
The HRUF, like other initiatives for cooperation among UN entities, has to rely on an institutional
commitment based on a limited legal basis for cooperation between specialized agencies and
the Secretary-General in the Charter.39 Specialized agencies, and similarly other UN funds and
programmes, were created for a greater independence in their operational activities in order
to depoliticize certain areas of international cooperation. They are funded through voluntary
contributions by Member States, are legally independent and supervised through specific Member
States structures. Some of the executive heads of specialized agencies are appointed by the
Secretary-General and members of the Chief Executive Board of Coordination (CEB), chaired by
the Secretary-General. Thus, the cooperation of specialized agencies, funds and programmes are
mainly based on the cooperation provision in the respective relationship agreement with the UN
and, ultimately, the cooperation of Member States in their governing bodies.
On the implementation of HRUF, RCs, as representatives of the UNCT, should report to a
joint cell in the EOSG rather than the head of UNDP in her capacity as head of UNDG, which
creates a constant conflict of interest when the RC is also the UNDP resident representative. This
would compensate for the lack of authority of the Secretary-General over agencies, funds and
programmes outside the Secretariat, provide direct access to RCs and UNCTs and underline the
centrality of HRUF at the field level.
In this regard, the present scope of HRUF may be generally too broad, as it applies a policy,
which derived primarily from recommendations developed after reviewing the extraordinary
circumstances of the end phase of the conflict in Sri Lanka to any country situation and applies
38
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to all human rights violations. This can expose the UNCT and its members to criticism by the
host government, whose cooperation many agencies and funds require for implementation of their
country programmes. OHCHR, which suffers from considerable funding gaps, may soon find itself
overstretched by its role in implementing the policy, which may lead to HRUF being ignored at the
country level. Instead, the elements of HRUF should be implemented by every UNCT according to
a central schedule and based on questionnaires and reporting guidance distributed by the EOSG.
This exercise should benefit from the presence of OHCHR, but should not rely on OHCHR for its
implementation.
When the DSG referred to human rights as the “lifeblood” of the UN, he pointed out an
important difference between the UN system and, in particular, bi-lateral development and
humanitarian actors, i.e. the universal normative framework for all UN action. At the country level,
each UN field presence accepted in general human rights and humanitarian law as a basis for joint
planning and implementation. This institutional commitment will be sustainable if, inter alia, this
position of the UN can be promoted at the country level without a major drop in funding compared
to other multi-lateral and bi-lateral actors. UNCT members often compete for limited voluntary
contributions by Member States for their activities and support for HRUF will depend in the longterm on its impact on access to this funding.
At the more practical level, HRUF will be difficult to sustain over time without a common
information management system linking the field and headquarters, and headquarter entities.
The Individual Commitment of Senior Managers and All Other Staff Members
Unlike past reforms, the HRUF initiative builds on explicit individual commitments of senior
managers and all other staff members.
In addition to institutional and structural approaches, which have not lead to sustainable
change in the past, HRUF emphasizes the responsibility of every UN staff member to protect
human rights regardless of the field in which he or she is working.
The individual responsibility placed on senior staff and each lower level staff member is meant
to be compensated by headquarters. The letters of the DSG acknowledged that it was often difficult
to choose between the wider humanitarian and development roles and raising serious human
rights concerns. The DSG pledged that headquarters would take over the burden of raising serious
concerns with state authorities.40 The use of Charter article 99 by the Secretary-General in a welldocumented and analysed case could encourage all staff members that the risks related to their
individual commitment to speak out is equally shared by the Secretary-General himself. However,
the structural and procedural distance between RCs, UNCTs and headquarters regarding the RQR
and the coordination through the ITFs or SAG will hardly encourage UN staff in the field to raise the
alarm, as the possibilities for the field to influence the analysis and its role in decision-making may
be very limited and could create concerns of overriding political considerations at headquarters
determining the response strategy. It could be preferable to apply the principle of subsidiarity to the
response to country situations, i.e. to prioritize local action and participation of local stakeholders
over headquarters and, first, target the impact level of violence and the immediate perpetrators
and, second, the broader underlying economic and political interests at stake.
The individual commitment of each staff member could make a decisive contribution to the
sustainability of HRUF, if the UN succeeded in an increasingly polarized world, united mainly
in rejecting international human rights and humanitarian norms running counter to short-term
political and economic interests, to bring its diverse work-force behind a commitment that puts
them in conflict with many Member States as donors, host-countries or members of mandating
bodies. The policy and the accompanying material must be translated into all six UN languages
as soon as possible and new material should not be distributed before it exists at least in English,
French, Spanish and Arabic. This will avoid the impression in the field that HRUF is an initiative
promoted mainly by a former Secretary-General, which will go away over time as similar initiatives
in the past.
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The individual commitment of all staff and its inclusion in personnel management tools aims
at mainstreaming its content into day-to-day action by individual staff members. The approach
of mainstreaming the objectives of HRUF may suffer from the same deficits observed regarding
the mainstreaming of other cross-cutting issues in the past, including gender, HIV/AIDS and
human rights, unless this general approach is broken down into a list of implementable practical
and compulsory activities summarized in a thematic compendium with proposed forms and
concrete language. The individual commitment can be translated into individual action only if
the respective staff member had simple and practical tools available for the application of the
HRUF and understood his/her role in the context of the broader early-warning and early-action
methodology applied. The repeated assertion by the DSG that human rights violations are often a
precursor to mass atrocities remains too general. The connection between the violation of particular
rights and their impact on specific risk factors in a particular country situation remains too vague
and requires fine tuning for each country. While any risk analysis will become more reliable after
a long-term process of data collection over several years, the expectations towards HRUF are very
high. Thus, there is a need to design a strategy for the application of different methodologies of
data collection and analysis over the coming years. In addition, detailed analysis could be limited
initially to a number of countries, while undertaking more of a screening for others until they pass
a particular threshold, i.e. if a ‘real risk’ of mass atrocity crimes actually appears.41
Regarding senior managers, annual instructions, including generic elements for the inclusion
in annual work-plans of RCs and UNCTs, should be developed by the EOSG as a constant reminder
of HRUF.
Implication of Member States
Unlike past reforms, the implementation of the HRUF Action Plan does not depend entirely on
Member States’ prior approval.
Notwithstanding its focus on elements under the prerogative of the Secretary-General,
ultimately, for the different reasons stated above, HRUF will depend on the cooperation of
Member States to become sustainable. Thus, it will be important to navigate the different political
sensitivities by using all existing tools with great flexibility and to time interventions carefully.
Given its connection to the UN’s failure to respond adequately to the situation in Sri Lanka,
the HRUF initiative will have to prove its impact on other situations where no UN peace mission
is on the ground and which are not on the Security Council’s agenda. While Member States have
reiterated the importance of early-warning and discussed possible procedures in the Security
Council, general sensitivity of early-warning briefings has not been overcome. This suggests that
there will continue to be limitations to the enhancement of cooperation with Member States on
situations of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
Conclusion
The HRUF initiative is a promising new attempt to reinforce the UN’s capacity to prevent and
respond to, serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. It encompasses the lessonslearned from past failure and translates them into realistic and modest new processes and structures.
Given the difficult global environment for the protection and promotion of human rights, it is yet
to be seen whether the organization will be granted the time and space required for the initiative to
be fully implemented. Much will depend on whether the Member States are prepared to promote
in practice early-warning and conflict prevention as main elements of a collective a norms-based
international order.
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Introduction
The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities involves normative as well as practical challenges.
To motivate effective action to deter or halt mass killings of civilians, it is first necessary to persuade
the relevant actors of the legitimacy and necessity of such a policy. The struggle to implement robust
atrocity prevention measures is often lost at the normative level. Key government decision-makers
may decide that the prevention of atrocities is peripheral, or even antithetical, to “core national
security interests.”1 Conversely, when the United States or other great powers do intervene to
protect civilians, they may arouse suspicion from other parties. As the Albright-Cohen Genocide
Prevention Task Force observed in 2008, many governments “regard assertive U.S. policies as
ultimately self-interested, even or perhaps especially when framed in terms of humanitarian
purposes.”2
Comprising fifty-seven participating States “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,”3 the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides a particularly salient case
study of the normative dimension of atrocity prevention efforts. The OSCE is the successor to the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), established by the Helsinki Final Act
of 1975 with the goal of finding “common ground through a process of dialogue, norm-setting, and
consensus” among the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The CSCE was “designed
as a process, with an informal structure that could provide flexibility” in promoting “common and
comprehensive” security.4 In the words of former OSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Höynck, “[T]
he Final Act affirmed that the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential
factor for the peace, justice, and well-being, necessary to ensure the development of friendly
relations and cooperation.”5
The end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes both to the structure and mission of
the CSCE. Between 1990 and 1992, the organization established a formal institutional structure
including a Secretariat, a Permanent Council of ambassadors from all participating States, the
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the Office for Free Elections (later to become the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or ODIHR), the Forum for Security Co-operation, and
the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).6 In 1995, the CSCE was
renamed the OSCE, reflecting this formalization of its institutional structure.
With an annual operating budget for 2017 of EUR 139 million (including EUR 4.7 million for
Conflict Prevention and EUR 3.4 million for the HCNM), the OSCE has been described as a “flea”
in comparison to the “elephant” of the European Union (EU), whose 2017 budget was more than
a thousand times larger.7 Despite its limited resources and lack of coercive power, the OSCE has
1
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played a critical role in preventing or containing violence against civilians in numerous regions of
Europe and Central Asia. As Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell argued in a 1999 essay, the CSCE/
OSCE mechanisms for preventive diplomacy
have proven to be the real workhorses of the international community in its attempts to
control substate conflict in post-Cold War Europe…. CSCE mechanisms have been involved
in managing far more potential substate conflict situations that either [NATO or the EU]…
Moreover, nearly all of these missions involved circumstances where it would have been
impossible for states to have used either of the other two institutions for collective intervention,
because neither had been endowed with the instruments to deal with prevailing conditions.8

In recent years, however, some observers have questioned the effectiveness of the OSCE’s
work, remarking on the “growing futility”9 of the OSCE as the EU has expanded its political and
security-related missions. During the Cold War, a clear demarcation existed between the structure
and function of the European Economic Community (EEC) and that of the CSCE: the EEC was a
regional organization focusing on the economic integration of Western Europe, whereas the CSCE
was an informal dialogue process promoting cooperative security measures between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. In 1993, the EEC was subsumed under the EU, which had a more comprehensive
mission including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Over the past quarter-century, a
“functional convergence” has occurred between the EU and OSCE. Not only has the EU expanded
eastward into the former Warsaw Pact region, it has increasingly taken on political and security
functions, such as election monitoring and security sector reform, that had previously been the
province of the OSCE.10 The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU has also put the Russian
Federation on the defensive. Russian leaders have argued that “instead of acting as a genuine
transatlantic organization, the OSCE has evolved into an institution that seeks to act as a tool of
Western influence, pushing forward an agenda of excessive intrusion and potential destabilization
in Russia’s neighborhood.”11 As long ago as 2006, one expert asserted: “The OSCE is in crisis. . . .
There can be no doubt but that the OSCE today, as compared to its heyday during the Cold War, is
a far less visible landmark on the European institutional landscape than was formerly the case.”12
This essay will argue that the OSCE continues to play a unique and vital role in preventing and
containing ethnic conflict in Europe and Central Asia, but that its greatest distinctive strength—
the capacity to help foster shared political norms supporting “common and comprehensive
security”—has eroded since the late 1990s. Part I of the essay will discuss the original operating
concept of the CSCE and OSCE, which sought to constitute a cooperative transatlantic security
community through the promulgation of shared norms. Part II will examine the erosion of the
normative consensus between the Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE since the
late 1990s, focusing on some Eastern states’ distrust for the Western democracy promotion agenda.
Finally, Part III will examine the prospects for a more robust role of the OSCE in protecting civilians
from violent conflict and mass atrocities, given the increasing tensions among Eastern and Western
OSCE participating States in recent years.
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The OSCE Ideal: Community Building Through Norm Formation
Emanuel Adler has evocatively termed the OSCE an “imagined security community,” describing
the logic of the organization’s founders as follows:
[T]he OSCE has adopted the view that you must first let the largest number of people from
different states imagine that they are part of a community; only then, when all have formally
and instrumentally accepted the institution’s shared normative structures and practices, do
you socialize their elites and peoples by means of continual diplomatic interaction and a
wide range of community-building practices.13

Adler’s description of the OSCE community-building enterprise points to the power of norms not
only to constrain or regulate behavior but also to constitute new communal identities:
When assessing and measuring the influence of OSCE’s practices, we cannot simply look at
this institution’s regulative tasks or short-range activities, because what matters most is the
long-range effectiveness of its practices and activities as constitutive of community identity
and bonds . . . [W]hat matters most is not the short-range success of the mission, seminar,
or inspection, but the construction of a foundation for community practice and behavior.14

Although it might be tempting to dismiss the OSCE’s “seminar diplomacy” as an elaborate
sleight of hand, conjuring the illusion of a transatlantic community that remains purely imaginary,
this would ignore the real historical impact of the CSCE/OSCE enterprise. During the 1970s and
1980s, the Helsinki Process created a space for the articulation of human rights claims by dissident
groups in the Warsaw Pact, which played a role in facilitating a peaceful end to the Cold War. Since
the early 1990s, the HCNM and other OSCE institutions have sought to foster “an environment
characterized by shared meanings, trust, increased cooperation, and a sense of common identity.”15
For all the frustrations and setbacks involved in this project, there have also been important
successes.
Of the various component institutions of the OSCE, two are particularly relevant to the mission
of atrocity prevention: the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), along with the field operations that it
supports, and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). These will be
the focus of analysis for this paper.
Created in 1990, the CPC “acts as an OSCE-wide early warning focal point, facilitates
negotiation, mediation, and other conflict prevention and resolution efforts, and supports regional
co-operation initiatives.”16 In its initial years, the CPC focused principally on reducing risks of
interstate conflict among the OSCE participating States, for example by promoting Confidence and
Security Building Measures such as exchange of military information.
Over the past two decades, the mandate of the CPC has expanded to include early warning,
situation monitoring, mediation and dialogue facilitation, and support for OSCE field operations,
among other roles. It supports mediation initiatives in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria,
and Georgia.17 The OSCE also currently deploys sixteen field operations in South-Eastern Europe,
Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, addressing issues including reconciliation
and human rights protection in the Balkan states, conflict monitoring in Ukraine, and the monitoring
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and prevention of ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan.18
The HCNM, which was created in 1992 in response to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, has
played the most robust role within the OSCE in the prevention of mass atrocities and other forms of
ethnic conflict. In the 1990s alone, the HCNM was involved in mediations in thirteen states, and the
OSCE deployed thirteen missions of long duration in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central
Asia.19 OSCE interventions helped prevent conflict or defuse political crises in Estonia, Latvia, the
Crimea, and Albania. In other regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova, the OSCE
was unable to facilitate negotiated settlements to the conflicts. Nonetheless, even there its missions
may have “made important contributions by keeping negotiations open and by preserving the
cease-fires that… prevented large-scale violence from reappearing.”20 In recent years, the HCNM
has continued its intensive and wide-ranging activities. In May 2016, High Commissioner Astrid
Thors reported that over the past six months, she had traveled to ten countries—Kyrgyzstan,
Serbia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and
Macedonia—for consultations on issues related to national minorities.21
According to the 1992 Helsinki Document, the HCNM was intended to “be an instrument of
conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.” The office’s mandate was described as follows:
The High Commissioner will provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action”
at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which
have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgment of the High
Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area, affecting
peace, stability or relations between participating States.22

Under the mandate established by the Helsinki Document, the HCNM has the authority to
act independently, without approval either from other OSCE authorities or from the concerned
state, in order to address situations involving national minorities that have the potential to
escalate into violence. Max van der Stoel, a former Dutch foreign minister who served as the first
High Commissioner, has described the HCNM as “an independent, nonstate entity but with the
political support of member-states… This depoliticized, multilateral approach allows the High
Commissioner to employ cooperative, noncoercive problem-solving techniques…”23
In describing the early work of the HCNM in preventing ethnic violence in post-Cold War
Europe, Van der Stoel emphasized the normative foundations of his office’s authority. In a 1999
article, he asserted that
the HCNM’s independence follows naturally from the logic of international public interest
that underlies the concept of comprehensive security. Indeed, I believe it is now well
established that the multilateralism that created and sustains the HCNM offers opportunities
to address highly charged and potentially violent situations in a somewhat depoliticized
manner—at least at arm’s length through an impartial intermediary.24

18

Alice Ackermann, “Strengthening the OSCE’s Capacities in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Conflict
Resolution” Security and Human Rights 23, no. 1 (2012), 11-18; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe,
“Where We Are,” accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/where; Organization for Security and CoOperation in Europe, Conflict Prevention Center, Survey of OSCE Field Operations (Vienna: OSCE, October 2017, OSCE
Doc. SEC/GAL/27/16), accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/74783?download=true.

19

Flynn and Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace, 507.

20

P. Terrence Hopmann, “Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Peaceworks, no.
31 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 1999), 45.

21

Astrid Thors, “Address by Astrid Thors, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, to the 1102nd Plenary
Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council” (speech, Vienna, June 2, 2016) OSCE.

22

Quoted in Max Van der Stoel, “The Role of the OSCE High Commission in Conflict Prevention,” in Herding Cats:
Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 1999), 68.

23

Van der Stoel, The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner, 65.

24

Ibid., 70.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

Levinger

64

Although van der Stoel saw the HCNM’s independence as a critical prerequisite for its success, he
also stressed that the High Commissioner “could not function properly without the political support
of the participating States.”25 He declared:
Durable solutions are possible only if there is a sufficient measure of goodwill and consent
from the parties directly involved. I always endeavor to find such solutions and to bring
the parties to a consensus. I always try to find mutually agreeable solutions and to offer my
assistance in implementing measures. I am there to assist OSCE participating States that are
experiencing difficulties, and I work together with the parties on the basis of their good faith
and their mutual interest in settling difficulties with a view to enjoying a more peaceful and
prosperous life together.26

Thus, for example, he stressed that “the protection of persons belonging to national minorities has
to be seen as essentially in the interest of the state”; and conversely, that “solutions that allow for
the full realization of the aspirations of persons belonging to minorities should be sought as much
as possible within the framework of the state itself.”27
Van der Stoel was careful to emphasize the convergence of shared values and interests that
motivated the members of the OSCE community. This convergence was emphasized by the
very blandness of his own professional title: he was not the “High Commissioner for National
Minorities”—an advocate or ombudsman for threatened ethnic groups—but rather the “High
Commissioner on National Minorities,” charged with preventing and managing substate conflicts
related to minority rights.
From the outset of the Helsinki Process, there have been normative tensions within the OSCE
community-building enterprise. The Helsinki Final Act recognized not only the inviolability of
European borders but also the principle of self-determination—which had the potential to redraw
borders. Likewise, it asserted the principle of noninterference in states’ internal affairs while
also guaranteeing respect for human rights—which legitimated human rights monitoring of the
Warsaw Pact states. In addressing conflicts over minority rights, the OSCE has emphasized the
importance of resolving such conflicts without disrupting existing borders. In OSCE practice, write
Flynn and Farrell,
The norm of self-determination was not only subordinated to the norm of inviolability of
borders; it was also effectively removed as an independent principle of international relations
in Europe separable from the norm of democracy. Self-determination was to be directly and
exclusively related to creating political institutions that would protect cultural and ethnic
differences within common frameworks, rather than using these differences as a basis in
themselves for separation.28

In the next section, we will examine several case studies that illustrate how the normative authority
of the OSCE has played a role in preventing or containing ethnic violence in Europe and Central
Asia, as well as how that authority has eroded since the late 1990s.
Case Studies: The Declining Normative Authority of the OSCE
Although the OSCE’s mandate contains no formal provision referring to the prevention of genocide
or mass atrocities, several of its diplomatic interventions during the 1990s played an important
role in defusing crises that had the potential to result in large-scale violence against civilians. Its
efforts were generally more effective in regions that had not yet reached the boiling point—such as
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Estonia, Latvia, and Crimea—than in active conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, or NagornoKarabakh.
After the Soviet Union annexed Estonia and Latvia in 1940, significant Soviet military bases
were established in both republics, and large numbers of ethnic Russians moved into the region.
By 1989, a third of the population of Estonia and 42 percent of the population of Latvia consisted
of Russians and other Slavic nationalities. When the Baltic states achieved their independence in
1991, tensions intensified between the Baltic and Slavic ethnic groups, particularly in Estonia and
Latvia. Ethnic Estonians and Latvians, resenting the half-century-long Soviet “occupation” and
the accompanying suppression of their national languages and cultures, denied citizenship rights
to ethnic Russians who had entered the country after 1940. The countries’ Russian minorities,
many of whom had supported independence, felt betrayed by the restrictive citizenship laws. The
Russian government weighed in by vocally supporting the Russian minorities; and, in October
1992, it suspended the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the Baltics, citing its concern
for the violation of Russian minority rights. Outside observers grew concerned that Russia might
capitalize on the crisis to justify military intervention in the Baltic states.29
The OSCE’s conciliation efforts between the Baltic governments and their Russian minorities
included the establishment of missions of long duration in Estonia (1992-2001) and Latvia (19932001), along with numerous visits by the HCNM, Max Van der Stoel. The OSCE missions steered
clear of recommending wholesale revisions to the countries’ restrictive citizenship laws, but
encouraged them to implement the laws with greater lenience and to make it easier for members of
minority groups to pass the citizenship tests, for example by expanding access to language classes
to enable Russian speakers to pass language exams. At the same time, the missions consulted
extensively with the leaders of the minority communities in both countries, urging them to accept
and cooperate with the national governments, rather than taking destabilizing actions that might
have provoked Russian military intervention.30
The Crimean Peninsula, whose population was about 67 percent ethnic Russian, had been
transferred as a “gift” to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. The
issue of the Crimeans’ national identity became salient only after 1991, when Ukraine achieved
independence. When a nationalist Russian was elected the first president of Crimea in 1994, he
proposed secession from Ukraine, provoking a political crisis. As in Estonia and Latvia, the OSCE’s
intervention involved the establishment of a mission of long duration (1994-1999) and a series of
visits by the HCNM. Van der Stoel’s office also organized several conferences and seminars that
successfully sought to harmonize the constitutions of Crimea and Ukraine, establishing a special
status for Crimea as an autonomous region within Ukraine.31
In describing the OSCE’s approach to addressing the crises in Estonia, Latvia, and Crimea,
Terrence Hopmann observes:
Issues of identity are virtually impossible to settle through negotiations based on a traditional
bargaining process. Instead, they require what has become known as a problem-solving
approach to negotiations. This negotiation process prescribes a number of negotiating
behaviors that are quite different from traditional, confrontational bargaining. The parties
should approach the conflict as a problem to be solved jointly rather than as a conflict to be
“won.” They should treat the dispute essentially as a “non-zero-sum” game, in which both
parties stand to lose from escalation while both may gain from mutual accommodation.32

Several features of the geopolitical context of these conflicts were favorable to this
problem-solving approach. The Russian government of Boris Yeltsin actively supported the
29
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OSCE’s diplomatic engagement in Estonia and Latvia, because Yeltsin saw the missions as
a means of protecting the rights of Russian minorities in both countries while defending his
credibility against his own nationalist domestic critics. Government officials in Estonia, Latvia,
and Ukraine, by contrast, viewed the OSCE’s involvement as a means of strengthening their
countries’ ties to the West and breaking their dependence on Russia. These governments’
desire to join the EU provided leverage to OSCE mediators, who were able to sustain their
conflict prevention efforts even in the face of staunch criticism from nationalist leaders in
the Baltics, who denied that there was any conflict to prevent. Finally, the United States was
itself able to exercise coercive leverage on behalf of the OSCE’s efforts: in 1994, the U.S. Senate
voted to suspend all aid to Russia until it completed the withdrawal of its military forces from
Estonia.33
Since the late 1990s, however, the OSCE has rarely been able to rely on such a supportive context
for its mediation efforts. For example, the carrot of potential EU membership, which provided a
powerful motivation for leaders of the Baltic states, has not been available to bolster mediation
efforts in Central Asia or the Caucasus. To the contrary, writes one commentator, the presence
of an OSCE mission “is often unfavorably perceived as an indication of an unstable area, thereby
warding off necessary foreign investment and weakening the country’s economic development in
these areas.”34
A greater challenge to the OSCE collaborative problem-solving efforts has been the rising
tension between Russia and the West. During the early 1990s, Yeltsin and other Russian leaders
embraced the organization as the potential centerpiece for a future collaborative European security
architecture. In subsequent years, however, the Western participating States placed increasing
emphasis on expanding NATO and the EU, to the detriment of the OSCE. The expansion of
NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, and an additional seven
states including the Baltic republics in 2004, drove home the view among Russian leaders that the
OSCE was “erecting a wall within itself, artificially dividing its members into the NATO and EU
members, and the rest.” Under these new conditions, declared Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, “NATO deals with security issues, the EU with economic issues, while the OSCE will only
monitor the adoption of these organizations’ values by countries that have remained outside the
EU and NATO.”35
In the late 1990s, Western criticisms of Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya, along with
Russian unhappiness over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, created further frictions, which
intensified after the election of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation in 2000.
Russia’s leaders increasingly expressed suspicions that the OSCE agenda was “destabilizing its
neighborhood and in the long run potentially also Russia itself.”36 They were particularly unhappy
with the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which they
saw as “regionally biased against the East.”37 Beginning in 2002, Russia sent its own observers to
monitor elections in the post-Soviet states, alongside monitors from the OSCE and EU, in order
to counter the “Western bias” in ODIHR’s conclusions. On Russia’s insistence, the OSCE also
sent observers to monitor elections in Western participating States, including Canada and the
United States.38 Russian leaders accused the OSCE of being a tool of Western interests in Ukraine
both during the Orange Revolution of 2004 and during the political crisis of 2014, and bridled at
ODIHR’s repeated criticisms of election irregularities in Belarus. Unnamed Western states, claimed
33
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Putin in 2007, were “trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote
the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”39
Over the past decade, the OSCE has been largely stalemated in its efforts to resolve many
protracted conflicts on the periphery of the Russian Federation, including Nagorno-Karabakh, South
Ossetia, and Transdniestria; and it has struggled to respond to Russia’s military interventions in
Georgia and Ukraine. In dealing with the crisis in Syria since 2011, the OSCE’s response has largely
been confined to a few statements addressing the refugee crisis. Syria is not a state partner of the
OSCE, so the organization has no official mandate vis-à-vis events in that country. Moreover, as
Alice Ackermann points out, the EU and OSCE sometimes establish an informal “division of labor”
in their efforts: for example, the OSCE has taken the lead role in addressing the conflict in Ukraine,
while the EU and UN have played more prominent roles with respect to Syria.40 Nonetheless, given
the profound implications of the Syrian civil war for international security within the boundaries
of both Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE, a more robust joint response would
have been desirable.41
The Path Forward: Building Cooperative Capacity for Atrocity Prevention
In an October 2016 interview, OSCE General Secretary Lamberto Zannier observed that “the OSCE
as a security organization is facing a very complicated environment,” because of the “return of
geopolitics” involving “divisions in Europe that we haven’t seen in a long time,” aggravated by
global challenges including terrorism along with migration stemming from violent conflicts and
the effects of climate change. Zannier observed:
As the OSCE was built in a divided environment to bridge the gulf between opposing sides,
today the convergence of all these problems is eroding the effectiveness of the tools that
were created at that time. So we are facing a situation where we may have more division,
and the tools that we developed to address the problems coming with the divisions are not
functioning… as well as they were. So engagement, creating a space of dialogue in spite of
the differences and the bitter debates… remains the key task for all of us.42

In the bitter aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, where the Russian
intelligence services allegedly sought to undermine the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary
Clinton in order to tip the result to Republican candidate Donald Trump, such constructive
dialogue has become more challenging than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Having
long complained of Western meddling in Russia’s “near abroad” through democracy promotion
initiatives and support for the “Color Revolutions,” the Putin regime has effectively turned
the tables on its Western counterparts. Russia is alleged to have “cultivated an opaque web of
economic and political patronage” throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe,43 as well
as to have forged connections with right-wing parties in Western Europe including the UKIP in
Britain and the National Front in France.44 The heated accusations of ill will on both sides have
further narrowed the already constricted avenues for cooperation between the OSCE’s Eastern and
Western participating States.
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As one scholar has written, the OSCE is “par excellence, a ‘soft security’ institution with
extremely few material resources at its disposal.” Unlike other regional organizations such as
the EU and NATO, the OSCE cannot exercise coercive power by imposing economic sanctions or
threatening the use of military force. Nor, in the current geopolitical environment, can it credibly
offer material rewards such as the prospect of EU membership, which served as a powerful incentive
for cooperation by the Baltic governments in the 1990s. The effectiveness of the OSCE depends on
its ability to “use its moral authority as a principled organization and its limited amount of cultural
capital (e.g. technical expertise) to exercise symbolic power.”45
In the current polarized international security environment in Eurasia, it is increasingly
difficult for the OSCE to assert universally recognized moral authority. During the 1970s and 1980s,
the CSCE took shape as a dialogue process between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a period of high
international tension and distrust, which eased temporarily during the decade after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. To some degree, the rising frictions between the Russian Federation and its Western
counterparts have returned Europe full circle to the geopolitical atmosphere that surrounded the
CSCE’s founding.
Even in an inhospitable geopolitical context, the OSCE can make several valuable
contributions to protecting civilians threatened by violent conflict in Eurasia: conflict prevention,
crisis management, cooperative problem-solving, and the promotion of norms favoring peaceful
coexistence of diverse ethnic and national groups. The remainder of this essay will address each of
these aspects of the OSCE’s work in turn.
Conflict Prevention. During the recent period of rising tensions between the Eastern and
Western factions of the OSCE, a number of efforts have been made to bridge this geopolitical
divide and develop more constructive strategies for mitigating threats of violent conflict. In
2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for a
new European security dialogue to discuss post-Cold War security arrangements.46 In 2009, the
Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE launched a series of dialogues known as the “Corfu Process,”
which sought “to strengthen the Organization’s responsiveness to conflict in all its phases,”
including “early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and postconflict rehabilitation.”47 These dialogues culminated in 2011, under the OSCE’s Lithuanian
Chairmanship, in Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, which affirmed
“the Organization’s commitment to revisiting its approaches to conflict prevention and conflict
resolution for the twenty-first century.”48 Among other things, Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 called
for the establishment of a systematic conflict early warning system and a more robust mediationsupport capacity. Unfortunately, there has been limited practical follow-through on many of its
recommendations.49
Crisis Management. Some of the most intractable conflicts in the OSCE region—e.g. those
in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh—are located in areas on the
periphery of the Russian Federation where Russia has a strong vested interest in the outcome.
Given the OSCE’s lack of material instruments of leverage, the organization is unlikely to be able
to successfully mediate such conflicts that have become locked into a “security competition”
frame. Nonetheless, it can help contain violence by focusing international attention on events in
the conflict zones, monitoring developments, and providing early warning of potential escalation.
The presence of an OSCE field mission or visits by the HCNM may also provide channels of
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communication between leaders of rival groups, which may help keep a lid on violence even in the
absence of a formal settlement.
In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has tracked the
living conditions of the 1.8 million IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014, offering
recommendations for how the government of Ukraine and international donors can meet the
needs of IDPs and enhance relations between IDPs and host communities.50 The SMM issues
daily spot reports on security conditions in Eastern Ukraine, monitoring compliance with the
Minsk ceasefire agreements, and “engages with authorities at all levels, as well as civil society,
ethnic and religious groups and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground.”51 Astrid
Thors, who served as High Commissioner on National Minorities from 2013 through 2016,
also engaged in efforts to “facilitate a dialogue between national minorities and the Ukrainian
authorities on issues of common concern.” For example, she co-hosted a 2016 roundtable in Kyiv
on “Strengthening the Institutional Framework Related to Inter-ethnic Relations in Ukraine in
the Context of Decentralization.” Asserting that “improved policies in the field of inter-ethnic
relations would help to consolidate Ukrainian society and would increase stability in the country
as a whole,” the HCNM has worked to provide a platform for Russian and other minority
communities in Ukraine to express concerns about the protection of their language and cultural
identities.52
In less geopolitically sensitive regions, such as Central Asia and the Balkan states, the OSCE
may have greater potential for robust conflict prevention and crisis response—but its record
in achieving this potential has been uneven. For example, in May and June 2010, HCNM Knut
Vollebaek issued urgent warnings to the OSCE Permanent Council on the risk of interethnic violence
in Kyrgyzstan, asserting that the situation represented “one of the OSCE’s biggest challenges since
the 2008 war in the Caucasus.”53 When violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in
southern Kyrgyzstan that June, however, the OSCE Permanent Council displayed no appetite for a
robust response. In the words of one commentator, “The lack of collective will by the participating
States and the Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps in managing the
conflict in Kyrgyzstan significantly curbed the OSCE’s room for maneuver.”54
Cooperative Problem-Solving. Even in geopolitically contested settings where a comprehensive
settlement remains elusive, the OSCE may be able to promote incremental progress toward peaceful
coexistence of rival groups. For example, in Georgia, where the OSCE field mission was closed
down on Russia’s insistence in 2008, the HCNM has “encouraged the effective implementation
of the State Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration for 2015-2020 and Its Action Plan,” and
has “continued to support a project to facilitate interaction between the political parties in the
country and national minority representatives, including by bringing them together to discuss
topical issues on televised talk shows.”55 In Moldova, High Commissioner Thors worked with
the parliament to establish a “joint working group with members of parliament and the People’s
Assembly of Gagauzia” to improve “the functioning of the Gagauz autonomy,” and she has worked
with the OSCE Mission to Moldova to address cultural and linguistic issues surrounding the
status of Transdniestria.56 Thors also remained engaged in addressing issues related to citizenship
rights, political representation of ethnic minorities, and protection of minority languages in a wide
50
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range of other countries including Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia,
Hungary, and Slovakia.57
Norm Promotion. Over the past twenty years, the OSCE has issued a number of statements
of principles regarding the protection of minority rights, including the Hague Recommendations
Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations
on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), and the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration
of Diverse Societies (2012).58 In documents such as the Charter for European Security, adopted at
the Istanbul summit of 1999, it has also reaffirmed its commitment to “preventing the outbreak of
violent conflicts wherever possible” and “to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged
by war and destruction.”59 Beyond affirming these principles related to human security, the OSCE
has sought to memorialize its operational approach to conflict prevention in documents including
“The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security” (2009) and the Ministerial
Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (2011).60
Scholars disagree about the efficacy of the OSCE’s efforts to transform norms governing
relations among diverse ethnic groups in Eurasia. Some observers, such as Wolfgang Zellner, have
argued that the HCNM has been relatively successful in “de-securitizing” relationships between
states and minority groups by “introducing international minority rights standards as the frame
of reference for majority, minority and kin-States.” The HCNM, Zellner asserts, has facilitated
“substantive short-term solutions with a view towards sustainable long-term solutions under local
ownership.”61 Others have taken a more skeptical view: David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy
contend that “the HCNM’s role in societal security often appears to maintain the status quo ‘state
vs. minority’ logic of the European minority rights regime,” and that the OSCE as a whole has been
unable to transform the “zero-sum context” of interethnic relations in Eurasia.62
Despite the sometimes disappointing results of its conflict prevention and crisis management
initiatives, the OSCE remains a vital component of the Eurasian security architecture, both because
of its inclusive membership structure and because of its core mission to advance “common and
comprehensive security” through a consensus-based approach. Yet, for the organization to play
a robust role in addressing the urgent security challenges in contemporary Eurasia, it is essential
that its participating States share a genuine consensus about the importance of protecting civilians
threatened by violent conflict.
One stumbling block to productive cooperation between the Eastern and Western participating
States of the OSCE has been mutual suspicion over the other side’s motives. In Zellner’s words,
“what the U.S. regards as democratization, Russia takes as destabilization.”63 As Alistair Miskimmon
and Ben O’Loughlin have observed, a profound misalignment has emerged between Russian and
57
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Western narratives about the post-Cold War order. Rather than being recognized as “co-constitutor
of this emerging system,” since the early 1990s “Russia has complained of being excluded from
the major decisions affecting it.” Consequently, Russia “feels mis-recognized,” driving a “cycle of
miscommunication, generating frustration on all sides and restricting the scope for cooperation.”64
During the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE explicitly avoided establishing a democratization agenda,
which the Western participating States recognized as a bridge too far for their Soviet counterparts.
Instead, participants in the Helsinki dialogue process focused on promotion of human rights and
other aspects of the “human dimension” of security, in an effort to build mutual trust and lay a
foundation for a broader range of security cooperation activities.
In the current period of retrenchment in relations between NATO and the Russian Federation,
it is essential for the OSCE to seek areas of common ground that can serve as a focal point for
constructive engagement. A narrowing and deepening of the OSCE’s mission, refocusing on the
objectives of promoting human security in regions afflicted by conflict, might help rebuild the
normative consensus between Eastern and Western participating States and increase the OSCE’s
operational effectiveness.
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Introduction
Slowly opening up to the rest of the world at the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has been active
in various countries and context to deal with the past and prevent mass atrocity crimes as well
as genocide for many years. These activities have been institutionalized by the establishment in
2011 of a cross-departmental entity, the Task Force for Dealing with the Past and Prevention of
Atrocities. Part of the wider peace promotion policy, the Task Force activities are thus a specialized
area of activities in Switzerland’s foreign policy. As a consequence, they are influenced by the way
foreign policy is shaped and by prominent political features of the country.
The present article aims to confront the Swiss practice regarding the prevention of genocide
and mass atrocities in Swiss foreign policy and its particularities shaping its international
relations. Neutrality, a core part of Switzerland’s identity on both the internal political level and
the international level, will be at the center of our analysis. Indeed, how can a country engage in
prevention activities while keeping its neutral status? How does neutrality influence these activities
across time? What foreseeable impact could neutrality have on them?
Despite the institutionalization of prevention of mass atrocities and genocide several years ago,
the Swiss government did not define in precise terms what falls under the label of mass atrocities
and genocide, nor under the label of prevention. As we will see throughout our analysis, the lack
of clear and precise definition is a constant in Switzerland’s foreign policy concepts and goals.
While this can be easily explained (it allows the government some leeway in its actions following
international and internal political circumstances as it is not bound by a precise wording) this
shortcoming is a challenge to the present article. In order to remedy to this situation and better
frame what shapes prevention activities regarding mass atrocities and genocide, the article will be
divided following a macro to micro logic, going from Switzerland’s political and foreign policy key
yet general features and principles, before addressing peace promotion, and finally mass atrocities
and genocide prevention.
The present article will thus be divided as follow: the first part will be an overview of the Swiss
government and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (A). We will then lay out Switzerland’s
characteristics shaping its international relations (B), especially neutrality, before presenting its
foreign policy principles and objectives (C), with a special focus on peace promotion policy (D). This
contextualization of Swiss institutions and foreign policy aims to enable a better understanding of
how activities pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocity crimes and genocide are embedded in
Switzerland’s political environment. The following part will present the evolution of Switzerland’s
activities regarding prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the actual mechanism—
the Task Force Dealing with the Past and Prevention of Atrocities (E). We will consider how the
Task Force is related to other areas of the government and the international community, what
are its areas and countries of activities, which procedures it follows to start a project as well as
the challenges it ought to overcome in the future. Finally, the last part of this article will present
a critical analysis of the Swiss mechanism through the lens of its foreign policy and neutrality, to
establish if—and how it is compatible with Switzerland’s neutral status (F). From the conclusion
reached, the article will flesh out the future of the Task Force’s work in light of potential evolutions
of Switzerland foreign policy and neutrality.
A. Swiss Government and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs: A Brief Overview
In order to better understand the place of mass atrocity prevention activities in the Swiss context,
it is necessary to step back and give an overview of Swiss characteristics likely to influence any
foreign policy decision. These factors can be internal, namely the Swiss political system, or external,
the Swiss key characteristics in the international realm. The following part gives a brief overview of
the Swiss political system and government.
Giulia Persoz, “Neutrality: A Tool or a Limit for Preventing Mass Atrocitiy Crimes and Genocide? The Case of Switzerland” Genocide
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Since 1848, Switzerland has been a democratic federal state composed of 26 regional states
called cantons. Its political form is a direct consequence of the country’s heterogeneous nature: with
four national languages (German, French, Italian and Romansch), different cultures and religions,
Switzerland’s population is extremely diverse. The Swiss political system is thus a multi-ethnic
federalism, an alternative to the nationalist integration strategy that prevailed in Europe during
the 19th century.1 Similar to the American model, the Parliament follows a bicameral system. It is
composed of two chambers (the National Council and the Council of States), both representing the
cantons.2 The executive branch of the government, however, differentiates itself from the United
States: instead of having a government lead by a powerful single presidential figure, the leadership
of the country is assumed by a council composed of seven equally powerful ministers, elected by
the Parliament every four years.3 Each year, one of its member assumes the role of President of
the Federation. However, while they are considered head of state, they enjoy no special political
privileges.4
Democracy in Swiss political culture is not perceived as a majoritarian democracy but as a
consensus democracy. Thus the Swiss perceive that “[...] conflicts are resolved not on the basis
of narrow and shifting majorities, but rather through negotiations leading to a clear majority or
even total consensus.”5 Conceptualizing politics this way yields two consequences. First, political
bodies should be drawn from all important groups (linguistic, geographic, etc.).6 Secondly, Federal
Council decisions should be taken collegially. As such, deliberations within the Council should be
led jointly, aiming for consensus.7 If consensus is unachievable, then the decision should be taken
following the majority principle. However, once the decision is made, each Councilor must back it
even if they originally adhered to the overruled minority.8
Another strong political feature of the Swiss system is direct democracy. At the federal level,
referenda are mandatory for all constitutional amendments, as well as the ratification of treaties
concerning membership in international collective security organizations or supranational bodies.9
The system also allows in the case of federal legislation, or permanent international treaties that
provide an accession to an international organization, that contain important legislative provisions
or whose implementation requires the enactment of additional federal legislation, for an optional
referendum when requested by 50,000 citizens or eight cantons.10 If the voting population rejects the
act or treaty, it cannot be passed or ratified. In addition to this post-facto procedure of democratic
control, Swiss citizens also possess a right of initiative to modify the Federal Constitution.11 Onehundred thousand citizens have to petition for the initiative to be put to vote.12
These features have a strong impact on foreign policy making. Within the government, the
lack of outright opposition, as well as the lack of election of individuals based on specific foreign
policy goals, and the slow decision-making process inherent in collegiality help shape the way the

1

Adrian Vatter, “Federalism,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Peter Knoepfel et al., 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Publishing, 2007), 78-79.

2

Ibid., 78.

3

Government of Switzerland, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 18 April 1999, as of 1 January 2016, RS 101, art.
174 and 175 (hereinafter FC). An official English version is online, accessed December 28, 2017, https://www.admin.ch/
opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html.

4

Ülrich Klöti, “The Government,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Ülrich Klöti, 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Publishing, 2007), 145.

5

Ibid., 149.

6

Ibid.

7

FC, Art. 177.

8

Klöti, The Government, 155-156.

9

FC, Art. 140.

10

FC, Art. 141.

11

FC, Art. 138 – 139.
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For more on Swiss direct democracy: Wolf Linder, “Direct Democracy,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Peter Knoepfel
et al., 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung Publishing, 2007), 101-119.
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country is run.13 Moreover, referendum and initiatives can modify Swiss foreign policy, more often
than not impeding a possible active and integration-based role in favor of a more protectionist
approach.14 Swiss citizens strongly identify with the state’s emblematic political specificities
(namely federalism, collegiality, concordance and direct democracy). They want to preserve this
combined approach and are extremely reluctant to change it, especially when they feel pressured
to do so by a foreign interference.15
In Switzerland, state competences are divided between cantons and federal authorities, which
are called the Confederation, on the basis of the Federal Constitution (hereinafter cited as FC). The
Confederation’s executive branch has the task of implementing the law enacted by the legislature
and is divided into seven Departments, each led by a member of the Federal Council: the Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Department of Home Affairs, the Federal Department
of Justice and Police, the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport, the Federal
Department of Finance, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, and
the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications.16
Mass atrocities and genocide prevention activities fall within the competence of the Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter FDFA). The FDFA is responsible for implementing
Switzerland’s foreign policy and for protecting its interests abroad.17 In addition to its network of
Missions, embassies and other representations abroad, the head office of the FDFA is subdivided
into eight departments, each pertaining to a special theme. The State Secretariat is responsible
for the maintenance, development and coordination of Switzerland’s bilateral relations with
other States, as well as its multilateral foreign policy. The background work central to the proper
running of the FDFA such as the development of foreign policy goals and strategies, as well as
the identification of the current trends, challenges and risks is done by the Directorate of Political
Affairs. The Directorate itself is organized into sections focusing on bilateral relations, multilateral
relations, sectoral foreign policies, security policy and human security. Given the importance that
Switzerland attaches to the European Union, a special Directorate for European Affairs has also been
established. In addition to this political core, the FDFA also encompasses of the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation, which is responsible for the coordination of development activities
and cooperation Switzerland undertakes, as well as for the humanitarian aid; the Directorate
of International Law; the Consular Directorate; the General Secretariat; and the Directorate for
Resources.18
B. Key Characteristics of Switzerland’s International Relations
As stated above, while collegiality, consensus and direct democracy have an impact on foreign
policy decision, the Swiss government is influenced by several other external factors. The section
below addresses three key characteristics likely to shape foreign policy either during its decisionmaking phase: Switzerland’s small state status; neutrality; and/or during its implementation, a lack
of colonial past.
Within the international community, Switzerland is distinguished from other states by several
characteristics. First, Switzerland is a relatively small state. Surrounded by big European powers
such as France or Germany, Switzerland has, from its historical creation in 1291 until today, been
“a small state surrounded by much larger nations” whose “existence depended on the good will
13

Jürg Martin Gabriel, “The Price of Political Uniqueness: Swiss Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” in Swiss Foreign
Policy 1945-2002, eds. Gabriel, Jürg Martin et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 9.

14
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Figure 1. The full-size version of this figure can be downloaded at http://doi.org/10.5038/19119933.11.3.1507.
of these neighbours.”19 The potentially threatening bigger neighbors have had a large impact
in shaping the Switzerland’s foreign policy. That policy simultaneously pursued two different
aims: to guarantee the collective defense of the Confederation against intruders while remaining
neutral, and to ensure that its powerful neighboring states would not view its defensive policies as
provocative.20 According to Graf and Lanz, “the two World Wars, in which Switzerland remained
uninvolved, solidified the image that Switzerland, being smaller and less powerful than its
neighbours, should refrain from competing with the big powers but adopt a niche foreign policy in
order to maintain its independence.”21
Secondly, and as a consequence of its small-state status and geographical situation, Switzerland
has chosen to remain neutral when faced with conflicts throughout Europe.22 Neutrality was the
political response Switzerland devised to counter its vulnerability among European greater powers:
it allowed the country to protect its sovereignty and placed the principle of non-interference, the
fundamental mantra of small-state diplomacy, at the core of Swiss foreign policy.23 Some have
argued that neutrality stood for the absence of foreign policy.24 But Goetschel was probably more
accurate when he underlined that “neutrality was actually a strategy for survival.”25
It is not evident to establish prima facie how neutrality affects Switzerland’s foreign policy,
and, in extenso, its mass atrocities prevention activities. In order to do so, it is necessary to layout
what entails neutrality for the Swiss government, and how it evolved through time according to
the international circumstances. In subsequent section (F), Switzerland’s approach to mass atrocity
and genocide prevention will be analyzed through the lens of this conceptual framework.
Swiss neutrality can be traced back to the battle of Marignano in 1515, however its status as a
permanent neutral state has been formally recognized by the international community only since
the Congress of Vienna in 1815.26 Since then, Switzerland has ratified in 1910 the two international
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conventions respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers. The status of a neutral state invokes
rights and duties for both the neutral state and the belligerents states in times of conflict.27 While
it is a political choice to abide by neutrality law, its consequences are of a legal nature.28 Neutrality
law can be summed up as follow: as long as the actions of the neutral state do not interfere with an
armed conflict, impeding or giving an advantage to one side or the other, the neutral state benefits
from a special protection from the consequences of the conflict (such as the interdiction for the
belligerents to militarily use its territory).29 Moreover, any action taken by a neutral state in order
to protect its neutrality cannot be qualified as a hostile act by parties to the conflict.30
A State can decide to stay neutral with regard to a specific and delimited armed conflict
(occasional neutrality achieved by an ad hoc declaration), however Switzerland has chosen to remain
permanently neutral. This implies that it stays neutral at all times, with respect to all conflicts.
Although ad hoc neutrality applies only in times of war, permanent neutrality also creates duties
for neutral state in times of peace: the neutral state cannot bind itself to any military obligations
nor act in a way that would impede the realization of its duties if an armed conflict were to arise.31
In other words, a permanent neutral state promises not to enter into preventive alliances,32 and can
only enter a defensive alliance in reaction to a perceived threat.33
Conceptually, neutrality has served two security purposes for Switzerland. On the one hand,
it has protected the country from foreign interference. On the other hand, it has also proved useful
to achieve domestic stability.34 As mentioned above, Switzerland is a heterogeneous country
composed of several religions, languages and cultures. Given its lack of common identity, internal
cohesion has never been set in stone, especially in times of European tension. For instance, the
Swiss population was divided over whom to follow during the 16th century’s era of religious
conflicts, as well as during the two World Wars. Picking a side would have led to internal crisis.
Thus, neutrality avoided a potential national implosion.35
It is worth noting that while the security and the independence of the country are mentioned
in Article 2(1) of the FC, which specifies the aims of the Confederation, neutrality has been
purposely left out. Neutrality actually only appears twice within the federal Constitution: Articles
173(1) and 185(1) give to the Federal Council and to the parliament the power and duty to take
“measures to safeguard external security and the independence and neutrality of Switzerland.” As
a consequence, though neutrality is a central maxim that shapes Swiss foreign policy, it has to be
considered not as an aim per se but as a flexible tool which can be used to foster its independence
and security.36
This flexibility is made possible by the distinction between neutrality law and policy of
neutrality. All measures taken by the Swiss government that exceed its legal duties as enshrined
in neutrality law are defined by its policy of neutrality.37 A neutral state must a minima ensure the
respect of the relatively narrow neutrality law, but can make a political choice to go further. In
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this regard, “neutral politics have the function of protecting the credibility of neutral law.”38 For
the Federal Council, this possibility gives to Switzerland a large freedom of action.39 The Council
even considers that there is only one immutable principle in regard to its neutral status: the noninvolvement in an international armed conflict.40
For the Swiss government, neutrality is a flexible instrumental concept that should be used
to best serve the country’s interests, namely its independence and security.41 In that regard, the
Federal Council considers it necessary to adapt its policy of neutrality to changing international
circumstances. The Council justifies this approach not as a case of opportunism but as a way to
preserve Switzerland’s stability and predictability.42 This concept implies that if neutrality were to
be unable to best protect and preserve the country’s independence and security, Switzerland could
renounce to its neutral status.
From the Second World War until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has followed a strict
policy of neutrality, going so far as to refuse, in the name of neutrality, to adhere to international
economic sanctions for a limited amount of time.43 Perceived by the population as the reason why
the country made it out of the Second World War relatively unscathed, neutrality was more and
more considered as an end unto itself rather than as an instrument of foreign policy.44 Despite the
weakening of the nation-state era and the beginning of a new trend towards multilateralism and
integration, as well as the radical power balance shift brought on by the end of the Second World
War, this conception remained unquestioned for more than four decades.
From the end of the Cold War, the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world with the rise of
new kinds of cross-border threats such as international terrorism, organized crime, environmental
issues, etc., the strict understanding of neutrality that prevailed was no longer considered
sufficient to ensure Switzerland’s independence and security. In 1993, reconsidering its foreign
policy according to the changes occurring since 1945, Switzerland shifted from its traditional,
more isolationist interpretation of neutrality to a more flexible approach.45 This new approach,
called active neutrality, allowed for expanding its humanitarian activities and security policy,
namely by increasing its cooperation with other states in order to fight and prevent these new
threats.46 Two consequences arose from the government’s 1993 White Paper on Neutrality: first,
it somewhat reduced the importance of neutrality.47 Secondly, it subordinated neutrality to the
principle of solidarity.48 Indeed, according to the White Paper, for Switzerland to stay useful to
the international community, “neutrality needs to be interpreted in light of the requirements of
international solidarity and should be used to serve of the international community and world
peace.”49
Despite this redefinition, Swiss neutrality still plays an important role nowadays. While the
obligations deduced from its neutrality policy have been gradually scaled back in the wake of the
Cold War, Switzerland’s status as a neutral state was publicly reaffirmed by the Federal Council.50
This apparent dichotomy can be explained by the role of neutrality as a cohesion factor: as Goetschel
argues, “[neutrality’s] role as an identity provider has become neutrality’s most important function
38
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since the end of the Cold War.”51 Indeed, a large majority of the population still continues to believe
that the country’s foreign policy should be based on neutrality.52 Direct democracy ensures that
Swiss foreign policy makers do not stray too far away from this popular conception, including in
peace promotion and prevention activities.
As popular but also foreign policy makers conception of neutrality and Switzerland’s role in
the international realm does not always equate to the legal definition of neutrality, it is necessary
to ask oneself how this Switzerland’s characteristics are likely to influence its foreign policy.
Drawing on Holsti typology,53 Graf and Lanz consider the tendency to isolationism, a corollary
to Switzerland’s small and neutral state status, as one of its national role conception—which they
define as a “state’s self-image as well as the expectations it perceives from the outside world [that]
are incorporated into the foreign policy-making process.”54 According to Holsti, “the national role
of the isolate demands [...] a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety. [It] reveals fears of
external involvements of any kind and emphasizes self-reliance.”55 Switzerland’s isolate national
role conception should however be nuanced. While neutrality may play a great part in shaping a
protectionist approach, placing independence and sovereignty at the core of Swiss foreign policy,
other interests and characteristics may have a clashing impact. In that sense, Gabriel considers
that Switzerland suffers from dualism: “economically, scientifically, and culturally the country is
extremely interdependent internationally, while at the same time it places extraordinary emphasis
on maintaining its independence.”56 As a consequence, he makes a distinction between “high
politics” (namely security and other areas of high political importance where the Swiss are more
protectionist) and “low politics” (related to well-being and technical areas where the Swiss are
more likely to be internationalist).57 One could argue that given this dualism, Switzerland could
be considered independent instead of isolate, as it lacks the fear element. Indeed, in accordance
with Holsti’s definition of independent government, Switzerland stresses the element of selfdetermination and interest-driven foreign policy, as we will see below.58
Graf and Lanz recognize a second Swiss national role conception: the role of mediatorintegrator. Holsti defines mediator-integrator governments as governments perceiving
[...] themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to
reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states. (Statements that referred to a
mediatory role in only one specific crisis were not counted.) The themes for this national
role conception indicate perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their
differences.59

As the isolate national role conception, the role of mediator-integrator is a direct consequence of
Switzerland’s neutrality. Neutrality often entails an idealistic dimension, which compels neutral
states to promote world peace through their services. This semblance of missionary faith can be
explained following a utilitarian logic. According to Goetschel, “neutrals felt the need to highlight
their own role in the international system, and for this purpose they conceived their policy as
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something ‘higher’, like an ideal of justice.”60 The mediator-integrator role is for instance embodied
in the Swiss traditions of providing good offices in situations of conflicts. Switzerland can either
offer its protecting power or can position itself as a facilitator in the mediation process.61 Another
example is the longstanding Swiss humanitarian tradition—a reference to this long-time tradition
is present since the beginning of Switzerland constitutional history, in 1848.62
A priori contradictory, the isolate and the mediator-integrator national role conceptions are
another dualism in Swiss foreign policy. Both roles co-exist as they are traditionally associated
with different political trends and groups within Switzerland. One or the other can prevail at
different moment in time according to the evolving circumstances of the international world. As
we mentioned earlier, the Cold War era led to the prevalence of the isolate role conception, while
since 1993, a more flexible approach of neutrality has allowed a more active mediator-integrator
role. While peace promotion appears to be a logical extension of a strong mediator-integrator role,
activities in the field are not completely put to a stop whenever the other conception prevails.
Peace promotion, during tense period, is a way to demonstrate Switzerland’s usefulness to greater
powers.63
While Graf and Lanz limit themselves to two Swiss national conceptions, it can be argued that
other role conceptions defined by Holsti apply to Switzerland. To name a few, Switzerland could
also be considered as a bridge state, which completes its mediator-integrator role as it searches to
build bridges between different in times of war and peace.64 Indeed, as Didier Burkhalter, Federal
Councilor in charge of Foreign affairs from 2009-2017, stated: “the idea of bridge-building is also an
intrinsic part of Switzerland’s identity and foreign policy. It is part of our political DNA. As a multiethnic country with four national languages, Switzerland has relied on dialogue and compromise to
ensure its domestic cohesion for centuries.”65 It could also be argued that the government considers
itself bound by the defender of the faith national role conception in relation to its tradition of
promoting humanitarian value.66
Last external factor likely to influence Switzerland’s foreign policy activities, whereas the
majority of European States have historically been involved on other continents, Switzerland has
no colonial past. As a consequence, Switzerland benefits from a broader flexibility to undertake
actions and programs with a broader array of international partners. This characteristic, in
opposition to the ones mentioned above, may not have a significant impact in foreign policy making
process. However, it may give to Switzerland a greater freedom of action in its implementation. For
instance, peace promotion activities from former colonial powers may sometimes be considered as
a new form of colonial interferences and be refused on that basis. Both the lack of colonial past and
neutrality give to Switzerland a comparative advantage in its international relations.67
C. Swiss Foreign Policy’s Principles and Objectives
To understand how Switzerland’s activities regarding mass atrocities and genocide prevention are
enshrined within Swiss foreign policy, it is necessary to go beyond external and internal factors
shaping foreign policy and define what exactly stems from them and constitutes Swiss foreign
policy’s principles and objectives. As a consequence from Switzerland’s limited power as a small
state, as well as its neutrality, direct democracy and federalism, Swiss foreign policy historically
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has not been accorded particularly high importance.68 Until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland
usually privileged the preservation of its independence through neutrality over its international
influence.69 In the old Federal Constitution, foreign policy was given a single goal: to preserve
Switzerland’s independence.70 Yet, the circumstances have changed. Switzerland has not been
viewed as a small state since the end of the Second World War. Globalization and integration tend
to question the viability and feasibility of a foreign policy based on independence.71 However, due
to its political characteristics and its conception of its national role, changes in Switzerland happen
very slowly.72
As mentioned above, the reconsideration of Swiss foreign policy in a post-Cold War conflict
led to a new approach to neutrality. More importantly, the extremely narrow foreign policy that
prevailed until then was considered inadequate.73 The protection of Swiss sovereignty as the sole
goal of the country’s foreign policy was abandoned in favor of a cluster of five programmatic
goals.74 Originally issued in the 1993 Foreign Policy Report, the goals were included in the revised
Federal Constitution of 1999, currently in force.
According to the revised Constitution, foreign relations are primarily the responsibility
of the federal government.75 Cantons only benefit from a limited role in shaping Switzerland’s
foreign policy, as they shall be consulted only if the decision affects their powers or their essential
interests.76 The Constitution establishes overlapping responsibilities of the government and the
parliament. Special committees of both chambers on foreign policy thus enjoy a consultative role.
The Parliament in full form addresses only the most important treaties.77 Swiss people benefits
from a broad range of opportunities to shape foreign policy, consequence of direct democracy.
The electorate enjoys a right of initiative on matters related to foreign policy as well. The sole
limit of this right is that initiatives must respect mandatory international law to be considered
valid.78 Moreover, constitutional guidelines foresee a mandatory and an optional referendum on
international treaties.79
In addition to the potential limits put by the Parliament or the Swiss population, the government
does not enjoy a complete liberty to elaborate foreign policy aims and strategies. Article 2 FC
defines the overall aims of the Swiss government and states that: “[the Swiss Confederation] is
committed […] to a just and peaceful international order.”80 More precisely, Article 54 (2) FC gives
the Confederation the duty to “[...] ensure that the independence of Switzerland and its welfare
is safeguarded; it shall in particular assist in the alleviation of need and poverty in the world and
promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful co-existence of peoples as well as
the conservation of natural resources.”81
Article 54 (2) FC upheld the five programmatic goals established in 1993. In defining its
foreign policy, the government should equally aim to 1) maintain and promote peace and security;
2) enhance human rights, democracy and the rule of law; 3) advance prosperity; 4) reduce social
inequalities; and 5) protect the natural environment. However, these goals have to be understood
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as an expression of the duty “to ensure that the independence of Switzerland and its welfare
is safeguarded,” considered by Goetschel as the “supreme goal” of Swiss foreign policy.82 The
revised Constitution thus adds the notion of welfare to the traditional goal of independence. In
comparison with the 1993 Report, it specifically provides a special treatment to trade policy, giving
to the government a task to safeguard Swiss economy’s interest abroad.83 It is interesting to note
that the two national role conceptions of Graf and Lanz can be linked to this segmentation—the
supreme goal might be attached to the national role of the isolate, while the five programmatic goals
might be an expression of the mediator-integrator national role. As such, undertaking activities
of prevention of mass atrocities and genocide seem to easily fall within most, arguably all, five
clusters. They must however always be taken in accordance with Switzerland’s independence and
its welfare.
The elaboration and implementation of foreign policy is primarily the task of the FDFA. As
we saw, the FDFA is divided in several units, usually given different theme of foreign policy. This
subdivision is subjective. Subjects are often cross-sectional: while the lead role is usually the task
of a specific unit, coordination and consultation of relevant divisions, sometimes even outside the
FDFA, are planned in internal procedure (consultation with the offices). Goestchel argues that the
adoption of five thematic goals of foreign policy is an expression of the thematic specialization
within the FDFA.84
The overall constitutional aims are concretized through foreign policy reports and strategies.
They follow the implementation principles traditionally governing Swiss foreign policy, among
which neutrality, universality, dialogue, efficiency and coherence, solidarity and responsibility.
Indeed, according to the Swiss government, the importance of a State within the international
community is also measured by its responsible commitment to face global challenges in solidarity
with other States. While the principle of universality implies that Switzerland searches to maintain
good relationships with every States, it does not mean a lack of priority. Actions are privileged
wherever Switzerland can make a substantial contribution. Following a logic of efficiency, thematic
and geographic priorities are periodically redefined according to Swiss interests and area of
competences.85
In the heart of Europe, Switzerland has since long put an emphasis on European States in
its foreign policy. Since 2005, Great Powers, economically powerful countries, or countries with
whom Switzerland has strong economic ties are also awarded a special position (in particular US,
Russia, China, Brazil, India, Japan, and South Africa). Another special focus has been set on South
East Europe since the Balkan war, motivated by the proximity of the conflict menacing Europe’s
stability, as well as the migratory impact the war had on Switzerland. The importance of the Middle
East has also grown over the past few years.86
Currently, Switzerland’s foreign policy is defined by the 2016-2019 Foreign Policy Strategy,
explained by a Message of the Federal Council to the Parliament.87 During that lapse of time, Swiss
foreign policy will be embodied in four interlinked strategic priorities: relations with the European
Union and the EU and EFTA member states, relations with global partners, peace and security, and
finally sustainable development and prosperity.88 According to the Strategy, Switzerland pursues a
pragmatic, citizen-oriented foreign policy, which, while flexible to rapidly changing international
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circumstances, is in continuity with previous strategies.89 Moreover, it considers that Switzerland
is comparatively well placed within the international community and enjoys considerable soft
power.90
D. Peace Promotion in Switzerland’s Foreign Policy
The comprehensive overview of what constitutes and shapes Switzerland’s foreign policy gives
us the necessary context to understand Swiss political choices regarding peace promotion, and in
extenso, mass atrocities and genocide prevention. The section below will thus take a closer look at
the field of peace promotion, before the subsequent section can address Switzerland’s approach to
preventing mass atrocities and genocide.
With one out of the five objectives enshrined in the federal Constitution and a specific division
working towards its realization, peace promotion is an important part of Switzerland’s foreign
policy.91 In that matter, Switzerland core objective is to “[...] build on its commitment to peace
and security, lending significant impetus to a viable an just international order.”92 It is ensured by
mediation and crisis diplomacy, as well as the promotion human rights, fighting against terrorism,
and a continuous commitment to international law.
The argument used to pursue the objective on peace and security is twofold within the 20162019 Foreign Policy Strategy. First, it underlines the recent unrest development worldwide and
the negative reverberations it has for Switzerland. Indeed, “as a highly globalized country with
an export-oriented economy, Switzerland depends for its security and prosperity on a stable
environment and a viable an just international order.”93 Secondly, Switzerland is independent in
its peace commitment. It is not part of any military alliance, does not dispose of sufficient power in
itself to impose solutions, nor has a colonial history. As such, Switzerland does not follow a hidden
agenda. Moreover, given its multicultural population, democratic institutions and appreciated
tradition to provide good offices, Switzerland possess the knowledge and first-hand experience to
make a substantial contribution in peace promotion.94
The conception of peace promotion as an interest-driven policy and as a tool to assert its
position within the international community is regularly used by the Swiss government.95 As a
consequence, peace promotion is usually fuelled by security, economic stability and migratory
movement interests. Other arguments are also used for an active peace promotion policy, such as the
expectations of the international community towards Switzerland, or its sense of responsibility and
solidarity towards civilians whose security is jeopardized by conflictual situations.96 Sometimes, the
government states that Switzerland has to be active because the longstanding Swiss humanitarian
tradition shares common values with peace promotion.97 However this language regime has to
be taken with caution. Indeed, positions taken in official documents undergo scrutiny from other
states. Thus Switzerland has an interest to reaffirm its appreciated role in peace promotion as a
self-fulfilling prophecy. More importantly, the documents undergo the scrutiny from the Swiss
electorate. Convincing them that any foreign policy objective is well funded is especially important
as direct democracy give them a possibility to impede, even to forbid government activities.
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Currently, with a majority of the population convinced of the necessity of Switzerland’s neutral
status, and a strong conservative political party traditionally against international involvement, the
electorate can be the main detractor of an active Swiss foreign policy.
Swiss peace promotion is presented in a general and to some extent programmatic document
pertaining to Switzerland’s commitment for peace, human rights and security.98 More importantly,
the Federal Council has to review past peace promotion activities and has to present new orientation
and strategies to the Parliament, which in turn will vote an according framework-credit. For the
upcoming credit term (2017-2020), peace promotion measures are for the first time part of the more
general framework of Switzerland’s international cooperation. For this credit term, 230 million
CHF have been allocated to peace promotion and human security activities. 99
According to the coherence and efficiency principles, Switzerland is active in regions and
themes representing a special interest for the country and where its activities are likely to have
a substantial impact and make a difference.100 The government, however, is reticent to define
a long-term peace promotion policy. It considers that peace promotion strategies should be
progressive, innovative and flexible to best suit evolving conflictual context and partnerships with
relevant actors.101 Notwithstanding this concern, thematic and geographic priorities are defined
and regularly updated. The Human Security Division, in charge of peace promotion, is in
priority active in sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, in the Middle East, within the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and in several countries in Asia and Latin America.102
Moreover, the HSD works mainly in four areas: peace policy, which aims to resolve conflicts
through dialogue); to further develop humanitarian policy to ensure a better protection of civilian
during armed conflicts; to strengthen and promote human rights; and lastly, regarding migratory
policy, to better protect migrants and internally displaced people, and fight against human
trafficking.103
E. Switzerland’s Approach to Preventing Mass Atrocities and Genocide
Prevention of mass atrocities and genocide are part of Swiss peace promotion policy. Since 2003,
Switzerland has taken note of the principles developed by Louis Joinet in a report to the United
Nations Human Rights Commission. Joinet delimitated four key areas for action: the right to know,
the right to justice, the right to reparation and the guarantee of non-recurrence.104 Switzerland has
subsequently focused in these four areas in situations of serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. The underlining idea has been to avoid repetition of conflicts and
other atrocities.
Working within this conceptual framework, in 2003, the FDFA’s Human Security Division,
which is subordinated to the Directorate of Political Affairs, began to develop a series of activities
pertaining to dealing with the past and the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide. The HSD
has focused these efforts on four particular areas of interest: peace, migration, humanitarian policy
and human rights.105 Swiss activities for preventing mass atrocities and genocide were undertaken
by the HSD peace promotion division. Given Joinet four key areas of action and the evolution
of the international circumstances, it became clear that the complexity of these activities called
for an interdepartmental approach. In April 2011, the FDFA direction decided to create a new
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entity: the Task Force for dealing with the past and the prevention of atrocities (hereinafter cited as
the Task Force).106
The Task Force is responsible for ensuring that the Swiss strategy pertaining to dealing with
the past and preventing atrocities is coherent and consistent across the FDFA. While formally
attached to the HSD, the Task Force currently consists of eight experts distributed across the
FDFA’s various departments. They are based within the HSD, the Political Affairs Directorate’s
International Organization Division (where they follow discussions happening in international
fora and elaborate Swiss positions), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the
Directorate of Public International Law (where they focus for instance on the complementarity
between local, regional and international justice systems). The Task Force’s head office and Special
Envoy, who typically chairs international committees when the need arise, are based within the
HSD. The eight experts work together on operational tasks and meet bimonthly to review current
activities.
The Task Force’s one-year annual planning is defined by a Steering Committee composed of
the Ambassadors who head each expert’s department. They issue an internal annual plan that lays
out projected working over the coming twelve months. In addition to this yearly framework, the
Steering Committee also reviews the work undertaken by the Task Force twice a year (mid-term
and end of term review). Credits for the Task Force are included within the human security credit,
which is part of the global framework-credit for Switzerland’s international cooperation.
On a bilateral level, the Task Force has also been active in conflict and post-conflict situations,
as well as in countries undertaking a political transition from authoritarian regimes. Its overall aim
has been to bring about reconciliation in post-conflict societies, where tragic past events can create
smoldering resentments. This resentment, in turn, if left unchecked, can lead to social tensions, a
resurgence of violence, and can go as far as the commission of mass atrocities and genocide. By reestablishing social cohesion and having a deterrent effect, dealing with the past is closely linked to
the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide.
The Task Force’s conceptual framework of action has been constructed in a comprehensive and
holistic manner, based on the four key areas set out by Joinet’s original principles and subsequent
recommendations.107 The idea behind the holistic approach is that the four pillars suffer from
mutual influence and are interdependent. As a consequence, the Task Force works on a long-term
basis to reconstruct social cohesion between victims and perpetrators.108 Its goal is to bring about
reconciliation by contributing to a conducive environment to facilitate dialogue and by providing
experts. This does not mean that the Task Force is always active in each pillar. It will usually
analyze the situation as a whole, taking into account the four pillar, and subsequently tailor its
activities to better fit each situation. As such, it is difficult to layout an exhaustive catalogue of
activities undertaken by the Task Force, as it is constantly evolving, based on needs and means
at disposal. A tentative list can however be established according to the Task Force’s conceptual
framework and past activities: concerning the right to know, the Task Force works closely with
various fact-finding and truth commissions, on the safeguarding and the publication of archives,
and provides assistance to the search for missing persons. Concerning the right to justice, it works
closely with local, regional and international ad hoc tribunals as well as the International Criminal
Court. Concerning the right to reparation, it provides assistance to ensure the restitution of goods,
individual and collective reparation as well as psychosocial counseling, public apologies and
erection of memorials. Finally, concerning the guarantee of non-recurrence, it provides assistance
to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants, to hold elections and reform institutions, to
reform the security sector and the judiciary system, and to ensure no human rights violations
or war crimes perpetrators hold a position of power, for instance within the armed force or the
106
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police (vetting).109 The holistic nature of the Task Force is a direct consequence of Joinet’s principles,
which set out individual right of the victim (or the family of the victim), collective rights for the
society, and the duty for the state to ensure these rights are guaranteed and implemented.110
It is important to stress that the Task Force’s bilateral activities are solely consent-based and
only launched upon request. No action will be undertaken without official consent from the State
where it takes place. While it incidentally safeguards the principle of non-interference, consent
logically enhances the probability of success of any activities aiming to diffuse a tense situation.
There is no official procedure for establishing a program within a country: sometimes first
contact is made through embassies, but it can also be made directly by or through the Task Force’s
head office in Bern. In the countries where the Task Force is active, a human security adviser is
usually attached to the staff of the local Swiss embassy and serves as the focal point for the HSD
experts. The exact nature of the Task Force’s work is extremely diverse, and is organized to best
suit each national context. Switzerland currently supports several initiatives, in particular the
Philippines, Guatemala, Columbia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Ukraine, Burundi, Mali, Chad, and
the Middle East. The geographic areas of action change over time, depending on the evolution of
international and national situations. It provides financial, logistical, and/or political support, and
serves in an active advisory capacity.111
The Task Force works closely with the HSD’s peace promotion section and the geographic
sections of the Directorate of Political Affairs to implement its activities. As a practical consequence,
even if the Task Force is not bound to work only in specific countries, it is somewhat constrained
by priority countries listed within Switzerland’s foreign policy. Priority countries are strategically
important to Switzerland, and thus any support provided to deal with the past and prevent future
mass atrocities fits within Switzerland’s broader foreign policy goals. That was for instance the case
in the Balkans, where Swiss programs were driven primarily by interests due to the Balkans’ close
geographical location as well as by the conflicts’ migration impact. There have also been instances
where countries with historical ties to Switzerland, and where Switzerland has had an active
diplomatic and economic presence, have turned to Switzerland when facing difficulties and called
on the Task Force for support. Colombia provides an excellent example: Switzerland extended its
good office during the conflict and is now supporting the Historical Memory Centre.
Considerations pertaining more specifically to prevention of mass atrocities and genocide led
Switzerland to the co-organization of four regional forums in Argentina (2008), Tanzania (2010),
Switzerland (2011) and Cambodia (2013). They have been aiming to raise awareness among
participating governments about genocide prevention as well as to strengthen their capacities
in this field by sensitizing them to early warning signs and encourage timely and efficient
responses.112
At the initiative of Switzerland, these forums led to the establishment in 2013 of a boarder
initiative: the international network Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (hereinafter
cited as GAAMAC). GAAMAC’s role is twofold: it has been conceived as a platform to exchange
information on best practices; it also provides assistance to build states capacities to prevent mass
atrocities as well as to develop and to implement national preventive strategies. In addition,
GAAMAC also aims to serve as a bridge-builder between the Responsibility To Protect and the
genocide prevention communities. In fact, the name GAAMAC was specifically chosen with an
eye to attempting to comprehensively incorporate the themes underlying both the Responsibility
To Protect and genocide prevention. To date, GAAMAC has hosted two international conferences:
109

Ibid., 4-12; Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. “Switzerland’s framework for action,”
January 27, 2017, accessed February 7, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/
peace/dealing-with-past/conceptual-framework.html.

110

Swisspeace, Un Cadre Conceptuel pour le Traitement du Passé, 4.

111

Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Dealing with the past,” November 27, 2017,
accessed February 7, 2018, https://www.dfae.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/dealing-withpast.html.

112

Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Preventing atrocities,” November 11, 2017,
accessed February 4, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/genocide.
html.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

Swiss Approaches to Atrocity Prevention

89

Figure 1. Source: http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/about/approach.html.

GAAMAC I in Costa Rica (2014) and GAAMAC II in the Philippines (2016). Switzerland chairs the
network’s Steering Committee since its establishment.113
In addition to GAAMAC, the Task Force is also engaged on a multilateral level in diverse
international fora, working especially closely with the UN’s Secretariat. Swiss diplomats have
actively promoted and assisted in the development of several new ideas and concepts pertaining
to the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. For instance, Switzerland launched diplomatic initiatives
in 2005, 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2016 which led respectively to the adoption of resolutions by the UN
Commission on Human Rights and by the Human Rights Council aimed at strengthening human
right and justice in transitional processes. Switzerland also supported the establishment of a mandate
for a UN Special Rapporteur For The Promotion Of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of
Non-recurrence.114 Within the staff of the Special Rapporteur, Switzerland financed one expert’s
position. At the country level, Switzerland was at the origin of the resolution A/HRC/33/L.10 of
the Human Rights Council, adopted in September 2016. It requests a joint study from the United
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Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of nonrecurrence and the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide. The
study should address the contribution of transitional justice to the prevention of gross violations
and abuses of human rights as well as serious violations of international humanitarian law and
their recurrence. The Task Force also works with other international organization on an ad hoc
basis, providing for instance, experts to the European Union at various times.
Since 2010, the Task Force has also organized an invitation-only advanced lecture on
dealing with the past and the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. The goal of the course is “to
provide participants with in-depth knowledge of fundamental Dealing with the Past concepts,
mechanisms, best practices and lessons learned, as well as an opportunity to engage in a
process of critical reflection about different approaches to Dealing with the Past in post-conflict
contexts.”115 The course brings together civil society professionals and state officials from
various countries (usually around five states). While nationals are dispersed during the course,
the course usually ends with a group work conducted by nationals of the same country,
which allows them to reflect on the elaboration of a road map for their national context. Over
the years, interest in the advanced lectures has grown. Since 2015, lectures can be offered for
specific context on a case-by-case basis. Switzerland views the course, at least in part, as a way to
construct and consolidate a network of experts on dealing with the past and mass atrocity crimes
prevention.116
Since its establishment, the Task Force has been confronted with a number of diverse challenges.
Some challenges can be attributed at least partly to the subject itself. With the rise of demands
over the past few years as well as the expansion of GAAMAC, the Task Force is victim of its own
success: it currently lacks the financial and personal resources to address all of the demands being
placed on it. As a consequence, the Task Force recently developed an internal set of criterion against
which to accept or refuse requests for help. Switzerland’s foreign policy principles of efficiency and
coherence may provide broad guidelines in this establishment. They must however be used in
accordance with the principles of solidarity and responsibility. Establishing an assessment process
is not an easy task and raises multiple practical and ethical questions.
Challenges can also be due to the holistic approach followed. As a matter of fact, dealing with
the past and the prevention of mass atrocity crimes are extremely sensitive subjects in usually
extremely tense contexts. Activities must be the result of a good comprehension and inclusive
planning, taking carefully into account the conflictual situation and possible impacts to avoid any
escalation of violence. They must be sensitive and adaptable to the evolving conflicts dynamic
in diverse political, social and economic contexts. Moreover, to avoid problems due to the lack
of legitimacy and unfitting planning, a “bottom-up” approach elaborated with the inclusive
participation of significant national actors should ideally be followed. While a bottom-up approach
allows for the establishment of a fitting mechanism, it entails the challenge of defining measures
and mechanisms for each situation which could contribute to the transformation of a conflict, to
reconciliation and to the rule of law. These measures and mechanisms should not lead to impossible
expectations, but should be realistic and take into account available resources, often scarce in
conflict or post-conflict context.117
F. Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes in The Light of Swiss Neutrality and Foreign Policy
The general overview of the content and evolution of Swiss foreign policy underlined the shift
operated in the beginning of the nineties. By adopting an active neutrality, as well as defining peace
promotion as one of the five constitutional goals of Switzerland’s foreign policy, the Federal Council
paved the way for the development of peace promotion activities. Moreover, peace promotion
was actively developed as a niche diplomacy substitute for the ailing Swiss good offices. Peace
115

Swisspeace, “Goals,” Dealing with the Past: An Advanced Learning Course for Professionals, accessed September 4, 2016,
http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/about/goals.html.

116

For more information: Swisspeace, “Dealing with the Past Course,” Dealing with the Past: An Advanced Learning Course
for Professionals, accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/course.html.

117

Swisspeace, Un Cadre Conceptuel pour le Traitement du Passé, 14-18.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

Swiss Approaches to Atrocity Prevention

91

promotion thus developed and specialized in different areas where Switzerland, in conformity with
its foreign policy principles, could be efficient and make a substantial impact. Swiss characteristics
shaped this development. The Balkans war led to more peace promotion activities focused on
dealing with the past and genocide prevention, as a way to ensure Switzerland’s security and
economic and migratory stability, ultimate goal of Swiss foreign policy. Neutrality and direct
democracy also influenced this development. Military peace promotion was forbidden by popular
plebiscite in 1994 as a result of the right wing Swiss People Party’s action for an “Independent
and Neutral Switzerland.” Participation in UN and OSCE peace operations has subsequently been
accepted in 2001, under the condition that it should be conform to Switzerland’s foreign policy
and that Swiss participants would only carry a weapon for self-defence and not engage in any
enforcement action.118 This partial acceptance does not allow Switzerland to be a prominent actor
in military peace promotion, which could also explain the strong focus given to civilian peace
promotion. These multiple factors and slow evolution led to the establishment of the Task Force, a
niche diplomacy that seems to be in concordance with the values and principles of Swiss foreign
policy, as well as its neutrality. But are the Task Force activities really compatible with the flexible
and evolving conception of neutrality? How can neutrality influence the future of Swiss genocide
and mass atrocities prevention?
The following analysis aims to first establish whether the Task Force activities abide to
neutrality law in different conflicts configurations. In a second phase, they will analysed through
the lens of the policy of neutrality and its defining characteristic, namely the Swiss national role
conceptions as defined by Graf and Lanz. The last part of the analysis will address the future of
mass atrocities and genocide prevention in the light of the conclusion reached at this stage.
As we saw above, the juridical acceptation of neutrality is relatively narrow and forbids the
neutral state to intervene in armed conflicts. One can ask whether there should be a special exception
excluding the application of neutrality in case of mass atrocity crimes and genocide. During the
Kosovo war, Switzerland was confronted to this problematic through NATO’s humanitarian
intervention.119 Switzerland addressed the hypothetical applicability of neutrality law to military
measures taken as a reaction to mass atrocity crimes or genocide, in a case where the UN Security
Council did not endorse the measures. The Federal Council made a distinction between ethics and
neutrality. From the ethical point of view, the Council affirmed that States are expected to lend
support to populations suffering or being exposed to grave mistreatment. In terms of neutrality,
however, the Council recognized that Switzerland would have to decide whether or not neutrality
law would be applicable. The Council considered it hardly conceivable that an unlawful use of
force would not trigger the application of neutrality law, whereas the exclusion of neutrality, if the
use of force was undertaken in accordance with international law, was a disputable matter. In that
case, the Council fleshed out how the decision should be made. It “[...] necessitates a careful and
comprehensive weighing up of all the interests involved. In so doing, the prevention of and action
against international crime, respect for the prohibition of force and consolidation of the UN’s
system of collective security will be as important as Switzerland’s interest in a coherent, consistent
policy which—at least at present—seems completely guaranteed only by a purely formal approach
(i.e., existence of a decision by a legitimized organ).”120 No subsequent decisions or positions were
taken in that regard. While the establishment of a new circumstance excluding the applicability of
neutrality law is still open, it is however not (yet?) recognized by Switzerland.
As cases of genocide and mass atrocity crimes do not automatically exclude the application of
neutrality law, the common rules for its application and content must be analyzed to know whether
it forbids prevention activities. The Swiss government reaffirmed several times that the application
of neutrality law was limited to international armed conflict, in situations where the UN Security
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Council did not legitimize the use of force of one State.121 This understanding means that genocide
and mass atrocity crimes prevention activities are thus always compatible with neutrality law if
1) they happen in a strictly internal tensions context (civil war, political transition, etc.) or 2) if the
Security Council has endorsed one party, in accordance with international law. While legal, such
activities must still be confronted to the prevailing policy of neutrality, as it will be done below.
The lawfulness of the Task Force activities in case of other conflict configurations is less clear.
In the case of an international armed conflict where no side’s use of force has been legitimized
by a resolution of the UN Security Council, Switzerland considers that neutrality law forbids
Switzerland to militarily support a belligerent State.122 This interdiction is a corollary of the
obligation of equal treatment, core obligation of neutrality law.123 However, it is nuanced: the
principle of equal treatment only applies to acts of the neutral state which are of military relevance
to the parties of the international armed conflicts.124 In a hypothetical situation where State A and
B are opponents in an international armed conflict, State A is at the verge of committing mass
atrocities against State B’s nationals. If we consider that leading prevention activities provides a
military advantage to State B or military impede State A, then, by acting, Switzerland may violate
its neutral state’s duty of equal treatment. While preventing mass atrocities committed against
State B’s troops logically impacts the outcome of the conflict and should be considered as giving
at least an indirect military advantage, the status of crimes targeting civilian is less clear. Indeed,
given the psychological impact mass atrocities and genocide are likely to have on the victim State’s
nationals, as well as how they weaken the victim State’s apparatus and economy, they could be
considered as having an indirect effect on the military capacity of the victim State. As the Swiss
government recognized in its 2005 Neutrality Report, it is debatable how far the law of neutrality
governs measures which could indirectly influence the conflict to the advantage or disadvantage
of one conflict’s party.125 While some argue that a broad notion of military support should be
retained, which scope includes all indirect military support, the general acknowledged duties
of neutral States, including Switzerland, tend toward limiting neutrality law to its military core.
According to this understanding, providing indirect military support, limited to the principle of
equal treatment in trade, is forbidden.126 As such, activities of prevention may lawfully take place
in this context. They must however still undergo the policy of neutrality scrutiny.
The same debatable analysis has to take place in the case of an internationalized internal armed
conflict. In that configuration, State B might suffer from an internal conflict against a rebel group,
whose committing mass atrocities or a genocide. State A and State B are not directly in conflict
with each other. However, State A might be providing assistance to the rebel group in State B. It
is unclear if this configuration enters the scope of application of neutrality law. If the international
element of the internal armed conflict is deemed sufficient to trigger the application of neutrality
law, then the same analysis has to be made to define if undertaking prevention activities are
violating the neutral state’s duties.
As we have seen thus far, activities of prevention of mass atrocities might be taken in
accordance with neutrality law. However, if neutrality law does not seem to forbid all prevention
activities, a State can still politically choose to go further by adopting a stronger policy of neutrality.
Any mass atrocity crimes and genocide prevention activities that were deemed legal according to
neutrality law must also be compatible with Switzerland’s policy of neutrality to be carried out.
As aforementioned, Swiss policy of neutrality aims to give credibility to Switzerland’s position as
a neutral state. As such, bilateral activities—if led in purely internal armed conflict context, or, in
case of international armed conflict, if the activities do not fall in the scope of neutrality law—as
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well as multilateral activities irrespective of an armed conflict, should be analyzed through the lens
of the neutrality policy.
Given its nature of flexible tool, there is no precise definition of what the policy of neutrality
entails. Since the shift operated in 1993, Switzerland is following an active neutrality to answer
global threat—in opposition to the isolationism prevailing during the Cold War Era—and should
be realized “in the service of peace.”127 This conception is twofold: on the one hand, to compensate
the loss of Switzerland’s importance for providing good offices, neutrality should be interpreted
in a way that allows a stronger peace promotion policy. On the other hand, the Federal Council
affirms that neutrality is subordinated to the solidarity principle, which underpins Swiss foreign
policy.128 The Council concludes that “Switzerland will continue to direct its neutrality toward
humanitarian and peaceful goals. [...] In shaping its neutrality, it will also take the needs of
international solidarity into account in order to serve the community of nations. Swiss neutrality
must remain a peace-promoting factor both in Europe and throughout the world.”129
However, this ambiguous and vague definition of active neutrality does not necessarily
mean that mass atrocities and genocide prevention are compatible with the current Swiss policy
of neutrality. By using a deliberatively vague language in 1993, the Federal Council allowed the
expansion of peace promotion activities, while keeping a leeway to forbid any future politically
delicate activities in the name of neutrality. This seems to be confirmed by subsequent practice.
Instead of better define what the new conception of active neutrality meant, the Federal Council
used the same language on policy of neutrality in its two subsequent throughout analysis in 2000
and in 2005. In 2005 however, the Council introduced a slight change to its reaffirmed position,
stressing that “neutrality should not be equated with indifference” and considered that Switzerland
activities aiming to increase the respect of international humanitarian law by the parties to the Iraqi
conflict were deemed compatible with the Swiss policy of neutrality.130 An analogy could probably
be drawn from this consideration for the Task Force multilateral activities, such as GAAMAC, as
its aims are similar. On a bilateral level, it seems harder to conclude that the Federal Council’s
previous positions expressly allows Switzerland to play a more active role within a country party
to an international armed conflict.
Given the lack of clear and written policy of neutrality regarding mass atrocity crimes and
genocide prevention, and its evolving and fluctuant nature, we have to take a closer look on what
is shaping it, namely Switzerland’s national role conceptions—which stem from neutrality and, as
well as the aims of neutrality.
As mentioned earlier, two main and seemingly contradictory national role conceptions are
shaping Switzerland policy-making. The first one is the isolate national role conception—the
tendency to fear and avoid international relations. The second one is Switzerland’s mediatorintegrator national role conception, which can to some extent be linked to its less pronounced
bridge-builder and defender of faith national role conception. The inherent nature of mass atrocities
and genocide prevention seems to be the logical extension of the mediator-integrator national role
conception, and be in direct contradiction with its isolate national role. If we consider it to be the
case, then the existence of the Task Force implies that the mediator-integrator is actually stronger
than the isolate national role conception in the political sphere—and, through direct democracy,
the public sphere— as it can afford to contradict it.
However, another reading of the situation is possible. As underlined by Goetschel’s dualism
between “high” and “low” politics, not every international relation is following an isolationist
trend. Mass atrocity crimes and genocide prevention, though primarily aiming at avoiding the
commission of atrocities abroad, are part of Swiss peace promotion policy and thus obey its
interest-driven logic, fuelled by security, economic stability and migratory movement interests.
Its secondary aim is thus to ensure Switzerland’s stability and security, as well as its well-being.
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Because the work of the Task Force is not directly affecting Switzerland’s security, but only has a
future, negative and difficult to quantify impact (in the sense that it does not improve but allows
the situation to remain unchanged), it can be argued that mass atrocities and genocide prevention
should be labeled as “low” politics.
This second understanding seems to be confirmed by three facts. First, there is no available
document issued by the government to confirm that the Task Force’s activities are compatible
with neutrality. An internal analysis might have been realized, however, the lack of published
document on the matter seems to attest that government policy-makers did not believe it would be
in contradiction with the Swiss population conception of neutrality. Second, while neutrality is a
recurrent subject of parliamentary interpellation, no parliamentarian asked the Federal Council to
justify any genocide and mass atrocities prevention activities in regard to neutrality. Third, there
has been no plebiscite regarding civilian peace promotion activities, in opposition to military peace
promotion. The lack of reaction raised by prevention activities seems to confirm that they must be
considered as low politics, which are not limited by the isolate national role conception.
In conclusion, by following the current trend to limit the neutral state’s obligations to its
military core, Switzerland excludes mass atrocities and genocide prevention activities from the
scope of neutrality law. Moreover, as an expression of the mediator-integrator national role
conception or as a matter of low politics, they thus appear to be in conformity with the current
Swiss policy of neutrality.
What does it mean for the Task Force future? As the policy of neutrality is conceived as a
flexible instrument, its evolution is likely to influence Switzerland’s peace promotion and the Task
Force’s existence. Changing international circumstances may lead the Federal Council to reinterpret
Switzerland’s neutrality. One possible development would be to go even further than the current
active neutrality, interpreting Switzerland’s policy of neutrality and neutrality duties in a narrower
sense. In that scenario, the activities of the Task Force would remain unchallenged.
On the contrary, if Switzerland evolves toward a strict neutrality due to the resurgence of
a neighboring threat, similar to the integral neutrality of the Cold War, it would affect them
to a certain extent, depending on the degree of the evolution. A first step would be to adopt a
broad definition of what constitutes a military advantage in neutrality law, effectively forbidding
prevention in international armed conflict. A second step would be the adoption of a strict policy of
neutrality. In that configuration, the change in the political climate would likely result in a stronger
isolate national role conception over its mediator-integrator rival.
Two scenarios might unfold in this case: if mass atrocity crimes and genocide prevention stems
from the weakened mediator-integrator conception, the reinforcement of the isolate national role
conception will probably lead to discard prevention in favor of a more isolate behavior. If however,
prevention activities are, as we argued, part of Goetschel’s low politics, then it is possible that
they would not be challenged by the strengthening of the isolate conception. Given their inherent
international nature however, it seems unlikely that they would not attract further notice. The
Federal Council would probably have to realize an in-depth analysis of prevention activities
in the light of their utility to Switzerland and the international community, and their potential
contradiction to the aims of a strict understanding of neutrality. In case of clashing interest, the Task
Force’s existence would probably be in peril. While it could be argued that the indirect security
and stabilizing effects of prevention may be a sufficient replacement of neutrality, it seems unlikely
that Switzerland would abandon neutrality in favor of prevention. Indeed, prevention, while it
might ensure security, would not be able to ensure social cohesion by providing Swiss population
with a distinct identity. Moreover, national role conceptions at the basis of prevention —mediatorintegrator, bridge-builder and to a certain degree defender of the faith—are a direct consequence
of neutrality. It seems thus extremely difficult to replace neutrality by prevention, as neutrality is
indirectly one of the justifications of Swiss prevention activities.
G. Conclusion
Before the end of the Cold War, Switzerland was following a strict policy of neutrality which tended
toward isolationism. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world led to a new interpretation of
the policy, which allowed for the development of peace promotion activities. Peace promotion
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was then enshrined in the revised Federal Constitution as one of the five goals of Swiss foreign
policy. Two decades later, a specialized and cross-departmental entity—the Task Force for Dealing
with the Past and Prevention of Atrocities—was created. This specialization could be the result
of multiple factors: the diminishing role of the good offices, the need to reassert Switzerland’s
position in the international community by investing in new diplomatic niches, the impossibility
to develop military peace promotion as a consequence of direct democracy, etc. After a few years
of working both at the multilateral and bilateral level, following an inclusive and holistic approach,
the Task Force has to overcome a new challenge induced by the lack of resources and lay out a set
of criterion to accept or decline help request.
At the same time, Switzerland neutral status did not lose its force. The Federal Council
reaffirmed several times that neutrality has proven its capacity to protect Switzerland security and
stability. As we saw above, neutrality is thus both what allowed prevention activities to flourish—
as a consequence of the mediator-integrator national role conception—and what can potentially
limit them, as a consequence of the isolate national role conception. As we demonstrated, the
current interpretation of Swiss neutrality law and policy is compatible with mass atrocities and
genocide prevention. However, if new threats considered grave enough to adopt a stricter policy
of neutrality were to arise, it could have serious consequences on the existence of the Task Force.
A broader understanding of the interdiction to provide military advantages to the belligerents,
including in its scope indirect advantages, may lead to the illegality of prevention activities. The
strengthening of the isolate national role conception could also have an enormous impact on these
activities. If prevention activities are based on the mediator-integrator national role conception,
they may stop in favor of a more isolate behavior. However, if, as we argued, they are considered
to be part of Goetschel’s low politics, they may survive to the strengthening of the isolate national
role conception.
Regardless of the national role conception’s affiliation of mass atrocity crimes and genocide
prevention, the cessation of the Task Force activities must also be analyzed regarding Switzerland’s
international relations. Indeed, neutrality proves a lack of hostility, but peace promotion proves
usefulness vis-à-vis greater powers.131 In the light of Switzerland’s candidacy for the Security
Council in 2023-2024, niche diplomacy will surely be highly put forward to distinguish Switzerland
from rival countries. In addition, as Switzerland is a small, almost absent, player regarding military
peace promotion, it will probably counterbalance this weakness by an active, efficient, and, more
importantly, specialized civilian peace promotion. As a consequence of its candidacy, Switzerland
will probably intensify in the upcoming years its activities regarding genocide and mass atrocity
crimes prevention, especially in multilateral fora.
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Introduction1
“East Asia’s recent past is littered with examples of conscience shocking inhumanity against
civilian populations,” writes Alexander Bellamy. 2 “Indeed, for much of the Cold War, people in
East Asia were arguably at greater risk of death by genocide and mass atrocities than anyone else
in the world,” Bellamy observes.3 He continues:
Almost unnoticed, however, the region has been transformed. There are fewer cases of
genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia today than at any point in history for which
we have reliable records. This change has coincided with, and been informed by, a quiet
revolution in the region’s understanding of the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty.4

This “quiet revolution” is due in part to an unfolding commitment to what Steven Pinker has called
the global human rights revolution, which broke out in the wake of World War II and spread to the
countries in East Asia.5
Pinker has assembled in his book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, compelling “big data,”
drawn from a host of sources, that since 1945 the world community has experienced a significant
reduction in the number of genocides and mass atrocities.6 While it is a controversial thesis that
seems to be defied by current events, including President Bashar al-Assad’s barrel bombing of
Syrian civilians and the rise of ISIS, Pinker has effectively answered his critics and has updated his
argument.7 In comparative terms, “the world’s civilians are several thousand times less likely to be
targeted today than they were 70 years ago,” argue Pinker and Mack.8 The development of norms
by the global community that are then adopted by regional organizations like the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)9 help explain the success of the post-World War II human
rights revolution.
The global community created the UN (1945), held 13 trials holding the Nazis responsible
for crimes against humanity (1947-1948), and endorsed the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), and more recently, the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine (2005). The doctrine, based on three pillars, makes it a responsibility for the member states
of the United Nations to prevent genocide and mass atrocities that may result from interstate and
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intrastate conflict.10 Luck and Luck correctly argue that R2P has been a success; it has been called
one of the fastest-developing international norms in history.11 Beginning in 2005, the norms of
R2P have inspired international activism, have been invoked in twenty-five UN Security Council
resolutions, have been used to justify successful efforts to prevent or mitigate atrocity violence in
Africa (Kenya, 2008; Burundi, 2008; Cote d’Ivoire, 2010; Libya, 2011), and have contributed to the
reduction of mass atrocities in East Asia.
I suggest that the reduction of mass atrocity crimes in East Asia can be attributed to the
global human rights revolution and ASEAN genocide and mass atrocities prevention norms
and mechanisms that work to assimilate the global values of R2P with those of ASEAN member
states. The “ASEAN way” serves as a positive model for other regional organizations.12 To be sure,
the recent mass atrocities committed against the Rohingya civilians in Myanmar, a member of
ASEAN, illustrate that the creation of shared human rights norms may be a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the prevention of human rights abuses. However, the horror visited upon
the Rohingya stands out in relief against a relatively violence-free period in the region, and as a
2015 report issued by the Holocaust Museum indicated, there were many warning signs, including
the violation of accepted regional and international norms of human rights, suggesting that the
Rohingya would become targets of mass atrocities.13 The government of Myanmar has violated
established international and ASEAN human rights norms; the issue now concerns the political
will needed to enforce the norms.
Bellamy is careful to acknowledge that the acceptance of the R2P norm is but one of four
factors in the reduction of mass atrocities in Southeast Asia:
The dramatic and sustained decline of genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia was not
produced by any single factor, but by the combined effects of at least four important ones: a
reduction in the deliberate targeting of civilians in war, growing incomes across the region,
creeping democratization, and changing ideas about the nature of sovereignty and the
responsibilities for protection.14

Three of these factors, Bellamy observes, are structural; the fourth is cultural and symbolic, a result
of the incorporation of norms adapting the values of global human rights and R2P to those of East
Asia.15 These structural forces have played powerful roles in the reduction of mass atrocities and in
the creation of prevention mechanisms. Research has suggested as well that these structural factors
alone, without the appropriate cultural and ideational norms, do not and cannot lead to reduction
in mass atrocities.16 In the case of East Asia, it is clear that the establishment of human rights
norms and the values codified in R2P have played a role in the reduction of atrocities. As Pinker,
Bellamy, and others document, the structural factors that influence the outbreak or prevention of
mass atrocities are framed by ideas, norms, and discourse.17 The post-World War II human rights
revolution has, in Bellamy’s words, altered the thinking in East Asian countries
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about what constitutes legitimate conduct. These ideational shifts, which came in part from
global transformations, and in part from within the region, were transmitted by the region’s
growing middle class and activist civil societies and changed the expectations about the
proper relationship between governments and peoples.18

Scholars have corroborated Bellamy’s conclusions: Okere, Aning, and Nelson find that the
countries of ASEAN “have become increasingly involved in moving the [R2P] norm from rhetoric
to practice.”19 While there is a significant body of work that examines the three structural factors
that play significant roles in the decline of genocide and mass atrocity in East Asia, I seek here
to briefly explain how ASEAN’s genocide and mass atrocity prevention mechanisms intended
to foster changes in thinking and norms about human rights have contributed to the atrocity
prevention mechanisms and how they are evolving.
ASEAN was formed in 1967 to promote economic development and regional stability and
has contributed to the reduction in interstate war in the region.20 However, until the creation of
the R2P doctrine, ASEAN countries did not concern themselves with the mass atrocities that have
taken place within the borders of their member states until the advent of R2P. The Asia Pacific
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APCR2P is “the most important norm entrepreneur and
advocate for R2P in Southeast Asia…”).21 The Centre “has led efforts to socialize the region on the
2005 version of R2P” and seeks to embed the three pillars of R2P, including extension of the human
rights imperative into the internal politics of ASEAN member countries. 22 Launched in February
2008 with the help of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations Edward Luck and former
Foreign Minister of Canada Lloyd Axworthy, the aspiration of the Centre, observes Noel Morada,
one of the Centre’s directors, is to build “domestic constituencies around” the R2P norm with its
various programs.23
To build the R2P norm, the APCR2P uses a “bottom-up” approach through use of seminars and
workshops at the local level in the Asia-Pacific region on R2P and offers scholars the opportunity
to conduct policy-relevant, peer-reviewed academic research. The efforts of the Centre and the
more general and gradual acceptance in the region of the responsibilities of the state to protect its
citizens, and when it doesn’t, the responsibility of outside bodies to assist or to intervene to protect
human beings, irrespective of their geographical location, has borne some fruit in Southeast Asia.
The consensus of the emerging literature suggests that if global norms of human rights are to find
a place in ASEAN mass atrocity prevention mechanisms, they will need to be grafted onto those
that currently rule in the region; they cannot be imposed.24
The first mission of the APCR2P is to offer R2P norm-building training, projects, activities,
and workshops. Noel Morada, after conducting a series of interviews and workshops at different
locations in the Asia-Pacific region in 2005 to determine what might be done to promote R2P norms,
identified three best practices: translations of important UN and R2P materials into East Asian
languages, development and inclusion of R2P materials in the curriculum of East Asian universities,
and R2P workshops for government officials, military personnel, and important civilian groups.
The legacy of the Centre’s first R2P constituency-building workshop, hosted by the Centre in the
Philippines on June 25-26, 2009, is of importance. The workshop brought representatives from
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all of the important constituencies and focused on how the R2P norm could be promoted in the
Philippines. Morada reports that the workshop played an important role in providing information
on R2P to the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, which in turn influenced the Philippines’
taken on R2P during a meeting about the doctrine at the UN in July 2009.25
The second mission of the Centre is to promote research on R2P. The Centre has served as a
publishing house for works of research and as a scholarly clearinghouse for R2P in the Asia-Pacific
region. The APCR2P website hosts an “R2P Ideas in Brief” webpage. As a “resource hub,” the
webpage lists reports, podcasts, newsletters, and issue briefs outlining problems facing R2P. The
Centre has published full reports. A review of the “Ideas in Brief,” which lists five annual volumes
of research summaries of major issues, reveals well-researched and written case studies of R2P as
applied to human rights problems in the Asia-Pacific region.26 Individual scholars sponsored by
the Centre have made significant scholarly contributions to our understanding of genocide and
mass atrocity prevention mechanisms set forth by ASEAN. Two stand out as norm entrepreneurs:
Noel Morada and Alexander J. Bellamy. Both have provided comprehensive treatments of
efforts made by ASEAN member states to establish and develop the architecture for atrocity
prevention.
Morada, in his 2006 article “R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects,”
outlined a future of R2P in the Asia-Pacific region.27 Written one year after the doctrine was
endorsed by the United Nations, Morada’s contribution is prescient, as he accurately predicted
both the obstacles to and the promise of implementing R2P in Southeast Asia. ASEAN member
states, with their principle of noninterference, have successfully avoided interstate war, but the
principle undercuts interference and interventions that might prevent mass atrocities committed
by ASEAN member states against its citizens.28 Morada has led efforts to embed the values of R2P
in the East Asian cultural context.
Bellamy is a prolific author, and he has emerged as an international authority on R2P. His
articles in Ethics and International Affairs, reviewing R2P at five years (2010) and at ten years (2015),
are major contributions to an understanding of R2P’s perils and potential. Articles published in 2008
(on conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect), 2009 (on R2P in the Asia-Pacific region),
three in 2011 (on R2P, the invasion of Libya, global politics, and international law), and his 2015 The
Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (Oxford University Press) contribute to an understanding of R2P
and the importance of norms and their creation, adaptation, and adoption.29 Morada and Bellamy
provide important leadership and support for ASEAN member states to implant the norms of
human rights and R2P as mass atrocity prevention mechanisms.
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Seaman writes that ASEAN “provides one of the most interesting case studies in relation to
R2P.”30 Although Morada notes that the doctrine “remains a difficult norm to promote and gain
acceptance in South-East Asia,” some progress is evident.31 R2P seems to be “making significant
inroads as a regional norm in the Asia-Pacific region”32 and has “great promise as a norm developer
for the principles of underpinning conflict prevention...”33 The literature suggests that at least four
norms, with varying levels of acceptance, are in use or development by ASEAN member states.
The ASEAN Way: The Norm of Collective Decision Making through Networked Civil
Societies in South East Asia
The formation of ASEAN in 1967 fostered diplomatic communication, promoted the creation of
shared values among the ten-member states, and helped create a regional civil society. As Morada
writes,
For almost 40 years, ASEAN has relied principally on norm-building and promotion to
manage inter-state conflicts... Much of the pressure [to create norms] emanates from an
increasingly networked civil society groups in Southeast Asia, which has undeniably become
a moral force to contend with especially on humanitarian issues and concerns. In short,
ASEAN states cannot just simply ignore the emergence of a regional civil society that now
serves as the main avenue for promoting more people-oriented norms in ASEAN.34

ASEAN, according to James Waller’s recent survey, “has demonstrated a constructive capacity
to partner with existing institutions, mechanisms, and relevant government actors of the 10
countries within their organization to promote genocide prevention.”35 After the end of the Cold
War, ASEAN countries sought to create shared norms between 1997 and 2007, which then led
community building between 2008 and 2015.36 To be sure, the progress toward shared norms has
not been without setbacks, as ASEAN’s collective decision making resists rapid implementation of
new values. Rather, over time, the networked ASEAN civil societies work out through compromise
and accommodation the tensions between global and local norms.37
Bellamy points to the numerous efforts made by his Centre and ASEAN member states to
promote atrocity prevention. There are a “number of regional initiatives” under way to strengthen
mass atrocity prevention norms, including the Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocities Prevention.38
These initiatives build from the progress made to prevent mass atrocities in the region, doing
so by recognizing that individual nations will need to assimilate global human rights values
through dialogue and debate. ASEAN uses a consensus model of decision making, with all of
its drawbacks and strengths. While it takes time to secure a consensus, a process Bellamy rightly
calls “exasperating,” the shared judgments that produce norms are “sustainable and considered
legitimate.”39 The progress to establish norms against mass atrocity made through the networked
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civil societies of ASEAN member states has been, in Bellamy’s judgment, “impressive.”40 As a
preventative mechanism, the collective decision making based on consensus is understood as the
“ASEAN Way.”41 ASEAN has, over time, assimilated some of the global human rights norms.
The Norms of Global Human Rights
Although Bellamy categorizes the decrease in the use of mass atrocities as a stratagem of war
as a structural factor, he also acknowledges that the “principal reasons why states have moved
away from employing mass atrocities as a tactic are both ideational and material in nature.”42
The creation of international norms prohibiting genocide and mass atrocity after World War II,
backed by the physical and moral force of the United Nations and the International Criminal Court
(ICC), found their way into the value structures of ASEAN member states. These actions include
an ongoing interrogation of norms that have been used to justify mass atrocity. Norms in the AsiaPacific region that were once viewed as “natural,” such as the right of a nation to attack another
or the right of a state to commit mass atrocities against its citizens, have been inverted. Since 2005,
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have gradually come to view human rights as a responsibility
of the sovereign state. Rather than framing relationship between global human rights and state
sovereignty as an antinomy, the R2P doctrine has prompted ASEAN member states to define the
protection of human rights as a responsibility of the state.
The R2P doctrine has encouraged sovereign states in the Asia-Pacific region to broaden the
range of their responsibilities to include the prevention of mass atrocities. As such, ASEAN member
states are attending to factors that spark atrocity crimes, including climate change, economic
disparities, food security, and others. Teitt identifies two efforts made by ASEAN member states
to broaden the focus of mass atrocity prevention.43 First, the Japanese are working to broaden
the definition of human security to include social and economic inequalities, health disparities,
hunger, and other problems. Second, ASEAN member states are seeking to implement policies
that confront poverty and economic inequality as mass atrocity prevention measures. The “narrow
but deep approach to implementing R2P,” Teitt writes, “which recognizes a broader development
assistance agenda is part of the global effort to end atrocities, resonates both with human security
concepts originating in the Asia Pacific and the structural capacity-building agenda advocated by
the states in the region.”44
The consensus of the scholarship on ASEAN human rights norms and mass atrocity
prevention mechanisms suggests that both are the result of slow and incremental modifications of
local norms through consensus-building decision-making procedures. International and regional
organizations, including ASEAN, are in constant dialogue through the offices of the United Nations
and institutions like APCR2P. The goal is to assimilate the universal values of human rights into
the norms of ASEAN countries. Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, endorsed both the
nonintervention policy favored by ASEAN member states and the third pillar of R2P that called
for intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state when that state had failed to protect the human
rights of its citizens. The “consensus decision-making and evolutionary institutional change” in
use by the United Nations “appears to have increased comfort among Asia Pacific states” with the
R2P implementation agenda.45 However, ASEAN member states have not fully worked through the
tension between the doctrine of nonintervention, which has decreased interstate mass atrocities,
and R2P in its call for humanitarian intervention by outside forces when a state has failed in its
responsibility to protect its citizens. A norm bridging the two is forming.
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An Evolving Norm Nesting the Principle of Noninterference and the Responsibility to Protect
within the Sovereign State
ASEAN’s founding documents (1967), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration
of 1971, and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and Article Two of the ASEAN Charter
(2007) commit ASEAN to the principle of noninterference by external parties in the sovereign
affairs of member states. The significant decline in the number of mass atrocities due to armed
conflict between states in the region since the end of the Cold War can be traced to this principle.46
Indeed, “scholars are relatively unanimous in agreeing that during the first decades of ASEAN,
the principle [of non-interference] managed to translate into reality.”47 As a result, “there has
been no interstate conflict involving casualties between two ASEAN members, despite the fact
that some ASEAN members have been traditional enemies since before joining the organization.
This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially
after 1987.”48 Paradoxically, the principle also protected and shielded states that committed mass
atrocities against its own citizens. ASEAN has resisted contesting human rights abuses conducted
by its member states against its citizens.49
The application of the principle of noninterference by ASEAN “has been extremely strict
and has presented one of the major obstacles for ASEAN human rights bodies to interpret their
mandates and their functions effectively since their inception.”50 ASEAN was faced with the choice
of either rejecting or accepting R2P’s principle that interference and intervention in the affairs of
an ASEAN member state is justified if the government is committing human rights abuses against
its citizens. Rather than framing the choice as a binary, ASEAN is attempting to bridge the two
through an act of creative accommodation and dissociation.51
ASEAN is on a trajectory that is slowly, with its ponderous, consensus-based decision
making, aligning and assimilating the principle of noninterference with the three pillars of R2P.52
The networked international and regional civil societies have insisted that the ASEAN principle
of noninterference “evolve in a way that reflects a degree of receptivity to principles associated
with R2P... Thus, many Southeast Asian states are moving away from the traditional notion of
sovereignty and towards accepting a localised variant of sovereignty as responsibility.”53 This act
of assimilation and dissociation is not simply a crude importation of global human rights norms
or a continuation of local practices with a symbolic nod to R2P. Rather, ASEAN has engaged in the
negotiation and creative adaptations producing new norms “that alters both the new norm (R2P)
and those more established norms (non-interference).”54
The ASEAN dissociation and creative reframing of the principle of non-interference and those
of R2P has broadened the definition of ASEAN state sovereignty to include the responsibility to
safeguard the human rights of its citizens. Bellamy and Drummond highlight two illustrations
of this new formulation in action: ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis, which caused 138,000
causalities in Myanmar in 2008, and the positions taken by the region’s governments during the
2009 UN General Assembly debate on R2P. Both illustrations demonstrate how ASEAN honored
the principle of noninterference, while justifying intervention to secure the human rights of
individuals within member states as acts of assisting sovereign states to protect their citizens.
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Bellamy, in his 2016 survey concludes, “significant normative progress has been made in building a
regional consensus around the principle of the responsibility to protect.”55 In light of this progress,
ASEAN member states are now creating the norms necessary to prevent mass atrocity.
The Norm of Mass Atrocity Prevention
While atrocity crimes have decreased in Southeast Asia, there is a need to strengthen existing and
build new structures designed to prevent future outbreaks. The research suggests that mass atrocity
prevention is best done at the national level. Scholars and government officials are seeking to build
from the ASEAN’s successes in reducing the frequency of mass atrocities to develop an ASEANinflected R2P. Toward this end, a major effort is under way to fully mainstream R2P in Southeast
Asia. Government reports and scholars have offered recommendations that if implemented would
help create national architectures for ASEAN member states designed to prevent mass atrocities.56
Among the many recommendations, three are at the top of the agenda:
A. The need to continue promoting R2P and adapting it to the values and norms in the region.
To accomplish this end, R2P should be “properly contextualized in ASEAN’s language.”57
An effort should be made to suggest that ASEAN regional norms, values, and principles
are embedded in the Responsibility to Protect and are not alien to it.”58
B. A dedicated effort to strengthen and develop mass atrocity early warning systems.
Social science has identified the precursors to mass atrocity. ASEAN member states seek
to develop the tools needed to alert policymakers and the general public to conditions,
speech, and behavior that foretell mass atrocity. There is a need for networks that join
the ten ASEAN member states for the purpose of gathering and analyzing information
on human rights violations. At present, ASEAN countries need to devote resources to the
development of national architectures designed to prevent atrocity crimes.
C. The constructive management of diversity and deep pluralism. Atrocity crimes are often
the result of identity-based conflict. Government reports and scholarship highlight the
need for ASEAN countries to create cultural space and government institutions for people
of multiple and overlapping identities. Legal protections for minorities or those who do
not adhere to the majority’s religion or lifestyle are necessary to inoculate against atrocity
crimes. Conflict management systems, including conciliation, mediation, and arbitration,
should play major roles in atrocity prevention.
Conclusion
The member states of ASEAN have successfully reduced the number of wars and as a result, the
frequency of mass atrocities since the formation of the association in 1967. Scholars have identified
structural factors (reduction of mass atrocities as a weapon of war, rising incomes, and the spread
of democracy) and the norms framing them as explanations. The norms in play determine the
influence of the structural factors on the frequency of mass atrocities. The effectiveness of these
norms can be debated. Kassim argues, “R2P has only enjoyed lip service in Southeast Asia.”59
However, Kassim agrees with Bellamy and others that the doctrine is gaining acceptance as the
norm is debated and discussed by ASEAN member states.60 ASEAN member states have adopted
norms of collective decision making and global human rights and are integrating global human
rights into regional and national value systems. Although there are serious environmental and
political issues facing ASEAN, the association can draw from its history of success to develop new
norms that equip member states with the tools needed to prevent atrocity crimes. ASEAN stands as
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a model in its success at decreasing atrocity crimes, and the norms it has set forth and is developing
can offer lessons to other regional organizations. Future studies of successful norm creation should
include the roles played by the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and the Protection of the
Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights (AICHR), the R2P focal points adopted by Australia, Cambodia, and Timor-Leste, and the
UN’s “Human Rights Up Front” initiative on the formation of ASEAN’s human rights norms.
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Introduction
Concerns about people fleeing war-torn homelands have become part of our daily news. Vivid
images of destroyed cities, brutally murdered civilians, and crowded refugee camps have resulted
in an outpouring of compassion and humanitarian aid. Many countries, including the United
States, are being pressed to simultaneously undertake actions to halt genocide1 and to open their
doors to new waves of refugees. As a result, policy makers and citizens are asking themselves:
How do we decide when to get involved and if we are doing enough to halt the killing (or its
threat)? What types of actions might be most effective? How can we ensure that things go right?
And what constitutes a successful or unsuccessful intervention?
The importance of preventing genocide is not at issue. The doctrine of responsibility to protect
(R2P),2 articulated in 2005, permits the international community to intervene in the affairs of a
sovereign state if it fails to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes. In the United States,
the Executive Summary of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, co-chaired by Madeleine Albright
and William Cohen, begins by emphasizing “the fundamental reality that genocide and mass
atrocities threaten American values and interests.”3 President Obama supported and strengthened
this position by proclaiming, as part of Presidential Directive 10, the establishment of the Atrocities
Prevention Board (APB) and by stating that “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core
national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.”4
It might then be assumed that clear criteria and policies are in place for deciding when and
what to do. The reality, in sharp contrast, is that the absence of coherent procedures for addressing
intervention decisions is widely acknowledged. For example, in their comprehensive 2008 review
of genocide prevention strategies, Albright and Cohen wrote that “Simply put, the U.S. government
does not have an established, coherent policy for preventing and responding to genocide and mass
atrocities.”5 Drawing on techniques from decision analysis, psychology, and negotiation analysis,
we highlight a general approach to assessing genocide prevention decisions that we believe could
provide decision makers with insights about how to construct defensible intervention policies and
link proposed actions to national values in a manner that promotes consistency, efficiency, and
defensibility.
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Although we lack direct experience as senior-level policy officials, our research—as academics
and frequent advisors to governments—has focused on understanding how people both do and
should make decisions characterized by multiple dimensions of value, uncertain consequences,
and difficult tradeoffs. This characterization applies to most decisions concerning genocide
prevention but also to a host of other tough public policy choices facing governments such as
responses to climate change, storage of high-level nuclear wastes, or prevention of terrorism. Each
of these national-level policy choices is said to have an influence on “national security” and the
long-term “national interest”—two terms that often surface as part of discussions of genocide
prevention. In each of these diverse policy arenas the consequences of decisions typically are
subject to uncertainty (and thus good outcomes are not guaranteed). Nevertheless, appropriate
decision-making approaches have the capability to improve the quality of outcomes by identifying
choices that better align with and achieve the considered interests of decision makers. As President
Obama stated when discussing U.S. policies in the Middle East, “We have to be able to distinguish
between these problems analytically, so that we’re not using pliers where we need a hammer,
and we’re not using a battalion when what we should be doing is partnering with the local
government.”6
Evaluating Tough Intervention Choices
Everyone would acknowledge the many difficulties facing national leaders making decisions about
intervening in a foreign country in hopes of preventing genocide and mass atrocities. Whether
the U.S. (or any nation) should intervene and attempt to stop genocide is complicated, on many
levels.7 Such choices place a cognitive demand on decision makers because they involve multiple
dimensions of value and a wide range of possible alternative actions. The decision context typically is
characterized by numerous constraints including insufficient time, limited information, and scarce
financial resources. Intervention decisions also involve strong emotions because people’s lives—
foreign as well as domestic—are at issue and because decision makers feel a moral responsibility
for the outcomes of their choices.
In a widely cited speech to a group of foreign policy experts meeting at the Holocaust Memorial
Museum in Washington, DC,8 then Secretary of State Clinton emphasized the importance of
preventing mass atrocities when she said “The United States and our partners must act before the
wood is stacked or the match is struck.” She also noted that intervention efforts should “ensure
that all our tools and resources are being put to good use.” However, there was no explicit linkage
to methods or deliberative processes that might provide a practical and generalizable template for
assessing what it means to put resources to “good use”—presumably, a reference to undertaking
genocide prevention efforts that help to achieve (remembering Albright and Cohen) the Nation’s
“values and interests.”
Two basic approaches typically are used to come up with strategies and action plans in the
face of difficult choices. The first is to rely on past experiences and informed intuition. For such
decisions, some maintain, there is no substitute for experience and little role for external decision
aids or methods. This perspective—“decision making as an art”—is a reasonable characterization
of much of medicine,9 law,10 and the military:11 good decisions will arise naturally from discussions
among a small group of experienced experts. The alternative perspective—“decision making as a
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discipline”—derives from studies in decision analysis,12 psychology,13 and behavioral economics.14
It maintains that peoples’ unaided judgment is prone to numerous biases and errors, particularly
when decision contexts are novel, choices are sequential and shared (i.e., requiring multiple
decisions among multiple individuals), or when the task of balancing diverse objectives is critical.
Prescriptive Decision Aids
Prescriptive decision making is concerned with how people can improve their choice processes.
As succinctly characterized in the book Smart Choices,15 a recommended decision-making sequence
forms the acronym PrOACT: understand the Problem context, clarify Objectives and associated
measures, define Alternatives, identify their likely Consequences and important uncertainties, and
highlight key Trade-offs. When used in an iterative fashion, cycling back to re-examine assumptions
due to shifts in the importance of different objectives or because new information is available, the
approach is both rigorous and links with the logic of common sense.
To the extent that similar decisions are made over time, the use of a consistent decisionmaking framework encourages learning because it facilitates the comparison and review of
choices, examining criteria and reasons that (in hindsight) will turn out to have a stronger or
weaker rationale. The use of a simplifying structure to address intervention choices also has the
benefit of forcing decision makers to confront a paradoxical truth: it is because the issues involved
in framing such choices can appear overwhelmingly difficult that a simplifying structure is useful.
Without an organizing structure, the breadth of concerns involved in thinking about interventions
to prevent genocide can effectively serve to paralyze rational decision making. As a result, what
often happens is that the difficult becomes (falsely) easy by relying on a single consideration (what
is the dominant concern?), habit (what did we do last time?) or intuition (what is my gut feeling?).
Unstructured discussions often serve to bias decisions in favor of short-term, emotionally satisfying
goals (they attacked us so we’ll attack them) or achieving objectives that are easy to defend, such
as national security, without carefully weighing these against less prominent, more long-term,
or more difficult-to-achieve objectives such as enhancing human rights or reducing the loss of
civilian lives.16
In our experience, significant clarity can be gained through the simple act of developing a
common language for the key decision elements and placing considerations into their proper place
or order—an organizing or binning process referred to as “decision sketching.”17 The structuring
process begins by identifying a small set of objectives that effectively capture the concerns that
matter most in the context of a defined problem. Alternative responses can then be compared in
terms of their ability to achieve these identified values; the outcomes collectively determine the
overall benefits and costs of any selected policy. Some of the consequences will matter more to
some people than to others, which can help to shed light on individuals’ underlying values as well
as their interpretation of the available facts. The balancing of these different outcomes forms the
basis for discussions of trade-offs: how much of a potential gain in one objective is needed to offset
potential losses in another?
A decision-aiding approach uses several specific tools to help structure deliberations about
tough intervention choices, with the goal of highlighting key considerations and—by making
relationships among key decision elements more transparent—encouraging participants to pay
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attention to areas of agreement and disagreement. Four tools drawn from the decision sciences are
particularly helpful.
Objectives hierarchies provide a vehicle for identifying and ordering concerns relevant
to a decision.18 For example, key values for intervention decisions to prevent mass atrocities
and genocide will typically include effects on national security (including both domestic and
international political or economic threats), loss of lives and injuries (both domestic and foreign),
economic costs of intervention and aid, effects on the nation’s reputation (related to meeting moral
and legal obligations), and the anticipated impacts on regional stability. Each of these fundamental
concerns often will include several sub-objectives: “protecting human lives,” for example, includes
deaths and injuries that might affect either civilians or members of the military. Delineating
objectives (a) provides a clear basis and record for identifying what matters to the decision, (b)
identifies an explicit and consistent framework for comparing the consequences of alternative
actions or for generating new, creative alternatives, and (c) allows different participants to express
the importance they place on each concern, which often provides the rationale for disagreements
regarding choices.
Means-ends networks (also known as influence diagrams) are a common decision structuring
or modeling tool that graphically represents the relationship between decisions, uncertainties and
outcomes, using nodes and arrows.19 They emphasize the causal variables over which decision
makers have some control and their sequential influence on the values and objectives at stake: an
increase in funding for on-site medical personnel is a means that leads to better-staffed hospitals
which, in turn, allows for lower response times and helps to achieve the fundamental (i.e., end)
objective of saving more lives (see Figure 1). These diagrams can play an important role in defining
evaluation criteria to better estimate the consequences of different courses of action and improve
understanding of ways to achieve strategy objectives: meeting with leaders in Congress could be
shown as a useful as a way to build support and, in turn, to maximize domestic political acceptance
of proposed actions intended to protect the nation’s security. Moreover, means-ends networks
provide an easily accessible visual tool that facilitates communication among technical experts,
decision makers, and stakeholders about their understanding of the decision context, what
information is important, and why.
Performance measures establish one or more specific metrics (aka attributes) that account for
changes in the achievement of objectives related to an action. Developing good measures for each
interest is essential to the consistent evaluation of alternatives and also permits clear communication
about what matters among the decision participants. To work well, performance measures should
be understandable, complete (otherwise important concerns are omitted), concise (to facilitate
the ready comparison of alternatives), direct and unambiguous (to ensure clear communication),
and measurable (so that data can be found to estimate consequences among different intervention
alternatives).20 Coming up with good measures for some objectives is relatively easy, for
example using dollars to measure cost. Other important objectives, such as “national security”
or “national reputation,” are more ambiguous and can be difficult to define. In his 2016 review
of the “Obama doctrine,” journalist Jeffrey Goldberg notes that within the Pentagon or State
Department, America’s “national-security credibility” is seen as “an intangible yet potent force.”21
Because vague definitions—however strongly held—can lead to misunderstandings among
the different players,22 deliberations will be improved to the extent that different intervention
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Figure 1. Illustrative (partial) means-ends network. The full-size version of this figure is available for
download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
alternatives can be compared on key dimensions and with all participants using the same working
definitions.
Consequence tables are another key structuring tool,23 used to emphasize the link between
the consequences of alternative actions and the concerns that matter the most. They provide a
simple visual tool that conveys the anticipated changes across multiple accounts. As noted by
Samantha Power: “You have to take into account the other collateral issues that you’re dealing
with on the international stage.”24 Columns show the different intervention alternatives that are
under consideration; rows show the different values that may be impacted. Each cell of the table
thus shows what is likely to happen if that alternative is selected. Consequence tables can be kept
simple or they can be constructed to incorporate additional considerations such as the existence
of sequential decisions, information changes over time, thresholds signaling the need for possible
shifts in actions, or important geographic differences among potentially affected regions. In
complex decision contexts, consequence tables can also be used to highlight and characterize critical
uncertainties and to express probabilities and confidence levels in the expected consequences of
alternatives.
Expert elicitations provide a formal set of tools for incorporating the judgments of experts
whenever data needed as part of an intervention decision is either lacking or of low quality, a
situation that is common to many war-torn countries that are experiencing rapid and profound
economic, environmental, or social changes. Although ad-hoc approaches are still widely
employed, there exists a well-established consensus on best practices for selecting experts,
setting up elicitation protocols, avoiding bias (such as being overconfident in one’s knowledge
or anchoring on recent events), aggregating across experts, and documenting findings so that
their limits are clear and peer review is made easy.25 A common requirement is constructing a
conceptual model that facilitates decomposition of a complex technical question into its component
parts, which in turn allows for estimates of the uncertainty associated with the occurrence
of these key elements. Experts are encouraged to assign plausible upper and lower bounds to the
likelihood of an event as well as to identify the most likely value and the confidence held in their
assessments. All of this information then becomes the basis for discussions among experts, which
23
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facilitates learning and leads to improved transparency in the comparisons that are made among
alternatives.
Fast vs. Slow Thinking
A structured, decision-aiding process also can help to balance the role of two main judgmental
mechanisms, involving the automatic and the more thoughtful responses that have been termed
System 1 and System 2—fast and slow—thinking by Kahneman26 and others. System 1 is a fast,
automatic system based on experience and involving intuition and feelings. System 2 brings in
slower, more reasoned responses that involve cognition and analysis. Together these two ways of
comprehending reality form the basis for how we identify and make difficult tradeoffs; different
individuals and different groups—at the extreme, different countries—will rely on varying
mixtures of System 1 and System 2 inputs when addressing intervention decisions.
A particular concern with respect to genocide prevention choices is that the fast, automatic
thinking of System 1 can override the slower, more deliberate thinking of System 2 and lead
to a reliance on emotional responses and judgmental shortcuts. Although these “judgmental
heuristics” help decision makers to cope with the complex cognitive demands placed on them,
they can also open the door to a variety of decision-making biases that lead individuals to anchor
on past experience and oversimplified analogies or to give insufficient attention to their own
perspective and values, thus resulting in the well-known phenomenon known as “groupthink.”
Results from behavioral research also show that people facing multi-sided choices, particularly
in crisis situations, often tend to focus on only one or two prominent dimensions of a choice to
the neglect of other considerations that they previously have said to be important (Slovic, 2015).
Awareness of these judgmental biases—which research has shown to influence the choices and
reasoning processes of experts as well as laypersons—can help significantly to improve the quality
of decisions and aid in balancing the contributions of our System 1 and 2 inputs to choices.
Understanding Psychological Influences
Both policy makers and citizens ask themselves similar questions when considering the wide range
of genocide prevention intervention strategies: What can we do to halt or reduce the killing of
civilians? How do we even think about such large-scale losses of human lives? How do we decide
when we are doing enough?
These questions bring into play—for individual citizens and for national policy makers—a
mix of feelings and empathy that can run counter to the rational argument that the larger the loss
of life, the more serious the problem and the stronger the case for intervention.27 A key insight
from research into how people frame choices concerned with helping others—whether focused on
charitable giving or taking actions to prevent harms or civilian deaths—is that people often exhibit
a sharply diminishing sensitivity to what should be meaningful differences in the numbers of
affected people. Although an argument can be made that large losses of life are disproportionately
more serious, because they may threaten the social fabric or viability of a community or group,
research clearly has shown that the importance of saving one life is large when it is the first, or
only, life saved but diminishes as the total number of lives at risk increases.28 This effect, known
as psychic numbing (or, in the context of charitable giving, as compassion fade), can be extreme.
In some situations, for example, the value of protecting two lives is less than twice the value of
protecting one life, and the value of saving 10,000 lives not significantly different from saving 100
lives. It appears that peoples’ System 1 automatic, fast thinking systems can visualize and feel
empathy for the plight of one person but this emotional connection quickly becomes tenuous as the
number of people involved increases and statistics take the place of an identified person.29
26

Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.

27

Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (New York: Harper-Collins, 2016).

28

Slovic and Västfjäll, The More Who Die.

29

Deborah A. Small, George Lowenstein and Paul Slovic, “Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative
Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
102, no. 2 (2007), 143–153.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3

Improving Intervention Decisions to Prevent Genocide

115

Psychic numbing is often enhanced by an accompanying (and often false) feeling of inefficacy,
that nothing important can be done about the underlying issue. Although we can get our heads
and hearts around helping one person at risk, helping hundreds or thousands of people at risk
seems like it is beyond our capacity to make a difference This feeling of pseudo-inefficiency leads
us to believe that nothing we do will be effective, leading to inaction and passivity; similar feelings
may lie behind the lack of response on the part of many individuals to other large-scale global
issues such as climate change.30 The problem is that although it is true that these are massive and
urgent issues, in fact the actions taken by individuals—considered one by one, or when summed
across many people—can make an important difference.
A third reason for lowered levels of concern in the face of mass atrocities is that intervention
decisions involve multi-sided trade-offs. We care about the lives of civilians in other countries but
we also worry about the cost of an intervention, whether it will be successful, and whether America’s
long-term security will be improved. In such circumstances other considerations, thought to be
justified more easily than the uncertain ability to save foreign lives, often become more prominent
and capture both peoples’ attention and the bulk of public resources. Thus “homeland security”
or “the national interest,” despite being only vaguely defined, may be viewed by policy makers as
more easily justified; to the extent these objectives conflict with other goals of intervention, then
little may be done to address the ongoing loss of innocent civilian lives.31
These psychological mechanisms operate in the background as citizens and decision
makers ponder what is an appropriate response to an emerging genocide or mass atrocity event.
Different people will feel differently about proposed interventions to protect the lives of foreign
civilians, and this is as it should be: our interest is not to push decision makers in one direction
or another. Instead, our intent is to make sure that psychological tendencies such as psychic
numbing, a false sense of inefficacy, or ignoring less prominent attributes, are not permitted to
push us (or our elected representatives) into sub-optimal decisions, ones that they and we will
regret and would want to change if only we had a better understanding of what is guiding our
intervention choices.
Communicating About Intervention Choices
Decisions about whether to intervene to prevent or halt genocide and mass atrocities are rarely
made by a single individual or a group at a single point in time. Instead, a small group or groups
of experts (e.g., embassy staff within the country at issue along with colleagues working at the
home office) typically assembles relevant data and frames various alternatives, then presents this
information to other decision makers and elected officials. In addition to this internal dialogue
there are often formal discussions with selected interest parties (e.g., allies, NGOs, and business
leaders operating in the named country) and an informal dialogue with the general public (e.g.,
coordinated through the media).
These broader aspects of the intervention decision-making process, involving the justification
and communication of possible intervention choices, are often neglected as part of analyses of
intervention decision-making processes but hold important implications for their structure and
outcomes. The prominence effect, noted earlier, can play a key role whenever political agendas
enter into the picture. One result is that the expressed values of agency staff can be over-ridden
by decision makers’ perceived need to justify any eventual decision. As a result, humanitarian
and other objectives that are thought to be more difficult to define or to defend, and that perhaps
lack the emotional intensity of other concerns such as the maintenance of national security or
positive relations with key allies, can be assigned less importance in the course of the decisionmaking process due to the perceived need to provide a defensible argument to elected officials or
to citizens.
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Case Study: Structuring Intervention Decisions with Experts
Workshop Background and Participants
To test these ideas and the role of decision-structuring aids in the context of decisions to prevent
genocide and mass atrocities, a 1.5 day workshop involving experienced individuals was held
in 2015 in Eugene, Oregon (with funding support from the U.S. National Science Foundation
and the University of Oregon). Participants included Ambassadors, former officials of the U.S.
Department of State, analysts, academics, and other knowledgeable experts with experience in
genocide intervention decisions. Workshop objectives included discussing genocide intervention
decision making processes and examining different decision aiding techniques that may improve
deliberations related to intervention decisions. To ensure the relevance of workshop discussions
and results, we enlisted the help of four invited participants—two Ambassadors, one Agency
director, and one analyst—to review and comment on the agenda and background materials in
advance of the workshop.
Our Day 1 introductory comments to the group emphasized that substantial insights often
can be gained simply through organizing the various sources of decision complexity. To promote
discussion, we presented the following initial listing of key contextual concerns, values, and
alternatives:
•
•
•

Decision context: geographic location, history, economic capabilities, leadership stability
Values/objectives: national security, civilian lives and injuries (domestic, foreign), military
lives and injuries (domestic, foreign), economic costs (intervention, aid), reputation of
Nation (moral, legal, leadership), regional stability (social, political, economic)
Intervention alternatives: diplomatic, economic, legal, military (covert or overt—air strikes,
ground troops, etc.)

With this context as a common starting point, workshop participants explored a series of
questions concerning the key elements of the decision context, the fundamental values that
ultimately would determine whether the selected course of action was considered successful, and
the various intervention alternatives that—singly or in combination—could be implemented. On
Day 2 participants worked through a formal trade-off evaluation to explore each other’s values
and preferences and to identify the most sensitive factors influencing their choices. As several
participants pointed out, this ordering of key decision elements could be reframed as a series of
criteria or questions that might serve, in varying degrees, as a checklist to encourage more consistent
thinking as part of any intervention decision.
The Decision Problem
All participants were provided with a short memo, reportedly from the U.S. Ambassador to the
Assistant Secretary of State, which described the current humanitarian crisis in a fictional small
Asian country (called “Adler”) that threatens to soon expand to involve large numbers of civilian
deaths and possibly genocide. Because this brief introduction necessarily left many questions
unanswered—some of which typically would have been covered as part of agency memos and
background discussions—participants were encouraged, as part of their small-group deliberations,
to add (and document) contextual details as needed to proceed with a meaningful analysis of
intervention choices.
The memo summarized the dramatic recent increases in violence as part of Adler’s decadelong war between the ruling majority and rebels from an ethnic minority; participants were told
that estimates placed the number of people killed over the past two years at 90,000, with civilian
casualties accounting for over one-half the deaths. Information is scarce, however, with field
reports infrequent since the recent killings of five foreign journalists (two American and three
French). Rebel forces are demanding greater political and religious autonomy as well as a share
of government funds received from petroleum exports, developed in conjunction with both U.S.based and Chinese companies. The government, which has been in power for nearly 20 years and
continues to enjoy U.S. support, has demanded that rebels lay down their arms as a pre-condition to
the renewal of negotiations, which broke off nearly three months ago. However, both sides continue
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to cite fundamental ethnic and religious differences. Some actions already have been undertaken:
equipment has been brought in to jam TV and radio signals being used by rebel militants and the
Ambassador has been working closely with neighboring countries to reduce the rebel’s recruitment
of fighters and supplies. In addition, a Financial Intelligence Unit has been formed to reduce rebel
fund-raising through identification and freezing of foreign bank accounts. But the Ambassador’s
memo warns that new actions are urgently needed, with shipments of food and medicines largely
prevented from reaching the areas most in need and large numbers of civilians—perhaps as many
as 400,000 people—fleeing the country in search of safety and refugee status.
The Ambassador’s memo was said to have prompted swift action from the Assistant Secretary
of State, who called in six trusted advisers and led discussions focused on whether the US should
quickly do more to prevent further civilian casualties and, if possible, to help stabilize the region. He
prefaced his remarks by citing from the 2006 National Security Strategy that “Where perpetrators
of mass killing defy all attempts to peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required,
preferably by the forces of several nations working together . . .”32 The Ambassador remains in the
country but arrangements are being made for her evacuation, along with the remaining five staff
members.
Following the discussion of the problem context and the Ambassador’s memo, a proposed
objectives hierarchy was discussed based on the information contained within the briefing note (see
Table 1). In contrast to the usual focus on alternatives, the development of an objectives hierarchy
at the start of discussions was intended to provide a common framework for highlighting what is
important and the key values that could be affected as a result of the proposed actions. This discussion
further distinguished fundamental concerns (e.g., maintaining national security, protecting human
lives) from means objectives or contributing factors (e.g., obtaining congressional support). In
addition, the creation of the objectives hierarchy helped to build a common understanding of terms
such as “national security,” “national reputation,” or “regional stability,” which—as participants
confirmed—often claim a front and center position in intervention debates despite their ambiguous
definition.33 The objectives hierarchy was also used to facilitate the identification of sub-objectives,
more detailed components of these larger concerns that served to aid understanding and, in turn,
could lead to evaluation criteria useful for assessing the different intervention alternatives.
Once a common set of objectives and sub-objectives had been outlined, participants turned
their attention to thinking about how to express the different consequences of each intervention
option in terms of these identified concerns. This part of the deliberations built on the concept of
using explicit performance measures or attributes that would track the ability of each option to
satisfy the different objectives highlighted for the scenario. In some cases familiar quantitative
measures (such as dollars or lives) were used to express differences in the objectives across the
alternatives. In other cases, when concerns were brought into the evaluation that lacked familiar
measures or that required additional context, qualitative constructed scales were used (see Table
2). Keeping in mind the illustrative nature of this decision-structuring exercise, substantially
less time was spent on the development of precise measures than would characterize a real-life
intervention decision. Nevertheless, participants felt that—at least as a first approximation—the
range of objectives, sub-objectives, and scales were sufficient to ensure a common understanding
of key decision elements and to facilitate an initial comparison of the consequences of the different
intervention options.
Performance measures are particularly useful in the type of multidimensional, highly nuanced
decision environment that typically characterizes intervention choices. This is because they help
add precision to what otherwise often are vague criteria, thereby lowering the quality of initial
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George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006),
17.

33

In his careful review of the APB, Finkel writes that “the Board’s prescriptive deliberations” would be improved were it
able to “develop a common understanding of what atrocity prevention means,” in part because this would address
the concern “. . . that various Board members have very different notions about what prevention should and can
accomplish.” James P. Finkel, Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing the President’s Atrocity Prevention Board
After Two Years (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014), 3, 20, 23.
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Table 1. Case study objectives hierarchy.
Category (Fundamental Objective)

Sub-Objectives

Potential Defining or Contributing
Factors (Illustrative)

U.S. National Security

Domestic Political

Party support (internal)
Congressional support
Voter and public support

Within the context of assessing genocide
intervention decisions, national security Foreign/International
is broadly defined as potentially
weakening or destabilizing domestic
well-being.

Protecting Human Lives

U.S. International Reputation

Intervention Costs

Regional Stability

Consistency with and/or facilitating
U.S. foreign policy priorities
Support from key U.S. allies
Support from other countries or
agencies

Economic

Costs to U.S. companies
National budget
Adverse energy security implications

Homeland Security

Risk of terrorism (on U.S. soil)
Perception or feeling of insecurity

Exit Certainty

Avoiding enlarged or protracted
conflict (certainty of exit strategy?)

Civilian Lives (and Injuries)

U.S.
Foreign

Military Lives (and Injuries)

U.S.
Foreign

Moral Imperative

Requirement for action consistent
with what is the right thing to do

Legal Obligations

Consistency with ratified agreements
/ treaties (E.g. U.N. or Genocide
Convention)

Costs to U.S. Government

Administrative and management
costs
Military costs (equipment, salaries,
etc.)
Humanitarian Costs (food, housing,
medical—with vs. without
intervention)

Costs to Others

Foreign governments
Foreign companies

Political

Political upheaval
Balance of power in the region

Social

Social unrest

Economic

Uncertainty & losses to local/regional
economies

communication among decision participants and, at a later point in time, making it more difficult to
evaluate the success of intervention initiatives. As noted by Power,34 a decision-aiding framework
should not seek to homogenize these concerns and priorities but, rather, to clarify value differences
and to help decision makers understand their implications. She identifies two primary aspirations
of U.S. decision makers when facing mass atrocities: to “avoid engagement in conflicts that posed
little threat to American interests” and to “contain the political costs and avoid the moral stigma

34

Power, A Problem from Hell, 508.
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Table 2. Constructed scale used for estimating consequences of case study genocide intervention scenario.
+3

Significant Improvement: a significant net improvement is expected compared to current conditions

+2

Moderate Improvement: a moderate net improvement is expected compared to current conditions

+1

Small Improvement: a small but measurable improvement is expected compared to current conditions

0

No change: no changes are expected to occur relative to current conditions (i.e. neither a measurable
improvement nor a worsening in conditions)

-1

Small Deterioration: conditions are expected to worsen slightly (but measurably) compared to current
conditions

-2

Moderate Deterioration: conditions are expected to worsen moderately compared to current conditions

-3

Significant Deterioration: conditions are expected to worsen significantly compared to current
conditions

associated with allowing genocide.” Being true to these two concerns requires an understanding of
the other interests that also matter to decision makers, the types of threats that might be posed to
specific American interests, and what kinds of political or moral costs might arise as the result of
various levels of engagement in foreign conflicts.
Pre-workshop discussions with collaborating participants led to the generation of five
intervention options—drawn from a much larger set of possible actions, but useful to help focus
discussions—that would likely form the basis of intervention choices. These are briefly described
below and also are shown as the columns in Figure 2.
•
•
•

•

•

A first option is to continue the current “economic sanctions but no intervention” strategy,
perhaps with the addition of new educational or communications initiatives.
A second (“train and arm”) strategy would involve the identification of critical gaps in
Adler’s military capability and bringing in needed new military equipment for use by
Adler’s army. Costs for the one-year operation are about $250 million.
A third option (“air strikes”) would initiate bombing raids on rebel forces, using a U.S.
aircraft carrier as a base of operations and working in conjunction with allied air forces.
The targeted air strikes on rebel centers would cost nearly $100 million/month and limit
demands on an already overstretched U.S. military, but they could further reduce the
amounts of food available in the markets and lead to criticism of foreign intervention.
A fourth alternative (“safe zones”), to be organized in concert with regional and
international allies, would bring in as many as 6,000 ground troops (half from the U.S.)
to help create safe zones in areas of central Adler now experiencing the heaviest fighting.
Initial cost estimates for the U.S. share of the military intervention range from $3–5 billion,
with concerns expressed by the White House about possible U.S. military casualties and
adverse domestic implications as well as negative effects on the international reputation
of the U.S.
A fifth alternative (“full military intervention”), favored by some members of Congress,
would seek to defeat rebel troops by bringing in as many as 60,000 U.S. ground soldiers
and an equal number of troops from allies, with U.S. military personnel working alongside
members of Adler’s military and cleared for combat roles. Key arguments in favor include
the moral and legal obligations of the U.S. to prevent foreign civilian deaths and to protect
the interests of U.S. oil companies, U.S. costs would be as high as $5 billion, support
among other countries is mixed, and questions are being raised about the lack of a clear
exit strategy.
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Figure 2. Consequence table for case study genocide intervention scenario. The full-size version of this
figure is available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
These structured decision elements were then used to predict and compare the consequences of
the different intervention alternatives. These effects were summarized through a consequence table
(Figure 2) that shows the concerns in rows and the five leading intervention options in columns.
This visual display was useful in that it facilitated discussions of the pros and cons of different
actions and, in some cases, led to the refinement and alteration of the anticipated consequences as
new information was shared among the participants.35 To more easily compare the performance
between alternatives, the consequence table was color-coded to highlight significant differences in
the performance measures relative to the selected reference alternative (the blue column in Figure
3); programming easily shows this comparison with reference to any of the alternatives. The use of
colors facilitates the comparison of how well an alternative achieves each of the stated objectives:36
cells shown in green mean that another alternative is preferred for that objective, cells shown in
red mean that alternative is inferior with respect to the objective, and cells with no shading are
functionally identical to the highlighted reference alternative.
Workshop participants undertook two distinct prioritization techniques—direct ranking and
swing weighting—to identify their preferences about the intervention alternatives. Both involve the
elicitation of experts and include techniques intended to minimize the judgmental errors (discussed
in Section 2.1) which can bias experts’ opinions. Direct ranking is a more intuitive and experiential
technique (often associated with System 1 thinking and very common within governments) where
the best option is selected outright: given a set of alternatives, which one is preferred? Swing
weighting is a more deliberative and analytical technique (i.e., more closely aligned to System 2
thinking) whereby a preferred option is inferred based on the relative importance (i.e., the weights)
assigned to the different sub-objectives that characterize, to a greater or lesser degree, each of the
specified options. Direct ranking of alternatives is therefore viewed as more holistic and ranking of
sub-objectives (through swing weighting) as more decomposed.
An important point—often missed as part of policy assessments—is that the value weights
reflect importance of the relative differences in each of the sub-objectives rather than the importance
of the sub-objective as a category. In other words, it is not just how important a particular objective
35

The illustrative nature of this case study meant that there was less information than usually would be available; as a
result, more rows of the consequence table are, of necessity, filled in using constructed scales.

36

Keeney and Gregory, Selecting Attributes to Measure.
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Figure 3. Color-coded consequence table (using Alt 2 as the reference alternative). The full-size version of
this figure is available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
or sub-objective may be (such as national security) but also how much it varies across the set of
alternatives: if a sub-objective is fairly insensitive (i.e., the estimated performance measure values
do not vary significantly) then it will be less important, and have a correspondingly lower weight,
for selection of a preferred alternative.
Our goal was to highlight possible differences in preferred intervention scenarios depending
on which technique was used (see Figure 4) and to stimulate dialogue among workshop
participants. This goal is in line with general advice about how to deal with complex problems;
in a paper titled “The Realities of Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis,” for example, Fischhoff37 suggests
that the logic of analysts is to “Decompose complex systems into manageable components and
then calculate how they might perform together.” However, decomposition brings its own set of
challenges38 and, for this workshop, we emphasized that neither technique necessarily provides
the right answer; both have strengths and weaknesses. The decision-aiding benefit is that the two
approaches offer different perspectives about people’s values and the associated trade-offs, which
in turn often allows individuals to learn more about their own values and the reasoning underlying
their choices.
The incorporation of decision-aiding tools also allowed participants to explore the degree to
which they preferred one alternative over another and to observe how their preferences varied
relative to everyone else (Figure 5). In addition, the use of a more decomposed approach permitted
the invited experts to unbundle their thinking and to see which objectives were most instrumental
in determining their preferred alternative. As shown in Figure 6, some alternatives were very
successful at satisfying one objective and other alternatives were successful at satisfying other
objectives. Discussions clearly revealed that participants found this information to be helpful; as
several workshop members told us, the use of these visual tools permitted them to gain a better
understanding of their own preferences and, in some cases, to realize that adjustments in their
scoring of alternatives were requested to represent their own values accurately.

37

Baruch Fischhoff, “The Realities of Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Science 350, no. 6260 (2015), 527.

38

Gregory et al., Structured Decision Making.
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Figure 4. Participant direct ranking and swing weighting preferences. The full-size version of this figure is
available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.

Figure 5. Direct ranking weights of Participant 1 (in blue) of their preferred intervention alternative
relative to other participants. The full-size version of this figure is available for download at http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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Figure 6. Relative importance of the objectives for Participant 1 in determining their preferred alternatives
according to swing weighting. The full-size version of this figure is available for download at http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
Discussions on Day 2 of the workshop then led to the use of two other methods as aids for
further exploring participants’ reasoning. Figure 7 digs deeper into the importance of each objective
in shaping choices by showing the sensitivity of the weights placed by each participant on the
different objectives and how changes, small or large, in these weights could lead to the selection
of a different alternative. Finally, participants also were able to compare the consistency in their
rankings and weightings according to the two techniques using consistency plots (Figure 8) that
show their preferred alternatives: the closer preferences are aligned to the 45 degree line, the more
consistent they are across the two techniques, which suggests the presence of greater stability.39
Participant Feedback
Participants’ responses to the workshop were very positive, with an explicit values-based approach
to making intervention decisions considered both new and promising. Some concerns were raised
about the realism of the case-study scenario, which were anticipated; several of the participants
had previous experience with scenario development lasting several weeks (e.g., through the
National Defense University) and all participants, as part of their previous working experience,
had been part of scenarios that took shape over years and with thousands of inputs. Nevertheless,
a strong consensus emerged for adoption of a more structured framework to help in (a) untangling
and organizing the fundamental values relevant to intervention deliberations, (b) highlighting
potential decision biases that could lead to inferior choices, (c) clarifying information gaps and
uncertainties critical to the decision context, and (d) exposing key trade-offs associated with
different intervention choices.
As several participants pointed out, the framing of atrocities prevention as a core national
interest and the initiation of high-level groups such as the Atrocities Prevention Board also
underscore the importance of anticipating and preventing genocide as a fundamental interest of
the United States. A keen interest was expressed by participants in identifying key elements that
could help to characterize conflicts in the weeks or months prior to the escalation of violence and
the beginnings of genocide or mass atrocities. If a more structured process could anticipate and
target countries at risk of genocide and thus lead to effective, early-on intervention strategies, then
the approach merits additional examination.
39

We are well aware that this workshop focused on a hypothetical case-study and that not all groups would be so open
to the sharing of information about the importance of objectives underlying members’ expressed preferences; one
implication is that increased anonymity might be required as part of the exploration of participants’ reasoning in
high-conflict situations.
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Figure 7. Swing weight sensitivity analysis for Participant 1 between consistency plot of Participant 1’s
preferred alternatives according to their direct ranking and swing weighted results. The full-size version
of this figure is available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.

Figure 8. Consistency plot of Participant 1’s preferred alternatives according to their direct ranking
and swing weighting results. The full-size version of this figure is available for download at http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
Questions also were raised by participants about whether use of a more structured process
for identifying and scoring intervention alternatives might ask too much of participants in terms
of requiring them to be honest and transparent about what matters, both to themselves and to
the agency they represent. The workshop organizers are familiar with this concern and have
observed it in other contexts; it is real, but no more so—no more difficult to address and overcome
successfully—in the realm of intervention choices than for any other complex, multi-dimensional
problem. Workshop participants also noted that many of the key intervention decisions are made
by a small number of government staff who know each other well and are experienced in shared
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discussions, so that a basic level of ease and familiarity—at least in many situations—may already
be established. This will aid in the creation of trust but it may also work against the introduction of
any new approaches to analysis or deliberations.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P),40 articulated in 2005, permits the international
community to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state if it fails to protect its population from
mass atrocity crimes. In this paper we argue in favor of adopting a more structured decision making
process when considering possible intervention strategies that may help to prevent or reduce the
threat of genocide and mass atrocities. We link this argument to several shortcomings associated
with conventional deliberation processes, including paying attention only to more prominent
objectives (such as national security or economic costs) in order to justify a given strategy and
failing to respond appropriately to larger numbers of injuries and deaths because our automatic,
feeling response does not easily scale up from one to many. The workshop results highlighted the
insights that can be gained, in terms of the role of competing objectives and inferences, from the
use of different elicitation techniques to help select a preferred alternative. Leaving these factors
implicit takes away the opportunity for decision makers to learn more about their own preferences
as well as others’ views and can have the unintended result of discouraging interventions to save
lives unless this humanitarian objective aligns closely with the other economic, national security,
or reputational interests that underlie the intervention choice.
The use of different structuring techniques for displaying the results of the scenario-evaluation
exercises successfully stimulated discussions and prompted a constructively critical review of
participants positions: because choices were being made without access to perfect information and
because time constraints were severe (as they also would be as part of most real-world intervention
choices), it was important that individuals be given an opportunity to revisit their expressed values
and opinions and to reconsider their choices in light of the new information that becomes available
both through introspection and through subsequent discussions with colleagues. In addition, the
more structured deliberative process led to several new hybrid intervention scenarios that may not
otherwise have been identified.
We also note that uncertainty may play a complementary role in this de-emphasis of the
humanitarian aspects of the choice. If estimates of cost or the anticipated impacts of national
security risks are perceived as subject to less uncertainty than are foreign lives saved, then as a
result they may be weighted relatively more heavily. Analysis can address this possible bias, at least
to some extent, through the careful examination and communication of uncertainty and through
an accurate summary of the uncertainty associated even with supposedly precise estimates (e.g.,
predictions of future prices or expenditures).
Yet despite the best of intentions and the adoption of appropriate techniques, decision makers
may ignore the results of a more structured process, relying instead on System 1 intuitions and
prior experience. In such cases, highlighting the key elements and consequences of an intervention
choice will at minimum document the argument for selecting an intervention action—including
what is left out of the picture as well as what is included—and all this information will be available
and transparent if a subsequent review is conducted to determine why a selected strategy failed to
meet expectations. In time, this information is likely to make it more difficult for decision makers
to overturn the results of a thoughtful deliberative process.
Workshop results, including feedback from participants, provided clear support for our
hypothesis that depicting genocide intervention decisions in terms of fundamental values, clearly
articulated measures of performance, and the consequences of different alternatives can help to
organize what is known about the predicted consequences of interventions while highlighting key
information gaps. Because the primary goal of the workshop was to obtain feedback from these
experienced participants regarding the potential advantages and disadvantage of a more structured
framework for making intervention decisions, we did not formally seek to compare results of the
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United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138–140.
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holistic vs. decomposed approaches (e.g., through the use of control groups or over different
contexts) other than to observe afterwards that the two approaches offered different insights to
participants as aids for exploring which alternatives may best achieve their interests. Based on the
initial positive feedback we received from participants, this is clearly a subject for future study; as
several workshop members pointed out, the relevance of results would be improved to the extent
that the decision-making situation is an actual, unfolding case study and involves individuals
engaged in the decision-making process.
A more structured approach to intervention decisions also has the capability to examine
carefully a vague doctrine, such as “promote the national interest” or “implement our responsibility
to protect” and transform it into an organized framework that promotes both understanding and
discussion. Of course, no decision-aiding framework can or should “make” the tough choices
required of the US government with respect to interventions intended to reduce genocide and
mass atrocities. What it can do is to improve the quality and extent of intervention deliberations,
laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the threats posed
to American values and interests using a common language for analysis that facilitates input and
involvement from all key parties.
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“Genocide is not a crime that happens in dark alleys.”1 This pithy observation and over-all
graceful analysis investigates five separate genocides committed by the Iraqi government of Saddam
Hussein: the Arabization of historical Kurdish lands such as Kirkuk, the forced displacement
of Faylee Kurds, the disappearance of eight thousand Barzanis in 1983, the Anfal campaign in
1988-89, and the chemical attack on Halabja in 1988. However, the post-Saddam “Iraqi federal
governments showed no will to heal the wound caused by these events . . . with the exception
of some ineffective legal decisions.”2 Thus, “justice has been very limited and has left the Kurds
deprived of the compensation to which they were entitled, as well as feeling betrayed by Baghdad
and its judicial system.”3
As a former member of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—serving as Minister for
Human Rights between 2001 and 2005 and later as Minister of Extra Regional Affairs and the
KRG representative in Baghdad until May 2014 as well as being an academic holding a Ph.D. in
international law from the University of London and another Ph.D. in Arab and Islamic Studies
from the University of Exeter—Mohammed Ihsan is well-placed to write this account. His
concluding table on page 134 portrays each of the five genocidal crimes, how vast the Iraqi agencies
participating in them were, but how paltry were the number of final retributive verdicts. Thus,
many felt that his Shia enemies executed the ex-president [Saddam Hussein] before he was
made to pay for crimes against the Kurds. This led most Kurds to think that justice had been
hijacked by the tensions between Sunnis and Shias, leaving the Kurds without the possibility
of seeing justice for the crimes committed against them. 4

As a result, “any attempt to build a credible judicial system in Iraq was severely undermined
by this event.”5 In also blaming the “many witnesses . . . [and] the willingness of the greater part of
society to do nothing”6 Ihsan further concludes that his analysis “has been able to demonstrate that
the responsibilities lay far beyond the top of the regime.”7
The author further takes issue with the many well-placed who solely blame the murderous
insurgency that ravished Iraq after the U.S. victory [in 2003] on Paul Bremer’s de-Ba’athification
and disbanding of the Iraqi army, which put millions onto the streets with guns, but without jobs.
He argues instead that “people who took part in the Arabization and genocide campaigns are
still in the civil service and in the military structure of the government.”8 Nevertheless, General
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David Petraeus’s reawakening gestures to the newly disenfranchised Sunnis temporarily stabilized
Iraq until these lessons were tragically forgotten and ignored by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki’s disastrous Shite government that helped birth another genocidal disaster known as ISIS.
Ihsan emphasizes ISIS’s origin from “such myopic politics” and this “dangerous mismanagement
of post-Saddam Iraq . . . [and resulting] vacuum of power” that has led to the “now-inevitable
disintegration of the country.”9
Ihsan further argues that this deplorable situation in part “stems from the Bush administration’s
ignorance of the history of Iraq and its multicultural population . . . [and] because the Bush
administration never had a real postwar plan in place and it was merely looking for easy exit
policies.10
As for Kirkuk, it
is about more than oil. . . . For Kurds, Kirkuk symbolizes decades of forced displacement,
the destruction of their homes and the occupation of their lands by Arab settlers. . . . Kirkuk
is key to peace settlement and the key to restoring justice to the [Kurdish] people.11

Illustrating his attempt to be fair to Kirkuk’s non-Kurdish population, however, Ihsan warns
that “the Kurdish claim over this land could trigger a new, deadly sectarian war,”12 one that
this reviewer also feels might follow when ISIS is driven from Mosul and ethnic and sectarian
boundaries reset. “The Kurds have to face reality. . . . Giving up the claims to Arab-majority towns,
for example, in which Arab residents are not the consequence of Arabization, would be a first step
to smoothing the negotiations with Baghdad.”13
As for Halabja, “according to the Federation of American Scientists, this crime was, and
still remains, the largest chemical weapons attack directed against a civilian-populated area in
history.”14 Thus, Ihsan concludes that “it is evident that Halabja constitutes the peak of the stateengineered genocide against the Kurds…[where] the regime distanced itself completely from an
indifferent international community and international law.”15
There are a few errors in the manuscript that should be flagged. The KRG first appeared after
the election held on May 17, 1992, not “in November 1992.”16 Unifying the “Peshmerga, or local militias,
into the Unified Peshmerga Force under the direction of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs”17 is largely a
myth since the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) still
actually control these forces. Jus cogens, not “jus gogens…is a basic concern, an independent principle,
and a mandatory precept…in international law.”18 The author fails to explain why he thinks the ceasefire that ended the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in February 1992 constituted “unjust terms.”19
The domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter is Article 2, paragraph 7, not “article
2, chapter 7.”20 It is not clear which war the author means when he states that “in particular the
war in Europe, paved the way for a new phase in Kurdish and Iraqi relations.”21 “KRG Prime
Minister Nechir Van Barzani”22 almost sounds like a Dutch name. The correct spelling, of course,
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is Nechirvan. Endnote twenty-four on page forty-one confuses Gareth Stansfield as an editor of
the book Crisis in Kirkuk when actually he is the co-author along with the correctly listed Liam Anderson.
The well-known Kurdologist Ofra Bengio is a woman, and therefore it is not “his book”23 that is referred
to. If “killing members of a group is considered a basic element in the recognition of the crime of
genocide,”24 how does this differ from regular war?
Ihsan includes fourteen helpful maps, a list of abbreviations, five appendices each dealing with
the five case studies of genocide detailed in the book, a short index, and a longer useful bibliography
of secondary sources. However, one wonders why the author includes eleven separate works by
the Armenian genocide scholar Vahakn N. Dadrian, dealing mostly with the Armenians, yet does
not even mention the more apropos studies by Joost Hiltermann and Choman Hardi on the Iraqi
Kurdish genocide. Nevertheless, Ihsan’s jargon-free, reader-friendly study is recommended for
scholars and practitioners as well as the intelligent lay public.
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In mid-July 2017, six thousand people gathered at the white-power music festival Rock gegen
Überfremdung (Rock against Foreign Domination) in Themar, a small town in Thuringia, Germany.
At the event, the police recorded forty-six crimes, including assault, threatening behavior,
contravention of German weapons law and displaying illegal (i.e. Nazi) symbols. Six people
were arrested and the authorities recorded the identities of 440 festival-goers. An undisclosed
sum was raised for the far-right political cause.1 Music festivals of this kind and the violence that
accompanies them are part of today’s German political reality and, increasingly, of other countries
around the world. This makes the white-power music scene worth the attention of any scholar
studying extremist political movements, racism, or genocide.
The ethnomusicologist and genocide historian Kirsten Dyck is one of them. Unlike other
scholars in the field of white-power music, she looks beyond the country-specific variations of
such music scenes, and, in her book Reichsrock, makes a convincing case that festivals like the one
in Thuringia are anything but fringe phenomena. On the contrary, as she reveals, the white-power
music scene has become a diffuse ideological network with interconnected outposts in countries
around the world.
Dyck begins by explaining why she applies the term white-power—as opposed to whitesupremacist or white-nationalist—to the music scene she investigates. Because its promoters are
convinced that the existence of the white race is threatened, their music must express a sense of
power and of their empowerment. The umbrella term white-power music encompasses many local
scenes, each with its own type of pro-white racist music; its musicians and fans may or may not
interact or agree with their counterparts in other regions. She defines white-power music as “any
music produced and distributed by individuals who are actively trying to advance what they view
as a white-power or pro-white racist agenda.”2 In general, these individuals believe in a so-called
international Jewish conspiracy and stand in opposition to national governments and international
power structures like the United Nations or the World Bank while displaying hostility toward
racial, ethnic and sexual minorities.3 White-power music allows the far right to generate money
for its cause, to disseminate its ideology, to offer opportunities for social bonding, and to provide
a way in to white-power beliefs and activism for those who haven’t yet had interest in or contact
with such ideological beliefs and communities.
Dyck sets two ambitious goals for herself. The first is to present an in-depth study of whitepower music as a transnational rather than merely a local phenomenon; the second is to explore
the connections between seemingly non-racist elements of mainstream ideology and the blatantly
racist aspects of white-power philosophy. Although issues of gender and religion are central
themes of white-power ideology and music, they remain excluded from this study; the author
plans to focus on them in her future work.
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Other scholarly works on the subject have mainly used ethnographic methods, but Dyck’s
work stands out for her analysis of the primary and secondary texts the white-power music web
produces. White-power songs and albums, music magazines and Internet fora serve as sources; she
also analyzes sales figures, market demographics, and other key statistics—to the degree that they
are available in this murky arena.
In the following four chapters, the author first describes the history of the white-power music
scene in Great Britain, where the genre was founded in the early 1970s. It was British musicians
who drove its early development, in particular Ian Stuart Donaldson and his band “Skrewdriver.”
The following chapter then moves to continental Europe where white-power music soon appeared
in Germany, and then in Sweden, Norway, and other western Mediterranean countries. Dyck
follows the phenomenon through its rise in Eastern European countries like Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine, Poland, and Greece, and finally into countries outside Europe, in particular the United
States and Canada, Latin America, and finally Australia. The chapters link the regions’ histories
to their white-power ideology and their white-power music scenes, showing how they differ from
country to country while retaining a common core ideology. These elaborations demonstrate the
connections between particular lyrics and acts of violence by their fans, documenting cases of
criminals who sang or shouted phrases from the lyrics as they committed acts of racist violence.
She also argues convincingly that even the most forceful governmental interventions do not
extinguish—indeed, they often hardly disturb—the white-power music scenes for longer periods
of time. This is particularly evident in Germany, the spiritual home of most white-power neo-Nazi
musicians today, and the physical home of the world’s numerically largest white-power music
scene. Although the German constitution allows the government to ban materials it sees as threats
to democracy or to young people, and despite continued police monitoring, raids and law-suits, the
German white-power music scene is still growing. In only one country—Great Britain—have antiracist protests succeeded in making it more difficult for the white-power music scene to organize
concerts and to attract large numbers of attendees. Dyck’s study also shows the lasting influence
of the Nazi-version of white-power ideology, which is glaringly evident in the names of bands,
and songs, and of white-power ideological fan groups. There is, for example, a British organization
called “Blood & Honour,4” from the German Blut und Ehre, a slogan that was etched onto Hitler
Youth knife-blades; a German band is called “Endstufe,” a reference to the Nazi’s so-called Final
Solution to the Jewish Question (a Nazi plan for the extermination of the Jews during the Second
World War); the Greek band name “Der Stürmer” (the stormer) takes its name from the Third
Reich’s main propaganda newspaper, while a Russian song is titled “Holocaust Erotica.”
What stands out most in Dyck’s study is the malleability and flexibility of the white-power
ideology, which adapts to each country’s historical situation and its music scenes’ ambitions. Taken
together, its hackneyed ideas do not represent an internally consistent or contradiction-free belief
system. Although according to the Nazi and neo- Nazi systems of racial hierarchy, ethnic Slavs are
considered Untermenschen, or sub-humans, white-power ideology and its music scene thrives in
Russia and other Eastern European countries. In their ideology, Slavs are white and they reserve
their hatred for targeting Jews and other non-Slavic ethnic minorities. Even more problematic
for a German or Scandinavian neo-Nazi would be the way Spanish and South-American white
supremacists claim membership in white power circles. Their standards of racial purity would
not pass the Anglo or North American movement’s standard concept of “one-drop of blood”—
which automatically excludes individuals of mixed-race heritage—but instead involves a gradual
hierarchy of racial value depending on the proportion of European ancestry in a given person’s
family.
The music that comes out of these different national scenes is as dynamic and innovative as its ideologies
are flexible, encompassing the traditional British oi!-style and varieties of National Socialist
Black Metal (NSBM), neo-folk, industrial, and even hip-hop and dub. Dyck’s work supports her
4
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assertion that “one must understand white-power music as an international genre because one
must understand contemporary white-power racism—along with the older forms of racism and
white supremacy that have preceded it—as a global phenomenon.”5
The author also claims to show that mainstream western ideology is built on a form of unspoken
and taboo racism that is ubiquitous but unacknowledged in the culture; and she claims to show that
this mainstream ideology opens up the space for the extreme and outspoken forms of white-power
music so present in contemporary societies around the globe. White-power musicians’ ideologies,
she argues, descend directly from older types of racism which still persist and which mainstream,
avowedly non-racist populations in European-descended societies continue to tolerate. Russia,
for example, has long been profoundly xenophobic, an attitude that was sanctioned and even
fostered by the state, especially in the Stalin years. This xenophobic paranoia expresses itself in
hostility to actual foreigners but also to internal minority groups like the Ukrainians, Crimean
Tatars, and Chechens. Russia’s post-Cold War oligarchy, its financial crisis in 1998 and other factors
left large parts of the population in poverty and dissatisfaction, and it became fertile ground for
racist ideologies. In Moscow alone there were 450 racist killings and more than 2,500 injuries from
racist attacks between January 2004 and May 2010. The racism of Russian neo-Nazi groups finds
support from mainstream organizations like the administration of Moscow State University and
the Russian Orthodox Church.6 Similarly, the United States offers many examples of mainstream
support of racism, as evidenced by, among other things, “police brutality toward African Americans
and deep-rooted systems of structural inequality that leave this group living in poverty at rates far
higher than the national average.”7
Although Dyck’s arguments here have a degree of plausibility, her examples remain rather
broad, making her assertion that mainstream music and mainstream ideology supply the
scaffolding for the white power music web less convincing than it might otherwise be. This lack of
clarity is partly due to murky terminology (what is mainstream music and mainstream ideology,
and what is its’ structure? How does the author define race—a pseudoscientific term to begin
with—or racism, terms that she does not include in the otherwise excellent index of her book?). It
also stems in part from some issues that are integral to the subject: the bands and their products
are taboo in many societies and illegal in some, making sales figures hard to come by and hiding
many distribution channels deep in the recesses of the dark web. Adding to the challenge is the
fact that for copyright reasons, lyrics cannot be quoted, so the reader is not always clear about what
exactly the author is referring to. Mainly though, the lack of clarity is due to the fact that Dyck is not
specific about the theoretical frameworks or the political theory that informs her inferences, or her
conclusions about the ways mainstream ideology and music influence or give rise to white-power
ideology and music. Without a theoretical foundation, it is hard for the reader to determine if
Dyck’s conclusions are the result of her scientific investigation or rather of her own liberal political
beliefs.
These unanswered questions do not detract from the fact that Reichsrock is a significant
contribution to the exploration of white-power racism in its contemporary forms. Its historical
accounts are detailed and resourceful and their wide range and focus on worldwide connections
are highly valuable. Kirstin Dyck has delivered a much-needed contribution to the field, one that
historians, political scientists, and genocide scholars alike (as well as activists against extremist
political movements) will find to be an important resource for their work.
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The influence of perpetrators of massive violations of human rights does not vanish with
their death. This idea is so self-evident that it hardly seems to require further research. However,
La Muerte del Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa [The
Perpetrator’s Death. Interdisciplinary Reflections About Mass Murderers’ Dead Bodies] takes up
the challenge and sheds new light on several aspects of regime transition, transitional justice, and
the politics of memory. The volume, edited by Sévane Garibian, Professor of Law at the University
of Geneva and Associate Professor at the University of Neuchâtel, is a collection of chapters written
by authors from various backgrounds (historians, legal scholars, anthropologists, psychologists,
novelists) that brilliantly succeeds in drawing our attention to fascinating but hitherto neglected
issues.
In the volume’s introduction, Garibian underscores that while the literature has extensively
discussed the question of the death and burial of victims of mass violence, analysing the
perpetrators’ dead body is “a taboo within the taboo itself”1insofar as their death is hardly discussed
in the first place. Garibian introduces the three main questions around which the chapters are
articulated, namely the circumstances of the perpetrator’s death, “what to do with their remains?”
and “how to approach their legacy, the memory of their person and of their crimes?,” or their
“patrimonialization.”2 The first question is used to divide the book into three sections (“natural
death,” “judicial execution” and “extrajudicial killing”) that analyse case studies from various
geographical areas and historical periods. These are preceded by a discussion of the legality of
tyrannicide in international law. The status of this chapter as prologue seems rather odd since it
is only related to the third kind of perpetrator’s death. Including it in the third part of the volume
would have made more sense as it complements the other chapters, in particular those about the
death of Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi.
All the chapters are very informative and well-written, though their degree of engagement
with the issues outlined in the introduction and analytical depth varies. The first section of the
volume is entitled “Natural death, death under suspicion” to stress that its causes are often
contested or questioned (which may be used to present perpetrators as victims of injustice or
conspiracy), but also the fact that it means that perpetrators escape justice and accountability. The
section includes chapters about Pol Pot, Jean-Bédel Bokassa and Idi Amin Dada, Francisco Franco
and Augusto Pinochet, and Slobodan Milošević. The chapters about the Cambodian and African
dictators recount the circumstances of their death and explain how cultural and religious beliefs,
some of which pertain to the dead body, have shaped their surprisingly merciful memories. The
consequence of the perpetrator’s natural death are well highlighted by Milošević’s fate. Because
he died in prison a few days before the end of his trial, the truth about his role in the Balkan Wars
could not be officially established. Florence Hartmann refers to his “posthumous victory”3 insofar
1

Séviane Garibian, “Introducción: La muerte del verdugo o el tiempo incontable de su eternidad,” in La Muerte del
Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa, ed. Séviane Garibian (Buenos Aires:
Miño y Dávila editores, 2016), 25.

2

Ibid., 23.

3

Florence Hartmann, “La revancha póstuma de Slobodan Milosevic,” in La Muerte del Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias

Vincent Druliolle, “Book Review: La Muerte del Verdugo: Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa”
Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 3 (2018): 134-136. ©2018 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1521

Book Review: La Muerte del Verdugo

135

as Milošević will enjoy perpetual impunity, the truth about his crimes will remain partial, his
responsibility can still be denied, and both the victims’ work of mourning and reconciliation are
significantly hindered. In other words, he “wins several of the battles he had fought during his
life […] [and ends up killing] Justice and Truth.”4 Milošević’s dead body reflects how his death
represents a way out (muerte-escapatoria):5 no picture was ever seen and uncertainty surrounds
the site where Milošević is buried. Finally, the contribution by Rosa Ana Alija Fernández further
explores the relationship between the perpetrator’s dead body, truth and justice by comparing the
deaths of Franco and Pinochet. The author highlights the direct relationship between the dictator’s
dead body and the struggle for human rights and against impunity in both cases. Franco is buried
in a huge monument outside Madrid, el Valle de los Caídos (the Valley of the Fallen). Franco himself
had ordered its construction to celebrate his victory in the Civil War (1936-1939) and the works to
build it entailed the death of hundreds of Republican prisoners. Over the past two decades, several
actors have requested the transfer of Franco’s remains to another site in an attempt to recover the
site and resignify it, which has proved impossible. Alija Fernández argues that Franco’s mortal
remains symbolise the lack of a break with the past that characterised the Spanish transition to
democracy, and the legacy of the dictatorship in contemporary Spain. She astutely observes that
the demands to transfer Franco’s body have increased since Spanish courts ruled out the possibility
of judging his crimes, “as an alternative way of putting a symbolic end to impunity.”6 On the other
hand, though Pinochet had plans to have his own Valle de los Caídos built in Chile, he later decided
that his ashes would remain in a family mausoleum. Stressing the contrast with Franco, the author
underlines that the choice of a private burial site is the consequence of the political and judicial
struggle for memory and justice in Chile.
The second section focuses on judicial executions and has only two chapters. While the chapter
about Saddam Hussein’s death focuses mainly on the religious symbolism surrounding the
execution of “the Butcher of Baghdad” and the meanings of the footage of the event, Nicolas Patin
offers a historical perspective on the issues surrounding the treatment of the perpetrators’ dead
bodies by analysing the debates about the execution of the Nazi leaders sentenced to death after the
Second World War. He shows that the public character of the execution was seen as necessary to
avoid transforming perpetrators into martyrs and to symbolise the birth of a new political system.
Patin also critically engages with the idea that incinerating the perpetrators’ bodies and denying
them a burial (site) may prevent turning them into cult figures.
Finally, the third section is about extrajudicial killings or “death as vengeance.” Garibian is
interested primarily in the meaning and significance of the trial that led to the acquittal by a German
tribunal of the survivor of the Armenian genocide who killed Mehmet Talaat Pasha. The following
chapter by Didier Musiedlak about the mystery surrounding Mussolini’s death is very detailed
but fails to engage with the issues raised in the volume’s introduction. In her chapter, Muriel
Montagut is critical of the media and political leaders’ silence (or, rather, silent relief) following
the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi. She claims that the failure to condemn the cruelty of his death
and the degrading display of his body in an industrial freezer turns us from distant witnesses into
indirect accomplices and does not augur well for post-Gaddafi Lybia. The most challenging and
theoretically sophisticated chapter of the third section is Frédéric Mégret’s analysis of the “fugitive
death” of Osama Bin Laden. Drawing on Foucault, he argues that it is a practice that constitutes
and legitimises the knowledge and techniques of the so-called War on Terror at the same time as it
reaffirms the state’s sovereign power.
The chapters in La Muerte del Verdugo draw important lessons summarised by Garibian in
the introduction: “Natural death […] ‘makes [perpetrators] more human’ but does not repair.
Judicial execution […] condemns but does not demystify. [Extrajudicial killing] […] dishonours
Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa, ed. Séviane Garibian (Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila editores, 2016), 135.
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but does not pacify.”7 Besides, although it depends on a multiplicity of factors, the posthumous
transformation of perpetrators into cult figures is almost inevitable.8
The book is very enjoyable to read, though readers will likely lament the fact that it does
not include any pictures, which would have been particularly appropriate. The volume’s main
weakness is the confusion about what the chapters actually focus on. Indeed, some of them are
not so much about the perpetrators’ dead body—the book’s central theme—as about the pictures
or footage that immortalise it, the perpetrators’ grave or memorial, or simply his/her death.
Nevertheless, this may be one of the defects of volumes such as La Muerte del Verdugo that are
innovative and truly interdisciplinary contributions to the existing scholarship.
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With the recent migration crisis in the global North and the unrelenting pressure on host
countries in the global South where the vast majority of refugees continue to reside, Simon Turner’s
is a book that should be read widely. Turner’s careful ethnographic study of the micropolitics
unfolding in Lukole refugee camp for Burundian refugees in Tanzania remains one of the few books
offering an intimate portrait of daily life and conflicted politics of a refugee camp. By combining
the bird’s eye perspective with that of a close-up street view, Turner diverges from the removed
global economy analyses or the overly technical language of humanitarian reports by offering a
perspective that is both empirically rich and theoretically engaged.
Turner’s aim is to explore not how history creates conflict but how conflict creates histories
and how this relationship manifests in the space of the camp. As such, the book sits within an
emerging body of literature that challenges a one-sided Agambenian characterization of camp
inhabitants as “bare life” suspended in an exceptional state of limbo and an apolitical space of
exclusion. Research in conflict-affected areas such as Western Sahara or Eastern DRC has shown
that refugee camps are instead saturated with refugee politics, at extreme ends acting as quasistates or “practice polities.” While Turner doesn’t deny that liminality and exceptionality do define
the refugee camp, his picture is fundamentally one of ambiguity and he skillfully foregrounds the
interplay of “powers” in Lukole— between Tanzanian authorities and humanitarian agencies on
the one hand, and the refugees as they maneuver the space of the camp and construct their own
subjectivities. At the same time as they link the space of the camp with social and moral decay,
with experiences of status loss and emasculation (“UNHCR is a better husband”1 being fed by
“food distribution”2) Lukole’s inhabitants also strategically take advantage of new opportunities.
Chapter five excels in tracing concrete stories of such “liminal experts.”
In fact, the book is at its best when it discusses such paradoxes and ambiguities of camp
governance. Chapter three is especially strong on this, foregrounding the tensions between real
disempowerment faced by the refugees due to the restrictions and prescriptions (down to the form
and style of their blindé)3 imposed by the camp commandant and the humanitarian agencies, and
on the other hand the “empowerment” in form of participation promoted by the same agencies,4 or
the fact that indeed camp life did offer empowerment of sorts to its inhabitants by shaking up old
hierarchies and opening up new opportunities.
Turner’s careful study certainly succeeds in breaking down some of the pervasive stereotypes
surrounding the figure of the refugee and the space of the camp. The book challenges the notion
that the space of the camp is uniformly disempowering in chapter four by showing how the
politics of gender plays out differently for men and women, and across status lines. The book also
deconstructs the image of the refugee as a passive victim by foregrounding the politics of guilt
and the loss of innocence among the Hutu, who in the 1990s can no longer claim the mantle of
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“innocence” due to their own imbrications in violence inside Burundi. Through analysis of the
political parties operating in the camp in chapter six, the book breaks down the image of refugee
as an apolitical figure of a human in need. Turner’s distinct contribution here is his portrayal of
the camp as a political arena where different parties and ideologies compete for allegiance and
the ability to shape the historical narrative. Chapter six is a fascinating reflection on rumor as a
currency mediating this political competition.
Turner’s Politics of Innocence presents a key contribution to the study of camps and encampment,
in Africa and more widely. It builds on and extends the seminal work by Liisa Malkki5 who,
incidentally also working with Burundian refugees in Tanzania a decade prior, linked the space
of the camp to the production of strongly ethnonationalist historical narratives, narratives likely
to perpetuate rather than diffuse violence. But Malkki left camp politics aside, making it seem
that the narratives she gathered arose in a political vacuum. By contrast, Turner foregrounds
the fundamental ambiguity of the camp as both a space depoliticized through humanitarian
quasi-governance and hyperpoliticized through competition among political parties. Through
the struggle between the CNDD and Palipehutu, Turner persuasively shows that production of
history depends on power struggles in the space of the camp. The narratives of Hutu ethnic and
moral purity that Malkki collected could simply not arise again. The histories that emerged during
Turner’s time in the camp were not only conditioned by intra-Hutu political competition but also
constrained by the loss of the Hutu victim position through their own imbrication in violence in
the early 1990s and onwards.
Future work is needed to extend and systematize some of the insights that Turner offers in
his book. The experiences of women in the camp are notably missing. Accent is also primarily on
“big men” and the liminal experts benefitting from the opportunities of the camp rather than those
“sitting around” or bemoaning their loss of status. Going forward, more historical depth and a
comparative perspective would be useful in order to map out the historical transformation in the
experiences of Burundian encampment, the changing operation of political parties in exile and
across the different camps, and the circulation of refugees between the national space, the space of
the camp and other exilic spaces. Only such more systematic political exploration could deliver the
answer to the key question that Turner and Malkki open up to view: What is the relation between
the space of the camp, the production of history and the nature of nationalism that emerges in
exile? And how do these tie to the dynamics of ongoing conflict? If it is not Turner’s intention to
provide such broader-ranging investigation, it is certainly the merit of the book that it inspires us
to ask novel and more pointed questions about encamped experiences and their relation to both
conflict and peace building in a region that has seem some of the most entrenched and large-scale
violence of recent decades. The recent mass outflow of Burundians out of the country marks a new
chapter in the regional conflict-displacement nexus and further underscores the continued and
pressing relevance of the queries tackled in Turner’s Politics of Innocence.
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Simon Turner

University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
Andrea Purdeková, in her review of Politics of Innocence: Hutu Identity, Conflict and Camp Life,1
asks what the relationship is between the space of the camp, the production of history, and the
nature of nationalism that emerges in exile? And, she continues, “how do these tie to the dynamics
of ongoing conflict?”
These are important questions that go beyond the scope of my book. As she rightly points
out ‘more historical depth and a comparative perspective would be useful.’ Let me, however,
give some suggestions on the matter. In her seminal book Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory,
and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania,2 Liisa Malkki suggests that the kind of
ethnic nationalism she found in Mishamo camp, did not appear among the self-settled Burundian
refugees that she studied in Kigoma town. These apparently had a more cosmopolitan worldview.
Rather than cultivating roots and purity like the camp refugees, they were more rhizomatic in a
Deleuzian sense, living in the present and unconcerned with cultural purity. Malkki has indeed
been criticized for projecting her own ideals onto these town refugees. I am not able to judge
whether this is the case. I have, however, also done fieldwork among Burundian refugees who left
Lukole camp to try their luck in Nairobi. While the picture is not as clear-cut, as Malkki suggests,
several of the refugees suggested that they left the camp due to its saturation with politics, making
individual choices nearly impossible. On the one hand, Nairobi was the hub of communication
for opposition parties, while on the other hand, many chose to leave party politics and pursue
individual hopes for a better future elsewhere – often strongly attached to charismatic churches.3
These findings seem to support the idea that the refugee camp became a place for shaping
political ideologies—although I argue against Malkki’s findings that they must necessarily
be radically ethno-nationalist. One of the main arguments in the book is that there are several,
competing ideologies in the camp and that the dominant ideology was relatively ‘moderate’ and
democratic in its outlook. I argue in the book that the answer to this must be found in recent history
in Burundi and Rwanda, and therefore that we cannot see the camp in isolation from the outside
world and from the history of the region.
The findings also support the idea that refugees outside the camp are less shaped by such
political ideologies, although they also maintain relations with the camp and dreams of a different
future Burundi—and are therefore not merely rhizomatically living in the present.
So to answer Purdeková’s questions: the camps do indeed play a central role in shaping certain
political subjectivities that in turn shape the nature of conflict—and peace—in the region. And
while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
agencies seem to be oblivious to this fact and keep on treating refugees as innocent victims, other
actors in the region are well aware of the ways in which camps shape political subjectivities. I
have written elsewhere how the Rwandan state treated the returning refugees radically different
to the international community.4 Rather than perceiving the refugees as ‘bare life,’ lacking political
agency, the Rwandan state perceived them as what I have termed ‘bad life,’ containing harmful
political agency that could threaten the post-genocide nation and hence in need of re-education
in Ingando camps. Purdeková’s own book similarly demonstrates that the Rwandan state does
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not see its education camps as places for simply containing victims of history without agency, but
treats those who enter the Ingando camps as potentially having negative ideas that need removing
and replacing with new, patriotic mentalities.
In a sense, Purdeková and I both explore camps as sites of intense identity making. However,
the contexts and the foci of our work differ. The Ingando camps were created in the context of a
post-genocide regime that was acutely aware of the threat of ‘negative mentalities’ and bent on
creating subjects that were supportive of the new regime. The refugee camp, on the other hand,
existed in a context of international humanitarianism that is blind to political subjectivities and
more concerned with ‘pure victims’ devoid of agency—whether negative or positive.
In terms of focus, Purdeková primarily explores the camp from the outside, thus loosing out
on the negotiations and repositioning that might take place inside the camp, but demonstrating
nicely how the Ingando camps are part of a larger state building project. She is in other words,
making an important point about how camps are affected by the surrounding society and how
they in affect society. In my book, on the other hand, I have neglected this aspect as Purdeková
also remarks. Although I argue that ‘the camp was not an island unto itself’5 and show how the
conflict in Burundi followed the refugees into the camp, my focus was on the internal dynamics
of the camp, demonstrating that the refugees transformed the camp into something else than was
intended by its planners.
Both views are relevant and both are important, as much scholarships on camps makes
the double mistake of firstly treating camps as isolated entities and secondly assuming that the
policies of camp planning succeed. Our studies show that one should not assume either and that by
understanding camps—in their context as well as from the inside—we may understand a lot about
the constitution of society and its conflicts.
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Genocide scholars are of course familiar with the work of John K. Roth who has authored, coauthored, and edited numerous volumes on the Holocaust and other genocides. His most recent
book, The Failures of Ethics: Confronting the Holocaust, Genocide, and Other Mass Atrocities, may well
be his most insightful work yet. It is a work that deserves a careful reading by all of us in the field
of Genocide Studies, irrespective of disciplinary lens.
Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that he is resolute in confronting the horrors of genocide.
He quotes Emmanuel Levinas to the effect that “The Holocaust of the Jewish people under the
reign of Hitler…seems to me the paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, in which evil appears
in its diabolical horror.”1 He concludes his chapter on “God’s Failures” with a call for “no more
theodicy.” Roth explores the possibility that in an era of postmodern relativism the Holocaust
might well be a “negative absolute.”2 And following Jean Améry, Roth takes to heart the insight
that the Holocaust and other atrocities including rape and torture mark “the destruction of trust in
the world.”3 Yet like Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel—Roth acknowledges a deep debt to Wiesel—Roth
refuses to abandon hope. At the conclusion of Part I (of II) Roth writes:
’And yet . . . and yet,’ Elie Wiesel has said, ‘this is the key expression of my work.’ That
outlook should also be a key response to the failures of ethics, including God’s failures,
because life persists, history continues, and they embody so much that is good and precious,
so much that must not be abandoned—perhaps even God?—lest failure is compounded to
the point of no return.4

And Roth certainly strikes a similar albeit cautious message of hopefulness at the end of the
entire work. What then, are the failures of ethics that Roth discusses? For as he is right to claim,
“if ethics is to be a safeguard against its own failures, then people who try to be ethical have
to acknowledge the failures, own them when they should, and protest against them.”5 The first
failure he discusses is the problem and process of bystanding. Drawing from Wendy Lower6 and
Omer Bartov,7 among others, Roth draws attention to the scope of the problem—most Germans
during the Holocaust were neither perpetrators nor victims—and also problematizes the received
understanding of bystanders as entirely passive and without agency. He is surely right in claiming
“No single size fits all bystanders, but conditions for inclusion in that category involve knowledge
1
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and agency.”8 Many, if not most, of us have the power to in various ways challenge the scope and
depravity of genocidal violence.
A second failure is the abandonment of moral absolutes in favour of a postmodern, Nietzschean
celebration of the individual and the will to power as the source of value. A related problem is
that celebrating the individual as the source of all value risks abandoning our responsibility to and
for others. Roth is hesitant to call for the recovery of a religiously grounded moral absolutism—
something embraced by, among others, David Patterson.9 Roth seems forced to acknowledge that
“ethical outlooks” are social constructs with a history, but even so something like the Holocaust
can still serve as a negative absolute; in his view even a socially constructed ethics can still be
extremely powerful.10
The shortest chapter of the book, “Rape as Torture and the Responsibility to Protect”—a mere
fourteen pages—is nevertheless important for its recognition that rape and other forms of torture
have an as yet insufficiently understood enduring destructive potential: the ubiquity of rape as
a weapon of genocide prompted the Outcome Document of the United Nations World Summit
(2005),11 along with Resolution 2150.12 Roth, among others, remains sceptical about the efficacy of
the Responsibility to Protect initiative; he argues that a sense of “urgency and reality” might well
require attentive listening to the dead. He suggests that “listening to those ‘done to death’ by rape/
torture-as-policy in war and genocide, [might] improve the odds that moral motives will bite in the
ways we need them to do.”13
Additional chapters cover more familiar but nevertheless important topics. An additional
chapter calls for a trialogue among Jew, Christians, and Muslims to refocus attention on the
proscription of murder, a proscription at the heart of all three religions. He devotes a chapter to
“God’s failures” as well. Part II, “Resisting Failures,” adopts a more personal voice; “The Holocaust’s
impact on Christian-Jewish Relations” reads more like personal memoir. As a practicing Christian,
Roth has spent decades confronting Christian-Jewish relations and how European Jews such as
Elie Wiesel both understood and feared Christianity, and how “Christian understandings—better
identified as misunderstandings—of Judaism have produced immense suffering and sorrow.”14
Strongly influenced by Elie Wiesel—Roth published “Tears and Elie Wiesel”15 in 1972—Roth does
not shy away from the claim that but for centuries of Christian anti-Semitism the Holocaust would
not have happened.16
Roth makes a strong case for the failures of ethics, and there are many. And many of these
failures have their origins in philosophy itself. Philosophy is implicated in bystanding and
failing to protect; philosophy is similarly implicated in the logic of racism and the collapse of
moral absolutism. Reflecting on Kristallnacht and the destruction of the synagogue in the city
of Nentershausen, Roth claims: “A decisive failure of ethics, the destruction of the Torah scrolls
signified unbounded rejection of Jewish tradition, a ‘cleansing’ of the Ten Commandments and
their injunction against murder.”17 Given the scope and depth of these failures, how does Roth
propose, in his words, “resisting these failures?”18
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As mentioned earlier in this review, Roth proposes reconceptualising the status of bystanding
and recognizing that bystanding makes genocides possible. Moreover, bystanding involves some
degree of agency and therefore moral culpability. He also advocates giving moral traction to
the duty to protect, especially in the case of rape and torture, and deconstructing the concept of
race. More provocatively, and in the continuing reverberations of the Holocaust, Roth claims,
“Christians have yet to come to terms fully with the Holocaust’s implication that Christianity can
no longer take itself to be superior to Judaism.” This recognition needs to deepen for Christianity
to advance, and “such advancement,” claims Roth, would require profound changes in Christian
thought and practice.”19
A great and still growing body of scholarship is devoted to concerns over how best to define
genocide. Lemkin’s definition that was adopted as part of The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1948
has been and continues to be contested both as a juridical term and as a scholarly concept.20 Roth
wades into the definitional issues only briefly but suggests that what is needed is courage and
resolve. Roth claims that definitional conundrums aside,
“that genocide refers to a reality that deserves no more victories. Like so much else in human
experience, more than half the battle depends on the force of will to say, in spite of imperfect
definitions, that the most reliable evidence and straight forward clarity insist that genocide
is taking place there and must be stopped, or that genocide is likely to take place here and
must be prevented.”21

Roth’s chapter on “the politics of testimony” is especially illuminating for the recognition
that genocide testimony, in all its forms, “plunges one into abysmal darkness.”22 Here he quotes
Philip Hallie: “You cannot go down into hell with impunity. You must pay an entrance fee, and
an exit fee too.”23 The research of Lawrence Langer,24 for example, contravenes our platitudes
that good will prevail over evil or even that such testimonies can form a coherent narrative to
help make sense of things. Victim testimony for Langer gives knowledge that “does not unify,
edify, or dignify the lives of former victims.” 25 Yet for Roth, the abyss of the darkness that is
revealed in survivor testimony cannot be ignored. Contained in the abyss of darkness are glimmers
of hope. Citing Primo Levi’s Moments of Reprieve26 and the story of Lorenzo Perrone, Roth reminds
us that testimonies also provide “reminders of obligations and possibilities that can resist the
failures of ethics, even when it may seem hopeless to do so.”27 In the end, one cannot continue
to escape the moral responsibility of resisting the failures of ethics, and find meaning and joy
in doing so.
At times I found The Failures of Ethics somewhat frustrating to read owing to the brevity of the
arguments as they were cast. But then I was reminded of what Robert Pogue Harrison says of his
own book, The Dominion of the Dead. Harrison warns his readers that his book is not a writer’s book
but a reader’s book in that
“its articulation is full of empty spaces for the reader to enter and wander about in. It calls on
the interlocutor not only to think along with the author but to establish independent connections,
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leap over abysses, pursue his or her own paths of inquiry, bring to bear adventitious considerations,
and, through the tracings offered here, discover the topic for him-or herself.”28
Harrison’s description of the structure of his own book is also an apt description of Roth’s
book. Roth will not allow us to read his book as bystanders. Roth has written a reader’s book, and
that is what the best books are, after all.
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Shifting his focus from the German-Turkish question to one of the biggest taboos in Turkish
history, Fatih Akin continues digging deep in the racial-ethnic world-narratives. By honouring
the memory of those died during the infamous and often forgotten Armenian Genocide, The Cut
challenges the current ostrich policy to the Turkish ethnic cleansing that caused the death of about
1,5 million Armenians between 1914 and 1923.
After more than hundred years, the mass murder, deportation and systematic torture of
thousands of Armenians still form a less-known territory in the official historio-political European
discourse. The historical falsification and distortion causes a deep division between Turks and
Armenians, and builds tension between those countries that recognize the Genocide and those
who deny it. It is most probably because of this political tension that Akin decided to focus on the
emotional perspective of the genocide and avoided to put any emphasis on the socio-political and
historical context that embraces the tragedy.
The Cut follows the Armenian Nazaret Manoogian (Tahar Rahim) on his eight-year long
transatlantic journey from Mardin through Aleppo and Cuba to as far as North Dakota. The story
begins in 1915, when the blacksmith Nazaret, the father of two young twin-daughters, is forced
into slave labour by Ottoman command. Together with his Armenian mates, the family man must
build roads in the scalding desert, where they often witness Armenian groups marching through
the squally, dry landscape. Although it is unclear whether Nazaret is aware of the systematic
extermination of his folk, he tries his best to persevere and help his dying and tortured fellows.
One day however, he and his mates must meet their end and the small Armenian working group
gets executed. Luckily, Nazaret’s executioner is incapable of cutting the man’s throat, and only
wounds his neck, in this way helping the family man to survive the massacre. Although Nazaret
gets rescued by the Turkish soldier and later by a soap-maker from Aleppo, his wound makes him
mute, which only exacerbates his already hopeless and depressing situation. When he accidently
learns that his daughters might be still alive, he gains new strength and, sparing no effort to reunite with his family, goes on an endless journey to find his twins.
While trying to communicate via writing into his small notebook, Nazaret always finds Turks
and Armenians that help him on his journey. Thanks to this, he soon learns that his daughters
got married and moved to Cuba. In Cuba then, it turns out that the twins work in the United
States, which urges Nazaret to travel there as soon as possible. Despite his endeavour however, he
eventually loses track of his family and starts working at a railway construction in North Dakota.
We are in year 1923, when Nazaret overhears some Armenian songs coming from a small cottage
and learns that her twins might be in Ruso, some miles away. In the end, he mysteriously finds his
daughter on the icy-cold streets of the village, but the long-awaited reunification has a bittersweet
aftertaste for Nazaret soon learns that only one of his daughters survived the eight-year long ordeal.
As the story illustrates, The Cut is an ambitious, cosmopolitan production that was shot in
more than five countries with an international crew from all over the world. What Akin created
this way, is a global road-movie that, by using the Armenian Genocide as core of its narrative,
depicts a historical tableau of the early 20th century. Although the costumes, the design and the
landscape of the movie provide a spectacular glimpse into the era, the vision often annihilates the
personal motivation of the protagonist, who is illustrated as absolutely lost amidst the spotless
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historical design. The more the story progresses, the more unclear it is how Nazaret feels about his
own roots, own history, the death of his folks and the people who caused the massacre. Thanks
to this blurry mental map, the blacksmith gets absolutely objectified in the story, a part of the
historic design who, while walking great distances in the film sets, gets lost behind the beautifully
choreographed images.
Akin tries to stress the transformation of Nazaret through the man’s turning away from
Christianity, which constructs the very core to his Armenian identity. However, he keeps this line
too much on the surface, without explaining what Nazaret might think of his Saviour in the context
of the tragedies he witnessed. In the first sequences of the film, Akin depicts the man as deeply
religious who confesses his sins, prays before eating and stands for his Christian convictions when
the Turks ask them to convert to Islam. After contributing to the death of his sister-in-law in the
death camp of Ras-al-Ayn, Nazaret angrily throws stones in the air – as if aiming at Jesus – and
hopelessly tries to erase his cross-tattoo from his wrists with a stone. His endeavour to get rid of
the sign marks a turning point in the story and, together with the stone-motif, forms a metaphoric
structure in the film. Later, at the Turks’ march of shame in Aleppo, Armenian survivors throw
stones on the walking crowd but Nazaret, similar to his Turkish executioner, is morally incapable
of the act. Instead, being shocked of the image of a bleeding young Turkish boy, he quickly leaves
the march and returns to his shelter.
With representing the crimes and cruelty, as well as the helpfulness of both the Armenian and
Turkish folk, Akin tries his best to communicate a neutral standpoint in the film, thus urging both
sides to take moral responsibility for the happenings. Also, with the stone-motif, he often refers to
the Biblical message to throw back bread instead of stones, in this way to emphasize forgiveness
and moral compassion. Unfortunately, Akin’s mainly neutral point of view that is based on mercy,
erases the personal perspective of Nazaret to religion, who never talks about his relationship with
God. It is only in Cuba, where it becomes clear that the blacksmith has reckoned with his Christian
past. The father does not wait for his hosts’ pre-dinner prayer in Havana, nor is he willing to go
to church anymore. However, these smaller signs of Nazaret’s atheism are not exploited in depth,
which is most probably due to the very episodic narrative formula of the film that embraces too
many places in a time being way too short. Thanks to this structure that focuses on movement and
visuals instead of the very personal world of Nazaret, the films turns into a road-movie halfway,
thus shifting the emphasis from the Armenian genocide to a long flaneuring in the American
landscape.
Another point that makes the identification with Nazaret and his journey rather problematic,
and exacerbates his objectified position in the narrative, is his muteness that does not leave the
man any space for any verbal-emotional communication. This Biblical motif – God rendered
Ezekiel mute for seven and half years, which also corresponds to the length of Nazaret’s journey –
emphasises the already excluded position of the man. On the one hand, the blacksmith is member
to one of the ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire that puts him at the margins of the society
– existing outside the hegemonic power structure. In this Spivakian subaltern position, the only
way of Nazaret to be heard is to convert to Islam which, however, would mean to give up his
Armenian identity. He thus rejects the only opportunity to leave the camp and, such as Ezekiel,
gets muted by God. Nazaret thus takes on a double subordinated position. First, he is the Other is
the narrative, the inferior Armenian who is governed by the Turks who relocate him into the desert.
This dispossessed position is exacerbated by his muteness that puts him in an ever more vulnerable
and oppressed situation. He communicates by using Arabic, Turkish and English language and
completely ignores Armenian, the other pillar to his very identity. Deprived of his language, home
and religion, Nazaret becomes an absolutely homeless person and even more marginalized when
he travels to Cuba. In Havana, he does not know the language while, because of his muteness, he
cannot get a visa to the States. He drifts as a second-class citizen from one city to the other without
any stabile identity and legal status.
Nazaret’s in-between position recalls the marginalized position of the German-Turkish
director, which might be one of the reasons why Akin’s attention has shifted to the Armenian
question. Similar to Nazaret – his alter-ego – the director is subjected to the German law, while
he himself has a constant longing for the land of his parents, Turkey. In his fatherland, however,
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he is treated as an outsider for his German background, which results in an in-between, fractured
and torn identity-structure, depriving him of a full identification with Germany or Turkey. The
only way to acquire a pseudo-stable identity is to become a true cosmopolitan, constantly drifting
in space and time – a fluid position where Akin locates Nazaret. This might be an explanation
why all the Armenians speak English in the film. Avoiding the Armenian language and using a
very accented English throughout the film is most probably the biggest shortcoming of The Cut
that, only accelerates to the subaltern position of the characters and makes the identification with
Nazaret difficult.
His muteness, together with his minority-and-cosmopolitan position and the loss of his
religion, deprives Nazaret of his very Armenian identity that transforms the movie into a pseudoblockbuster cinema whose narrative reflects the aimless journey of a lost soul. In this Homerian
wandering, the landscape and its capturing in wide shots get special attention. Nazaret is often
portrayed against the barren, rocky and windy scenery of the desert and the icy, inhospitable hills
of the States. On the one hand, his long walks in the empty, austere landscapes signify his outsider
position – the wanderer who is rejected by the virgin environment – while the extreme long shots
that capture his stranger position put him into an even more isolated place. Nazaret’s physiognomy
and gestures that could help to understand his inner journey, and could overcome his muteness,
thus remain hidden from the spectator whose attention shifts to the landscape instead of the man’s
personal tribulation.
The beautifully choreographed images, the very detailed historic settings and the breathtaking sceneries of Jordan, Malta, Cuba and Canada are linked by a recurring Armenian folkmusic motif that accompanies the whole film. Together with the extended use of extras and the
very episodic structure that is built on textual references to signal the exact time and space of the
happenings, Akin’s story becomes a grandiose attempt to mimic the Oscar-winning Hollywoodformula. Unfortunately, the most important message, the Armenian Genocide gets scarified on
the altar of this ambitious experiment. Despite its shortcomings however – the pseudo-Hollywood
aesthetics, a huge lack of historical references and possible identification – The Cut deserves critical
attention for it is one of the first and bravest efforts to touch upon a taboo that deeply divides
nations. While there were attempts to represent the Armenian Genocide on screen, most directors
used the documentary genre (Eric Friedler’s Aghet, a Genocide, 2010) or only referenced the
massacre in feature films (Atom Egoyan’s Ararat, 2002), which makes Akin’s production a historiopolitical milestone in the representation of the systematic extermination of Armenians. The Cut
and the recently released American production, The Promise (Terry George, 2016) illustrate that the
collective remembrance on the Armenian Holocaust has just started, and the historical falsifications
and speculations can be finally addressed not only in literature, but in the cinema as well.
Title of the Film: The Cut; Director: Fatih Akin; Screenplay: Fatih Akin, Mardik Martin; Producers:
Fatih Akin, Karl Baumgartner, Reinhard Brundig; Music: Alexander Hacke; Cinematography:
Rainer Klausmann; Editor: Andrew Bird; Sound Designer: Zubin Sarosh; Cast: Tahar Rahim, Simon
Abkarian, Makram Khoury, Hindi Zahra, Kevork Malikyan, Bartu Küçükçaglayan; Country:
Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Poland, Canada, Turkey and Jordan; Year of Release: 2014;
Production Companies: Bombero International, Opus Film, Pandora Filmproduktion. Duration:
138 minutes.
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